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The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the contribution that the European Union (EU) 
could make to the prevention of addiction. The EU is empowered to support its Member States in 
the public health field through the adoption of legal acts, and has the power to regulate the internal 
market with public health goals in mind. Recent Treaty revisions has also recognised the EU’s role in 
the prevention of harm arising from tobacco and excess alcohol consumption.  
Yet, the EU has no addiction prevention strategy of its own, and the public health and social 
problems caused by addiction are barely mentioned in public health policy discourse at EU level. This 
thesis will argue that a renewed and more intense strategic approach to addiction prevention is 
needed across Europe, and especially at EU level, if the currently high prevalence of addiction is to 
be reduced. Addiction, it will be argued, is a complex problem, but one which is ultimately caused by 
the influence of the social environment. The right legal intervention can reshape this environment to 
weaken its influence upon individuals who are vulnerable to developing addictions. The thesis will 
argue that the EU has both the mandate and the legal capacity to contribute to such intervention, 
and will offer suggestions as to how such a contribution might be designed and defended. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the contribution that the European Union (EU) 
could make to the prevention of addiction. For over twenty years the EU has been empowered to 
support its Member States in the public health field through the adoption of legal acts. Since the 
turn of the millennium, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recognized that the EU 
legislature has the power to regulate the internal market with public health goals in mind. 
Moreover, for nearly a decade the EU has specifically had the power to adopt incentive measures 
that will prompt control of the markets for alcohol and tobacco, two common objects of addiction. 
These powers could be used to complement the work of the many EU Member States that have 
created dedicated addiction prevention strategies to try to halt the rising numbers of individuals 
who have developed an addiction.  
Yet, the EU has no addiction prevention strategy of its own, and the public health and social 
problems caused by addiction are barely mentioned in public health policy discourse at EU level. This 
thesis will argue that a renewed and more intense strategic approach to addiction prevention is 
needed across Europe, and especially at EU level, if the currently high prevalence of addiction is to 
be reduced. Addiction, it will be argued, is a complex problem, but one which is ultimately caused by 
the influence of the social environment. The right legal intervention can reshape this environment, 
in order to weaken its influence upon vulnerable individuals and communities. The thesis will argue 
that the EU has both the mandate and the legal capacity to contribute to such intervention, and will 
offer suggestions as to how such a contribution might be designed and defended.  
This introductory chapter will set the scene by laying out the public health context in which renewed 
EU action on addiction should be attempted, explaining the methodology that will be employed to 
conduct this analysis, and providing an overview of the chapters that this analysis will be divided 
into.    
I. Global public health context of the analysis 
In 2011, the global community committed, through the adoption of the United Nations Political 
Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases,1 to substantially increase 
the actions they were currently taking to reduce the world’s growing burden of non-communicable 
                                                          
1
 Resolution A/66/L.1 of the United Nations General Assembly.  
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disease.2 Non-communicable disease, or NCDs, is the general term given to chronic diseases that are 
not transmittable from one individual to another.3 Their causes are usually (not always, but usually) 
related to an individual’s lifestyle, and the four primary risk factors for the majority of NCDs are 
tobacco consumption, excessive alcohol consumption, excessive consumption of unhealthy foods 
and beverages, and lack of physical exercise.4 These factors are modifiable, which makes it possible 
to prevent the development of NCDs.5 However, far from being prevented, the prevalence of NCDs is 
still high – WHO figures suggest that in 2012, 38 million deaths, 63 per cent of all global deaths, were 
caused by NCDs, of which 40 per cent were premature deaths under the age of 70.6 In Europe, the 
burden of NCDs is particularly acute – 87 per cent of deaths and 77 per cent of the disease burden in 
Europe are attributable to NCDs.7  
 
The Political Declaration acknowledged that these statistics are unacceptable. Through it, heads of 
state and government recognised that ‘the global burden and threat of non-communicable diseases 
constitutes one of the major challenges for development in the twenty-first century’,8 that rising 
levels of non-communicable disease ‘can be largely prevented and controlled through collective and 
multisectoral actions by all Member States and other relevant stakeholders at the local, national, 
regional and global levels’,9 and that ‘urgent need for greater measures at the global, regional and 
national levels’10 is required.  
 
The political commitment of the Declaration was followed up by the adoption, under the auspices of 
the WHO, of a Global action plan for the prevention of NCDs,11 the purpose of which is to provide 
public policymakers with ‘a road map and menu of policy options’. It sets out 9 global NCD targets 
including a reduction of premature mortality from NCDs by 2025.12 This global call to action was 
followed by the adoption of regional action plans, including the Action Plan for implementation of 
                                                          
2
 On the rising global burden of non-communicable disease, see the Global action plan for the prevention and 
control of NCDs 2013-2020 (World Health Organization 2013). See also: A Daar et al, ‘Grand challenges in 
chronic non-communicable diseases’ (2007) 450 Nature 494.    
3
 See the WHO Factsheet on Noncommunciable diseases, available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs355/en/ (last accessed 25 July 2016).  
4
 Global action plan for the prevention and control of NCDs 2013-2020 (World Health Organization 2013), 1.  
5
 R Beaglehole et al, ‘Priority actions for the non-communicable disease crisis’ (2011) 377 Lancet 1438, 1438.   
6
 See the Global status report on noncommunicable diseases 2014 (World Health Organization 2014), xi.  
7
 Action Plan for implementation of the European Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable 
Diseases 2012-2016 (World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe 2012), document EUR/RC61/12, 1.  
8
 Resolution A/66/L.1 of the United Nations General Assembly, para 1.  
9
 ibid, para 33.  
10
 ibid, para 6.  
11
 Resolution 66.10 of the World Health Assembly, available online at 
www.int/nmh/events/ncd_action_plan_/en/. (last accessed 25 July 2016).  
12
 Global action plan, n 4 above, 1. 
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the European Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases,13 a strategy 
that had already existed14 before the surge in political recognition that current levels of action were 
insufficient.  
 
Although it is well recognised that NCDs have four main risk factors, it is less often acknowledged 
that three of the products implicated in these four risk factors, namely tobacco, alcohol and 
unhealthy foods and beverages, are also capable of becoming objects of addiction.  
 
The fact that many NCD risk factors can also be objects of addiction raises four further problems for 
NCD prevention. First, when products such as alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy foods are consumed 
as part of an addiction, the levels of consumption will be much higher even than consumption levels 
that are already classed as heavy and hazardous. Therefore, the health risks posed by products such 
as alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy foods are exponentially higher when they are consumed 
addictively, especially when the individual’s addiction causes them to ignore those health risks.15  
 
Second, addictions are often comorbid – meaning that once an individual has developed one 
addiction, the chanced of them developing further addictions at the same time is increased. An 
individual addicted to a product that is an NCD risk factor might also have a comorbid addiction to a 
product or service that is not an NCD risk factor. For example, there is significant comorbidity 
between gambling addictions and alcohol addictions.16 
 
Third, while heavy or hazardous consumption of objects such as alcohol, tobacco or unhealthy foods 
might be reduced in a relatively predictable way through intervention on the factors proximate to 
the consumption of those products, addictive consumption has a far wider causal nexus, some 
factors of which actively resist control by policymakers.17 Therefore the interventions required in 
order to prevent addictive consumption, as opposed to heavy and hazardous consumption, need to 
reach further and deeper than policymakers sometimes realise.  
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The fact that the majority of NCD risk factors are potential objects of addiction therefore makes the 
task of reducing the health burden of NCDs extremely complex. It is against this background of 
complexity that Member States, supported by the EU, must engage with the prevention of NCDs, 
and the phenomenon of addiction. This thesis will offer an analysis of the legal aspects of this 
process, and how legal intervention can be designed in accordance with available scientific in order 
to maximise its potential effectiveness as a tool of addiction prevention. The next section describes 
the methodology used to carry out this analysis.  
 
II. Methodology 
This thesis will attempt to illustrate how law is relevant to addressing complex public health and 
social problems, and how law could be reformed in order to better address that problem. It will 
therefore be necessary to draw upon a combination of epidemiological analysis, legal analysis and 
policymaking analysis.  
 
Epidemiological analysis will be relied upon to explain the nature of the addiction problem. If law is 
to be used in order to shape the environment in such a way as to improve the health of populations, 
the characteristics of that environment must be established. Public health epidemiology is ‘the study 
of the distribution and determinants of health-related state or events in specified populations’.18 As 
such, it provides the ‘ammunition for public health practitioners’19 to be able to address particular 
public health problems. An epidemiological approach will be used to identify the nature of the 
addiction phenomenon, and to identify the bodies of evidence that should inform the application of 
law to these problems. It will consequently be necessary to draw on a wide body of scientific 
literature that is relevant to the phenomenon of addiction, including literature from the 
psychological sciences, behavioral sciences, medical sciences and social sciences.  
 
Legal analysis will facilitate an explanation of why law is a legitimate tool through which policy 
makers should control environments that are likely to encourage the development of addictions. 
Since this thesis focusses on the contribution that the EU could make to addiction policy, legal 
analysis will focus upon the principles of EU constitutional and internal market law, drawing upon 
related literature for support, in order to identify the sources of EU legal power relevant to addiction 
                                                          
18
 J Last, ‘Epidemiology and ethics’ (1991) 19(3-4) Law, Medicine and Health Care 166, 166.  
19
 J Lomas, ‘Social capital and health: implications for public health and epidemiology’ (1998) 47(9) Social 
Science and Medicine 1181, 1181. 
 25 
prevention, and how these powers might be exercised. The legal analysis will also have to explain 
why particular laws should be made in order to achieve particular goals. This involves drawing upon 
a research tradition that has been identified as public health law research. Public health law 
research can be defined as ‘the scientific study of the relation of law and legal practices to 
population health’.20 Unlike the doctrinal legal analysis above, public health law research is 
‘concerned not with what is right, proper, or legitimate to include within the jurisdiction of public 
health law but with whether law can be empirically shown to have an impact on the health of the 
population’.21  Drawing on public health law research literature will therefore add a socio-legal 
perspective to the analysis, facilitating and explanation of why certain legal interventions are 
appropriate to solve certain public health and social problems.  
 
Finally, policy analysis will be used as a tool to explain how legal interventions designed to prevent 
addiction are to be adopted. Policy analysis can be understood as ‘a process of multidisciplinary 
inquiry aiming at the creation, critical assessment, and communication of policy-relevant 
information’.22 It is a ‘problem solving discipline’ which ‘draws on social science methods, theories 
and substantive findings to solve practical problems’.23  As such, a policy analysis approach will be an 
effective lens through which the practical policymaking aspects of addiction prevention can be 
examined. The policy analysis of this thesis will draw upon policy design literature, problem 
definition literature, literature on the politics of public health, and governance literature.  
 
Just as addiction is a complex problem, the analytical approach used to dissect it is necessarily a 
complex one. The above three methodological approaches will be therefore used in a 
complimentary way throughout the thesis, which will attempt to weave together different 
perspectives on addiction scholarship to produce a coherent explanation of why law should be 
relevant to addressing the addiction phenomenon.  
III. Chapter Overview 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters – the current introductory chapter, seven substantive 
chapters, and a concluding chapter. Chapters two, three and four will provide the theoretical 
foundations for the analysis of how legal intervention can most effectively contribute to addiction 
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prevention. Chapters five and six will analyse the current state of addiction prevention at the 
Member State and EU levels. Chapter seven and eight will then examine how a more intense legal 
approach to addition prevention might be designed and implemented, with a particular focus on the 
EU level. 
 
Chapter Two starts by surveying the literature on the three main theories of addiction – the disease 
model, the free will model and the environmental determinants model. It will conclude that an 
environmental understanding of addiction provides the best explanation of what the phenomenon 
is, but that something further is needed to explain how addictions are developed. Thus, an 
addictiogenic environment model of addiction development is set out, arguing that the development 
of any addiction consists of three elements – the experience of social dislocation, the capacity to 
form a pseudo-relationship, and the potential for vocational consumption. The analysis throughout 
the rest of the thesis will be conducted upon the understanding that the environmental factors that 
promote social dislocation, encourage pseudo relationships and facilitate vocational consumption 
are the root of the addiction problem.  
 
Chapter Three will set out the normative justifications for the use of law in controlling the factors of 
the addictiogenic environment. Two normative cases for action will be put forward – the existence 
of the right to health in international law, and the ethical obligations that are placed on public 
authorities by the stewardship and social justice principles.  
 
Chapter Four will complete the theoretical foundations of the thesis by setting out why the EU 
should and could contribute to controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment through 
legal intervention. After first explaining why EU policymakers should take responsibility for 
addressing transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment, the chapter will analyse three 
legal bases for EU action, Article 168 TFEU (the public health competence), Article 153 TFEU (the 
social policy competence) and Article 114 TFEU (the internal market competence). This analysis will 
reveal the extent to which the Treaties empower the EU to contribute towards the control of the 
addictiogenic environment for the purposes of preventing the development of addictions.    
 
Chapter Five will utilise the theoretical foundations provided in the previous chapters to assess the 
degree to which current Member State approaches to addiction prevention are likely to result in 
effective legal intervention. The addiction strategies of three Member States – Germany, France and 
Spain – will be examined, in order to determine whether their supposedly comprehensive addiction 
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policies are likely to produce a sufficiently comprehensive response to the addictiogenic 
environment. It will be shown that none of these Member State have been able to capture the full 
complexity of the addictiogenic environment, despite it being possible to identify best practice for 
achieving this across the three Member States’ approaches.  
 
Chapter Six will then examine the extent to which the EU has supported its Member States in 
tackling the factors of the addictiogenic environment. Since the EU has adopted a sectoral approach 
to addiction policy, three fields of policy will be analysed – tobacco, alcohol and gambling – and an 
assessment made of the strength of the EU’s contribution towards effective legal control of the 
addictiogenic environment. It will be shown that the EU has failed to discharge its responsibilities for 
tackling transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
Chapter Seven will build upon the findings of the preceding two chapters, and will put forward 
suggestions for how a more intense strategic approach to addiction might be designed. It will argue 
that renewed strategic intervention on addiction must be guided by clear goals and appropriate 
policy paradigms, and will discuss specific examples of legal intervention that could be considered by 
EU policymakers as part of a more intense approach to addiction prevention.   
 
Chapter Eight will identify the challenges that will be faced in attempting to implement legal 
intervention that is more intense than what has previously been attempted. The chapter will argue 
that addiction industries will oppose strong addiction interventions in two important ways – first 
through the agenda-setting power they have accumulated in the policymaking process, and second 
through the fundamental rights challenges they might make to addiction interventions. It will be 
argued that policymakers can find ways to overcome both of these hurdles.  
 
Chapter Nine, the concluding chapter, will summarise the lessons that can be drawn from the 
analysis conducted in the main body of the thesis. It will highlight the salient points that national, 
and in particular EU level, policy makers should direct attention to when engaging with the problem 
of the addictiogenic environment, and will suggest next steps for moving the current situation 
forward.  
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CHAPTER TWO – THE ADDICTION 
PROBLEM 
I. Introduction 
In order to correctly frame the analysis of how addiction is being addressed now, and how it might 
be addressing in the future, the nature of the addiction problem must be identified. The 
development of addictions constitutes a serious public health and social problem in Europe. 
Statistics from the European Health Interview Survey show that an average of 24 per cent of EU 
citizens are daily cigarette smokers.24 According to the report Alcohol in Europe conducted for the 
European Commission, an estimated 23 million Europeans are addicted to alcohol in any one year.25 
Furthermore, the Commission’s Communication on Online Gambling notes that between 0.5 and 3 
per cent of the European population has a gambling addiction,26 which in absolute terms equates to 
between 2.54 and 15.24 million people. As Chapter One highlighted, if one develops an addiction to 
a product that is an NCD risk factor, the health consequences can be extremely severe. However, 
development of NCDs is not the only harm that may result from an addiction, and substances such 
as alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy foods, are not the only harmful addictive objects. Gambling 
addictions can lead to a variety of serious mental conditions including major depression and bipolar 
disorder, and are also linked to suicide attempts, family dysfunction and domestic violence.27 
Addictions to Internet based social networking sites can lead to serious social harms, such as the 
undermining of self-esteem and negative consequences in romantic relationships.28 Moreover, 
research suggests that simply leading an addicted lifestyle is harmful to individuals – for example, 
the stigmatisiation attached to addiction prevents many addicted individuals from seeking 
assistance.29 
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Addiction cannot therefore be ignored – there is a link between the development of addictions and 
the development of NCDs, and a link between addiction development and a wide range of other 
health and social harms. In order to prevent the harms that can result from the development of any 
addiction, the phenomenon of addiction itself must be examined, to uncover what ‘addiction’ is, and 
how it is developed.  
 
The first section of this chapter will explore how addiction has been theorised, and will argue that 
environmental theories, specifically the social dislocation theory, best explain what addiction is. The 
second section will build on the social dislocation theory, proposing that an expanded social 
dislocation theory – the addictiogenic environment model – could be used to explain how addictions 
develop.  
II. Explaining what addiction is and how it is caused 
The scientific, sociological, political, legal and economic literatures have been grappling with the 
nature of addiction for some time.30 The fact that it is common for individual to be addicted to two 
or more completely different objects at the same time31 has prompted scholars to recognise an 
underlying addiction phenomenon, a ‘shared etiology’32 that explains the fact that ‘many 
commonalities occur across different expressions of addiction’.33 If one accepts the proposition that 
the causes of any particular addiction – whether it is to alcohol, tobacco, the Internet, or anything 
else – are essentially the same mechanism, then one must explain what this mechanism is. Theories 
on the mechanism underlying the development of addictions generally fall into one of three camps: 
theories that addiction is a disease; theories that addiction is a consequence of personal 
characteristics; and theories that addiction is a response to environmental conditions. These groups 
of theories will be explored in the sections below.  
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A. Disease theories 
The theory that addiction is a disease is perhaps the oldest. The central argument of all disease 
theories is that individuals are not responsible for the behaviour that they exhibit, either because 
they are biologically predisposed to addiction, or because ingestion of a substance has co-opted 
their biological functioning.34 Several variants have emerged over the years, from claims that 
addiction is a disease of morals, to claims that addiction is a physiological disease characterised by 
cycles of tolerance and withdrawal, to claims that addiction is a neurological condition.35  
 
Since the 1990s, when advances in neuroimaging permitted scientists to study the human brain far 
more accurately, theories of addiction as a disease have focussed on the co-option of brain function 
by various substances.36 One of the foremost proponents of this theory of addiction, Alan Leshner, 
wrote that ‘virtually all drugs of abuse have common effects, either directly or indirectly, on a single 
pathway deep within the brain’37 – the brain’s reward system – and ‘activation of this system 
appears to be a common element in what keeps drug users taking drugs’.38 He argued that ‘the 
addicted brain is distinctly different from the nonaddicted brain’ and that the fact ‘that addiction is 
tied to changes in brain structure and function is what makes it, fundamentally, a brain disease’.39 A 
multitude of different studies have subsequently produced evidence that apparently supports the 
view that co-option of brain circuitry by a substance is responsible for causing addictive behaviour.40  
 
However, despite advances in neuroscience, and the mountain of scientific studies produced to 
support the disease model of addiction, an explanation of addiction as a biological disease is 
unsatisfactory. As Reinarman points out, ‘despite deceases of research, the biological basis for 
addiction-as-disease remains elusive’.41 Quite simply, although there seems to be a mountain of 
scientific evidence that is raised in support of the disease model, this evidence does not conclusively 
show that sustained ingestion of substances, irrespective of what they are, will consistently alter 
human biology in a way that produces addictive behaviour.42 Hall and colleagues argue that the 
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evidence adduced to support addiction as a disease is problematic for five reasons – the chronic 
nature of the disease is unsupported, the fact that animal studies are a poor reflection of human 
behaviour, the fact that genetic studies are not informative, the fact that bias exists in neuroimaging 
sample sizes, and the sheer complexity of the neurobiology of addiction.43  
 
If evidence raised to support the disease theory of addiction does not particularly bear out the 
theory, taking a step back from biological functioning shows that biology is only one facet of the 
addiction phenomenon. As Satel and Lilienfeld argue, biological brain function is not the only factor 
implicated in the development of addictions,44 and as Dingel et al argue, reducing the addiction 
phenomenon to a matter of neuroscience overlooks the ‘complex biopsychosocial context’45 in 
which addiction arises. Furthermore, as Reinarman points out, the more times the disease model of 
addiction is re-approached, redefined and reapplied, including being applied to objects of addiction 
that are not substances at all, the more the notion of an addiction ‘disease’ is shown to lack any 
theoretical credibility.46  In summary, the disease model of addiction is an overly one-dimensional 
way of approaching the complex phenomenon of addiction, and cannot sufficiently explain how or 
why individuals might develop addictions.    
 
B. Free will theories 
A second group of theories claim that addiction is not a disease, but a failure of free will, a 
consequence of certain personal characteristics overcoming others in the determination of 
behaviour. One of the leading proponents of the free will theory of addiction has been Jeffrey 
Schaler, who has argued that ‘humans are capable of deliberate action in pursuit of chosen goals’.47 
His view is that since ‘all such voluntary human action is ultimately under conscious control’,48 the 
adoption and cessation of addictions are voluntary, conscious choices. Others have taken the free 
will theory even further, to argue that the term ‘addiction’ does not merely describe a life choice, 
but is a social construct49 created by dominant social groups, who see fit to categorise a set of 
choices that do not conform to the group’s expectations of restraint and social compliance as a 
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harmful decision to forego self-control.50 Thus, the argument made by proponents of the free will 
model is that addiction is the consequence of a socially undesirably choice to relinquish control over 
behaviour. 
 
As with the disease model, scientific evidence is available to support the theory that ‘thoughts, 
desires, values and other mental phenomena can dominate bodily functions’51 and lead to a loss of 
control. For example, proneness to ‘deviant’ patterns of behaviour predicts addictive behaviour,52 as 
does impulsivity as a personality trait,53 as does shyness and internality (the degree to which 
individuals believe they have control over their lives) as a psychological belief.54  
 
Furthermore, a free will theory of addiction explains several aspects of the addiction phenomenon 
that cannot be explained by the disease model. First, it explains why most objects of addiction tend 
to be pleasurable, even if their consumption is not normally or not always harmful to health. 
Pleasurable or visceral products and services55 are often objects of hedonistic consumption, a type 
of consumption that is associated with ‘the search for instant gratification’.56 Such a consumption 
ideology has often been viewed with distaste or disapproval by dominant social groups throughout 
history,57 and thus objects that lend themselves to hedonistic consumption have often been branded 
as ‘addictive’, and those who are perceived to consume them in excess are branded as ‘addicts’. 
Good examples of objects of pleasure and hedonism that are not inherently harmful yet are often 
branded as ‘addictive’ are sexual activity58 or online shopping.59 
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Consequently, the free will theory suggests that novel products or services, the use of which disrupts 
societally accepted norms of control and restraint, are likely to be pejoratively branded as 
“addictive”, in an attempt to re-impose an element of societal control that is perceived to have been 
lost, even if those products are in most cases completely benign.60 
 
The theory that addiction development is linked to free will is also better at explaining why addicted 
individuals often moderate their behaviour without any form of medical intervention or other form 
of external physical assistance.61 Furthermore, it provides a more believable explanation for why 
addictions tend to be comorbid, why addictions to substances are often comorbid with behavioural 
addictions as noted above, and why addictions are also often comorbid with mental health 
conditions.62    
 
We could draw some interesting lessons about addiction from the free will theory, particularly in 
relation to how the concept has been employed by some as a tool of social control. However, it too 
is flawed as a method of explaining what addiction is and how it is generated. Beyond the lose 
assertion that some objects are pleasurable and therefore invite a loss of control, the free will model 
does not provide any solid explanation as to exactly how and why an absence of will power, or the 
possession of certain personal characteristics, will lead to addictive behaviour. Impulsivity, deviance 
and shyness may indeed be correlated with addiction, however this does not prove that impulsive, 
deviant or shy people will become addicts. A person that is impulsive for example, will not be more 
likely to develop an addiction simply because they are impulsive. Rather, there must be hidden third 
variables present in the studies conducted on behavioural traits and addiction. For example, 
impulsivity may exacerbate an individual’s reaction to a third variable, making it more likely that 
impulsive individuals exposed to this variable will develop addictions, yet the study itself will not 
necessarily reveal what this variable is. The free will model is thus useful for understanding the 
sociological framing of addiction, but cannot truly explain the mechanism behind the phenomenon. 
A good illustration of this is that the free will theory of addiction has no response when applied to 
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the great number of individuals who are intent upon, even desperate, to end their addictions, but 
cannot.63  
 
In any event, the free will theory cannot hope to provide a satisfactory explanation for the addiction 
phenomenon because, like the disease theory, it takes too narrow a perspective on a complex 
phenomenon that ‘may be construed in terms of biological, social or psychological processes, or 
some combination of these’.64 Attempting to explain a complex social phenomenon using a theory 
derived from the fact that ‘people think of themselves or others … to be morally responsible for 
something’,65  when ‘people differ in their reasoning and intuitions around attributing causality to 
psychological and neurological mental states’66 will only ever produce ‘vigorous debates concerning 
the moral status of both addiction and the addicted person’.67 Vigorous debates on moral status are 
not sufficient evidence on which to found legal intervention. Free will theories are therefore not 
helpful in explaining the aetiology of addiction, but rather only add to the ‘conceptual confusion 
created by [hundreds of] years of moral discourse around addicted persons’.68  
 
C. Environmental theories 
Since the phenomenon of addiction cannot be adequately explained by the disease theory of 
addiction or the free will theory of addiction, some scholars have developed a third set of theories – 
environmental theories of addiction. These theories argue that it is in fact an individual’s 
environment that stimulates the development of addictions. Several interesting variants have been 
put forward. Shaffer and colleagues contend that addiction is a ‘syndrome’, a cluster of symptoms 
and signs related to an abnormal underlying condition’,69 that can result from a combination of 
‘individual vulnerability levels, object exposure, and object interaction’.70 They contend that 
‘throughout the course of development, people encounter and accumulate specific combinations of 
neurobiological and psychosocial elements that can influence their behaviour’.71 Essentially, Shaffer 
and colleagues argue that addiction is a product of the totality of an individual’s specific life-course 
experiences, and not simply a product of altered brain chemistry or lack of willpower. This would 
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tend to explain why one group of people who consume addictive objects will become addicted and 
another group who consume them at similar levels will not. It would also explain why addictions are 
often comorbid, why some addictions are easily overcome while others are not, and the diversity of 
objects that individuals can become addicted to.  
 
Gifford and Humphreys conceptualise addiction in a similar way. They argue that addiction is ‘the 
action of multi-dimensional individuals behaving in a particular fashion in certain contexts’.72 
According to their theory, an individual’s ‘social context serves as both a risk factor and protective 
factor for substance use, playing and important role in addiction’s initiation, escalation, maintenance 
and relapse; and conversely in its prevention, treatment and long-term resolution’.73 Social contexts 
that can play a role in the development of addictions include ‘the family, provider-patient 
relationships, treatment environment, peer groups and friendship networks, work settings, self-help 
organisations, neighbourhoods and cultural groups’.74 Thus, the addiction phenomenon can be 
explained according to Gifford and Humphreys by looking to the quality and interaction of an 
individual’s social relationships.  
 
The advantage of environmental theories of addiction is that they approach the phenomenon in  
more holistic manner. They argue that addiction should be understood as a deeply complex 
response to life conditions, rather than a simple biological reaction, or a simple absence of 
willpower. Of all the environmental theories that have been put forward, the most detailed is Bruce 
Alexander’s dislocation theory of addiction,75 which will be considered below.  
 
In essence, Alexander’s theory is that the natural consequence of the globalisation of free market 
ideals is widespread social dislocation, and that addiction is an adaptation to cope with the 
experience of social dislocation. Alexander begins from the proposition that humans ‘are not 
psychologically self-sufficient’ and ‘in every culture devote themselves to establishing and 
maintaining a place in their society’.76 In return, society ‘gives as much latitude as [it] can to 
individuals’ unique preferences and needs for autonomy, but always within limits that allow each 
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subgroup to carry out its essential economic and social functions’.77 Alexander identifies this 
‘complex, ever-changing state of interdependence’ in evolved human society as ‘psychosocial 
integration’, defined as ‘a profound interdependence between individual and society that normally 
grows and develops through each person’s lifespan’.78  He argues that while there are many ways to 
build psychosocial integration, there are just as many ways to destroy it. Alexander identifies an 
‘enduring lack of psychosocial integration’ caused by psychological and social separation from one’s 
society’ as ‘social dislocation’.79 
 
Alexander’s theory then argues that ‘globalisation of free-market society has produced an 
unprecedented, worldwide collapse of psychosocial integration’.80 Over thousands of years, human 
civilisation has evolved a balance between social cooperation and individual expression.81 Free 
markets ideals however encourage ‘intense, unrelenting individual competition’ between ‘individual 
economic actor[s], pursuing his or her individual enrichment’.82 If these ideals are to be pursued 
successfully, humans are required to abandon social ideals of cooperation and support. The 
consequence of asking one (the human need for social cooperation) to exist within the other 
(‘minimally regulated competitive markets’83), is, according to Alexander’s social dislocation theory, 
‘a general breakdown of psychosocial integration … producing mass dislocation in every stratum of 
world society’.84  
 
Social exclusion is one key way in which the operation of the free market will cause a breakdown in 
psychosocial integration, leading to social dislocation.85 Social exclusion has been summarised 
emotively by Wilkinson, who also provides a good picture of how it can result from intense free 
market competition between human beings:  
 
‘To feel depressed, cheated, bitter, desperate, vulnerable, frightened, angry, worried about 
debts or job and housing insecurity; to feel devalued, useless, helpless, uncared for, 
hopeless, isolated, anxious and a failure: these feelings can dominate people’s whole 
experience of life … The material environment is merely the indelible mark and constant 
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reminder of the oppressive fact of one’s failure, of the atrophy of any sense of having a 
place in a community, and of one’s social exclusion and devaluation as a human being’.86 
 
The experience of social exclusion is therefore an important conduit through which free market 
competition creates the breakdown of psychosocial integration and the experience of social 
dislocation. Those who cannot keep up with the pace of competition – or are not in a position of 
advantage to be able to capitalise on what the market offers – are left behind by society, an 
outcome that is made more likely the more disadvantaged one is to begin with.87 Social exclusion, 
while important, is not the only process that can lead to the breakdown of psychosocial integration 
though. Advantaged individuals are also at risk of developing addictions through a breakdown of 
psychosocial integration, for different reasons – for example, some have argued that factors such as 
pressure to achieve and isolation from parents may underpin a breakdown in psychosocial 
integration in children from affluent neighbourhoods.88 These findings can just as plausibly be 
connected to the materialistic, competitive culture that is promoted by the free market. 
 
Based upon the fact that free market competition can lead to the experience of social dislocation, 
Alexander’s theory argues that individuals ‘often adapt to the anguish of sustained dislocation by 
devoting themselves to narrow lifestyles that function as substitutes for psychosocial integration’.89 
Alexander identifies this narrow lifestyle as an addiction – addiction is therefore ‘neither a disease 
nor a moral failure, but a narrowly focussed lifestyle that functions as a meagre substitute for people 
who desperately lack psychosocial integration’.90 This theory finds support in the literature on 
negative affect and addiction – for example, Uusitalo and colleagues have argued that ‘affect 
conspires with [an individual’s] thinking and reasoning in support of choosing addictive behaviour’91 
where ‘existing negative affects such as depression, anxiety, restlessness, irritability or shame raise 
the expected utility of behaviours that offer the agent an escape from the present misery’.92 
Addiction is therefore explained according  to Alexander’s theory as an adaptation – not a biological 
reaction, or a personality failure, but a behavioural response to maximise well-being and survival 
chances in circumstances of acute discomfort and adversity.   
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Adaptation as a coping mechanism for social dislocation explains many of the curious features of 
addictive behaviour. It can explain why individuals cannot escape some addictions despite an 
intense desire to do so – if these individuals cannot build sufficient psychosocial integration, then 
‘without their addictions, they would have terrifyingly little reason to live’.93 The converse of this 
also explains why addictions can suddenly be overcome, without any apparent outside intervention. 
The adaptation to dislocation theory explains why individuals can become addicted to substances or 
behaviours. It also explains why individuals who to all intents and purposes have wealthy, well-off 
lifestyles can develop addictions as easily as those living in poverty – adaptation to an addictive 
lifestyle can be both ‘more sustaining than the unrelenting torment of social exclusion and 
aimlessness’ and ‘a sense of meaning for affluent [individuals] bereft of richer purposes’.94 The 
theory also helps to explain why some people in stressful life circumstances do not develop an 
addiction, yet others do – ‘only chronically and severely dislocated people are vulnerable to 
addiction’.95 
 
The adaptation to dislocation theory has many advantages for explaining addiction, yet it too, by 
Alexander’s admission, cannot explain every vagary of the addiction phenomenon. For example, it 
cannot explain why individuals suffering similar dislocation will turn to different addictive objects, or 
why similarly dislocated individuals may or may not find a way out of their addiction.96 Just as the 
disease model could not explain why addictions develop, and the free will model could not explain 
how addictions develop, Alexander’s social dislocation model raises further questions regarding the 
process of adaptation. How exactly do potential objects of addiction provide the adaptive 
relationship that a socially dislocated individual seeks? As West reminds us, no theory can fully 
explain the addiction phenomenon due to ‘unavoidable ambiguities in many of the concepts and the 
difficulty in ruling out competing explanations’.97 However, Alexander’s theory can be developed in 
order to build a more complete picture of addiction. The next section therefore presents an 
expanded model for addiction development that attempts to accurately capture not just the nature 
of addiction, but the process through which it is developed. 
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III. The addictiogenic environment – a modified social dislocation 
model of addiction 
As Alexander explains, ‘although only dislocated people become addicted, many severely dislocated 
people live and die in ways that cannot be called “addiction”’.98 This section will argue that an 
expanded version of Alexander’s social dislocation model – the addictiogenic environment model of 
addiction development – could potentially explain the circumstances in which the experience of 
dislocation is likely to lead to addiction.   
 
Consider the existence of a specific set of environmental factors that promote, encourage and 
facilitate the development of addictions. This set of factors could be called the addictiogenic 
environment, and could be mapped to three basic elements of addiction development. One is social 
dislocation. The other two elements are the capacity to build pseudo-relationships, and the potential 
to engage in vocational consumption. The model, represented graphically in Figure 1 below, holds 
that if factors within an individual’s environment are strong enough to promote their experience of 
social dislocation, encourage them to develop pseudo-relationships with potential objects of 
addiction, and facilitate their vocational consumption of such objects of addiction, an addiction is 
likely to be developed. All three elements – social dislocation, a pseudo-relationship, and the 
opportunity for vocational consumption – are necessary to the development of an addiction. The 
following sections present a more detailed explanation of the model.   
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A. ‘Promote factors’ of the addictiogenic environment 
The meaning of social dislocation was explained in detail above in the context of Alexander’s theory. 
From the perspective of an addictiogenic environment model, certain specific factors within an 
individual’s environment will actively promote the experience of social dislocation.   
 
‘Promote factors’ of the addictiogenic environment are often found in poorly designed social 
institutions and support structures, which then foster unsupportive or stressful social environments 
that cause individuals to lose psychosocial integration, and potentially experience social 
dislocation.99 For instance inequality in social support for minority groups, underdeveloped 
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understanding of and support for mental health illnesses,100 and ineffective approaches in 
redeveloping deprived areas101 all worsen what are already difficult circumstances to the point that 
they may become unbearable for the individual experiencing them. Further examples might include 
the way in which the social class hierarchy is perceived by individuals, which can lead to very low 
subjective perceptions of social standing, generating high levels of stress and negative psychological 
functioning.102 Moreover, social protection structures that, for example, ensure that an individual 
has access to sufficient housing may, if organised poorly, actually reduce the level of control that 
people have over their lives, generating high levels of stress, which can lead to the loss of 
psychosocial integration and social dislocation.103  
 
In general, as Marmot and colleagues put it, the fact that an individual’s social environment could 
promote the experience of social dislocation, and the fact that these experiences are unequally 
distributed within the population, ‘is not in any sense a natural phenomenon but is the result of a 
combination of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and bad 
politics’.104 The organisation of social structures and institutions in ways that do not generate 
opportunity and do not support vulnerable or excluded individuals, and the way in which social 
inequality amongst the population exacerbates this,105 therefore must be seen as factors of an 
addictiogenic environment.  
 
B. ‘Encourage factors’ of the addictiogenic environment 
In addition to factors that promote social dislocation, the addictiogenic environment is also 
comprised of a group of factors that encourage the development of pseudo-relationships between 
socially dislocated individuals and potential objects of addiction. Individuals that are searching for a 
way to adapt to social dislocation are searching for some experience that will act as a ‘partial 
substitute for the psychosocial integration that the addicted person has lost’, and with which it is 
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possible to develop a ‘strong attachment’.106 If an individual is able to form a pseudo-relationship 
with an object, a form of emotional bond that will provide ‘some real psychosocial gratifications’,107 
and to which they can dedicate a narrowly focussed lifestyle, an addiction to that object is likely to 
be formed.  
 
Objects are likely to sustain a pseudo-relationship, for example, when engagement with them entails 
participation in some form of subculture or group consumption that provides opportunities for 
human interaction and a sense of belonging.108 Objects are also likely to sustain pseudo-
relationships if individuals feel that they can depend upon them or their effects whenever needed, in 
the face of the volatility of the rest of their life.109 Objects whose use enables the initiation of the 
individual into a special ‘language’ of consumption, thus fostering a sense of ownership or 
specialness, will also be apt to sustain pseudo-relationships.110 As a final example, objects will 
sustain pseudo-relationships if they project a sense of personality or emotional identity with which 
the individual wishes to associate.111  
 
Accepting that individuals will seek to form pseudo-relationships with objects when they cannot 
establish sufficient human relationships, and that certain factors of an individual’s environment will 
encourage the formation of such bonds, can help to add further depth to Alexander’s social 
dislocation theory, providing a potential explanation for the mechanism through which an individual 
will adapt to a lifestyle of addiction. The pseudo-relationship, in short, provides the substitute 
emotional bond that individuals lose when they become socially dislocated.  
 
‘Encourage factors’ of the addictiogenic environment are often  the result of current policy 
approaches that do not carefully balance the potentially harmful nature of objects of addiction with 
their status as commodities.112 Despite being abnormal goods or services, the trade in addictive 
objects is guided by the economic norms that apply to trade in every other good or service. As Sihto 
and colleagues explain, instead of integrating public health concerns into the making of policy on 
trade in addictive objects: 
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‘health policy priorities are dependent on broader priorities and aims of governments … the 
aims of enhancing competitiveness of the economy or priorities of trade and industry are 
often substantially higher … [which] has led to a situation where, rather than articulating 
how economic, industrial and trade policies could contribute to the health and well-being of 
European citizens, health policies … are scrutinized themselves in terms of their compliance 
with and contribution to industrial, trade and economic policies’ 113  
 
Consequently, in most European countries public health concerns are not woven into the pursuit of 
all policy objectives, including those relating to trade in addictive objects. Even at EU level public 
health concerns are often secondary to economic concerns, despite the fact that ‘mainstreaming’ 
obligations exist at EU level, supposedly obliging the EU to ensure ‘a high level of human health 
protection’ in the ‘definition and implementing of all Union policies and activities’.114 
 
The result has been that addictive objects are treated as everyday commodities.115 The marketplace 
has consequently  normalised the consumption of objects of addiction by hiding potentially 
dangerous objects behind friendly consumer brands,116 brands that individuals are then encouraged 
to connect with in their everyday lives.117  The marketing and promotion of objects of addiction has 
served to enhance their emotional and relational characteristics,118 turning potentially dangerous 
products and services into desirable products and services. Producers of objects of addiction sponsor 
events with high emotional appeal,119 and advertisements play heavily upon various consumer 
aspirations,120 in order to give such objects personality. Addictive objects are also physically 
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designed to maximise their emotive properties. For example, electronic gambling machines are 
meticulously designed to offer a familiar and dependable bubble of escapism to gamblers, in order 
to mask the fact electronic gambling machines offer incredibly poor odds to players.121 Messages 
about the consumption of addictive objects have even become embedded in cultural pursuits.122  
 
The consequence is that the appeal and acceptability of potential objects of addiction is increased, 
along with the emotional and relational characteristics of such objects. This in turn increases the 
likelihood than an individual will be able to form a pseudo-relationship with those objects. 
Policymaking that creates conditions in which the market can turn commodities into objects of 
addiction that dislocated individuals would want to emotionally bond with must therefore be seen 
as factors of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
C. ‘Facilitate factors’ of the addictiogenic environment 
In addition to factors that promote social dislocation and encourage the formation of pseudo-
relationships, the addictiogenic environment is made up of one final group of factors. These factors 
facilitate vocational consumption of objects of addiction. Vocational consumption can be 
understood as just that – consumption that, for an individual, becomes their vocation. Individuals 
with functioning social bonds may choose to dedicate themselves to a variety of vocations – careers, 
hobbies, raising families, or looking after loved ones. When an individual is unable to form 
functioning relationships, and must adapt to a narrower lifestyle that is focussed upon a pseudo-
relationship with an object of addiction, the vocations that such individuals might devote themselves 
to become very limited in number. Consumption of their object of addiction becomes the primary 
vocation that an addicted individual feels able to dedicate themselves to. Such a vocation will enable 
them to engage in their pseudo-relationship on a regular basis, and to avoid having to face the 
reality of their social dislocation. 
 
In such a situation, consumption should be described as not just heavy, but vocational. Vocational 
consumption of an object is not a natural state of affairs, and if vocational consumption is to be 
sustainable, it must be facilitated by an individual’s environment. As Larkin et al note, ‘the 
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importance of context’123 is key in the development of addictive relationships. For example, 
individuals feel able to engage with their object vocationally when engagement per se with that 
object is considered a normal social activity.124  Furthermore, where those visibly in treatment for an 
addiction are stigmatised more than those not in treatment, the social incentive for addicted 
individuals to simply dedicate themselves to their pseudo-relationship, rather than attempt to leave 
it, is magnified.125 The extent to which resources that permit focussed and dedicated engagement 
with a particular object of addiction are available to an individual also determines the extent to 
which vocational consumption is possible.126  
 
‘Facilitate factors’ of the addictiogenic environment are therefore usually connected to policymaking 
that promotes ‘unfettered production, trade and consumption’127 of potential objects of addiction 
and ‘tolerance of a retail environment’128 for such objects, thus allowing the market to increase 
opportunities for consumption as much as possible, providing the space and resources that could 
sustain vocational consumption. Studies show that a high proportion of revenue generated by the 
consumption of potential objects of addiction comes from the heaviest users,129 so when economic 
operators are given little incentive not to target such consumers, it is inevitable that environments 
facilitating  vocational consumption will thrive.  
 
The result is an environment in which it is relatively easy for an individual to devote themselves to a 
vocation of consuming their preferred object of addiction. When the price of addictive objects is 
low130 and the abundance of deals and offers encourages buying in bulk,  when the distance 
individuals have to travel to acquire addictive objects is short,131 and when the hours of the day 
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during which individuals can access their preferred objects of addiction are extensive,132 there is 
little impediment to vocational consumption. At the extreme end of the scale, governments even 
condone consumption of addictive objects and provide the space in which individuals can devote 
themselves to consumption without fear of societal condemnation. State-run lotteries for example 
are common throughout Europe, and are actively promoted by governments or their agents, with 
the UK Government even introducing a National Lottery in 1994 with the argument that it was ‘not a 
real form of gambling because it was for good causes’.133 Lottery gambling, however has since been 
shown to be a potentially harmful object of addiction.134 In summary then, policymaking that 
permits the market to maximise the ease with which addictive objects may be consumed 
vocationally should be considered a final group of factors of the addictiogenic environment. 
V. Conclusion - Tackling Europe’s addictiogenic environment. 
This chapter has established that addiction is a phenomenon generated by an addictiogenic 
environment that promotes social dislocation, encourages the development of pseudo-relationships, 
and facilitates vocational consumption. Clearly, in order to reduce the prevalence of addiction, it will 
be necessary to reduce the strength of the addictiogenic environment by controlling the factors that 
comprise such an environment. 
 
However, as Alexander observed when setting out his theory of adaptation to dislocation, the 
globalisation of free market ideals is now entrenched to the point that such ideals would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to change.135 For this reason, society will always suffer addiction to at 
least some degree – Alexander’s theory holds that addiction is a natural consequence of free market 
competition, so therefore as long as free market competition persists, addiction will persist. Finding 
a perfect solution that eradicates all risks of addiction development is therefore not possible.  
 
Having said this, the strength of the addictiogenic environment will vary depending on how well its 
constituent factors are controlled – anything above a very weak addictiogenic environment must be 
considered as producing preventable levels of addiction. It is arguable that a strong addictiogenic 
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environment currently exists in Europe, since a lack of control of many of the factors identified 
above is evident. For example, social exclusion and social inequality is widespread throughout 
European society.136 Marketing controls currently do not prohibit advertising from playing on 
emotions, and often cannot prevent associations being made by advertising that are in fact 
prohibited from being made.137 The density of retail outlets for alcohol, unhealthy food and 
gambling, for example, is high, especially in disadvantaged areas.138 Rates of tax applied to alcohol, 
for example, have decreased in real terms across the European Union over the last two decades.139 It 
is therefore reasonable to argue that the addictiogenic environment is currently strong in Europe – 
weakening it will require focused and evidence-based interventions to control the factors of this 
environment. The next chapter considers the justification for using legal tools in order to provide 
this control.  
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CHAPTER THREE – THE NORMATIVE CASE 
FOR INTERVENTION 
 
I. Introduction 
So far, this thesis has argued that addiction may be explained by an addictiogenic environment 
model, and that the addictiogenic environment is responsible for promoting, encouraging and 
facilitating the development of addictions. It seems natural to presume that intervention by public 
authorities to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment would therefore be desirable, 
given the scale of the public health and social problem that addiction generates. However, shaping 
the social environment in order to achieve public health or social goals is not a costless activity. This 
chapter therefore seeks to make the case for why control of the addictiogenic environment through 
legal intervention should be pursued.  
 
The chapter will argue that law is an essential tool of addiction policy, yet that serious objections to 
the use of law in achieving public health and social goals can be raised. Legal intervention to control 
the factors of the addictiogenic environment must therefore be normatively justified, if it is to be 
legitimate. After presenting the normative case against legal intervention, two normative cases for 
intervention will be presented. The first is that the existence of a right to health in international law 
provides a rights-based justification for the Member States and the EU to do all they can to weaken 
the strength of the addictiogenic environment. The second is that the principles of social justice and 
stewardship provide ethical justification for public authorities to use the powers delegated to them 
to do the same.  
II. Law as a tool of addiction policy 
Law could be a crucial tool of addiction policy, since law is one of the fundamental ways in which 
governments and other public authorities can shape the social environment.140 Gostin summarises 
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the potential of law for shaping the public health environment as follows: ‘statutes, regulations and 
litigation can be pivotal tools for creating the conditions for people to lead healthier and safer 
lives’.141 Consequently, strong and evidence-based legal intervention is one of the most effective 
ways in which the factors of the addictiogenic environment could be controlled so that they no 
longer push individuals suffering hardship into a life of addiction.  
 
There are a number of ways in which law can achieve this.142 For example: certain behaviours can be 
encouraged or discouraged through the use of taxation and other economic incentives and 
disincentives;143 standards of quality for goods and services can be set, and the very goods and 
services that individuals are exposed to can be altered, through the use of product regulation144 or 
trade rules;145 the level of support that individuals can seek from the state can be defined through 
the rules governing access to social support and welfare funds;146 even the way in which we choose 
to engage with addictive objects can be guided, through the use of nudges147 or the demarcation of 
social space.148    
 
Evidence shows that certain legal tools are particularly effective in controlling important factors of 
the addictiogenic environment. Price is strongly linked to levels of consumption – by raising the price 
of addictive objects and therefore lowering their affordability and accessibility, taxation has proved 
to be a very effective method of reducing consumption of many objects of addiction such as 
alcohol,149 tobacco150 and sugary foodstuffs.151 Taxation is not the only form of economic 
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disincentive that can reduce the affordability of addictive objects though – when a more precise 
intervention is desired, minimum pricing has proved to be effective in reducing the affordability of 
the specific types of addictive object that are commonly consumed vocationally.152 
 
The marketing of objects of addiction has also been linked convincingly to the level at which those 
objects are consumed.153 By controlling the marketing of objects of addiction, alcohol for instance, 
the ability of the object to sustain pseudo-relationships will be greatly reduced. Evidence has linked 
the extent to which alcohol advertising is liked or enjoyed to the extent of consumption.154 This 
suggests that if advertising for addictive objects is controlled in such a way as to remove creative 
elements that generate liking or enjoyment, or if advertising is banned altogether, consumption will 
be reduced. In general, evidence suggests that advertising controls are effective in reducing 
consumption for a range of addictive objects, such as tobacco,155 alcohol,156 gambling157 and 
unhealthy foods.158 Since direct advertising is not the only way in which an object of addiction can be 
marketed, further legal controls have been devised, and have been effective in reducing the appeal 
of addictive objects and their consumption – for example point of sale display bans,159 and plain 
packaging of cigarettes.160 
 
The built environment is another major influence on the availability and accessibility of objects of 
addiction. Evidence demonstrates that if an area has a particularly high number of retail outlets for 
an object of addiction, gambling services for example, the high the consumption of that object will 
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be in that area.161  Since a high level of access to addictive objects is a factor that will increase 
opportunities for vocation consumption, controlling the physical availability of addictive objects 
through regulation of the built environment appears to be an effective way of controlling that 
factor.162 Furthermore, evidence also suggests that economic operators will specifically open retail 
outlets in areas of high market demand, which tend to also be more disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.163 Thus controlling the placement of retail outlets appears to be an effective way of 
preventing economic operators from targeting communities in which individuals are more 
vulnerable to being pushed into addictions.164  
 
The factors of the addictiogenic environment do not merely consist of the activities of economic 
operators and the attractiveness and availability of objects of addiction. The extent to which social 
structures promote the development of social dislocation is a crucial part of the addictiogenic 
environment, and a factor that legal intervention could also help to control. Evidence suggests that 
addictions are often comorbid with mental illnesses for example.165 Following the addictiogenic 
environment model of addiction development, individuals with mental illnesses may develop 
addictions as a result of exclusion or stigma that they have suffered  on account of their illness, a 
process which may even be systematically entrenched.166 Legal interventions can help to address 
systematic exclusion of individuals in vulnerable positions, such as those suffering mental illnesses, 
by mandating a certain level of institutional support that is to be provided to such individuals.167  
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Shaping the environment in the ways outlined above may result in a significant weakening of the 
addictiogenic environment. However, the fact remains that shaping the environment through law is 
often a coercive process,168 which is prone to ‘intrude on individual rights and interests and incur 
economic costs’.169 Furthermore, ‘by espousing controversial issues of economic redistribution and 
social restructuring, the field [of addiction policy in particular] becomes highly political’.170 
Consequently, there will always be objections to the use of law as a tool of addiction policy. Many 
objections are made on the grounds that legal intervention in individual lifestyles is an unwarranted 
and unjustifiable intrusion into individual choice.171 It is argued that government paternalism is 
unjustified on the basis that governments have little or no right to make lifestyle choices on behalf 
of individuals.172 Furthermore, legal intervention is objected to on the basis that it infringes cultural 
sensitivities and fundamental rights.173 As Martin notes, laws that seek to improve public health 
therefore ‘must, like other public actions, be challengeable by individuals on human rights 
grounds’.174 Economic operators also argue against legal control of their activities on the basis that 
they pose no threat to health. As Rothstein notes, ‘without a threat to the public, it is much more 
difficult to make a case for the use of coercive powers’,175 and addiction industries have mobilised 
on a large scale to discredit and denounce any evidence or suggestion that their products or 
activities cause harm, and therefore require legal regulation.176 
 
These objections to the use of law in order to shape environments are not to be taken lightly. 
Controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment through law involves addressing sensitive 
issues of health, wellbeing and social inclusion – ineffective or badly made policy choices could 
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generate highly negative outcomes that may eventually cost lives rather than save them.177 The 
ethical implications of such negative outcomes are amplified when the policies that generated them 
have removed choice from those they apply to. The use of law as a tool of addiction policy therefore 
must be justified if it is to be legitimate. Two justifications are presented below. First, the use of law 
is justified because governments must comply with obligations generated by the right to health. 
Second, the use of law is justified by the pursuit of social justice and stewardship principles in the 
discharge of public authority.  
 
 
III. Rights-based justification – the right to health  
A. Introduction 
A human right to health was first recognised in the 1946 Constitution of the World Health 
Organization,178 followed two years later by recognition in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.179 While these constituted strong rhetorical statements of the standard to health that every 
individual should be entitled to, they have no formal legal force,180 and therefore cannot be relied 
upon as rights-based justification for the use of law to control factors of the addictiogenic 
environment.  
 
The first legally binding statement of the right to health was made in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),181 adopted in 1966 and in force in 1976. Article 12 of 
the ICESCR states that: 
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‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. 
 
Unlike the WHO Constitution and the UDHR, Article 12 of the ICESCR does generate binding legal 
obligations on all State parties – and at present all Member States are parties to the ICESCR. Article 
12 is supported by General Comment 14 of the Economic and Social Committee, a document that 
interprets the content and scope of the obligations and responsibilities that the ICESCR places upon 
State and non-State actors alike.  
 
Although the EU itself is not a party to the ICESCR, it can be argued that the EU should nonetheless 
be committed to upholding the principles that Article 12 embodies. Ahmed and de Jesus Butler 
argue that the EU is bound as a result of the EU Treaties and customary international law to respect 
and uphold the obligations that its Member States incur under human rights treaties they have 
entered into.182 Even if the ICESCR cannot be deemed to indirectly bind the EU in this way, in 2009 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) became binding upon the EU 
institutions, and Article 35 CFREU provides that:  
 
‘Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from 
medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high 
level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
the Union’s policies and activities’.183 
 
The EU is therefore bound by the Charter to uphold the right to health. As Kenner notes, the 
‘Charter carries with it a deep political desire to give resonance to the values that it propounds’, and 
should be ‘understood as part of a much broader fundamental rights dialogue’.184 Peers et al further 
note that the ICESCR is one of the international law sources for Article 35 CFREU.185 Moreover, as the 
CJEU acknowledged in their Deutsches Weintor judgement, an alcohol control intervention adopted 
‘in view of the risks of addiction and abuse as well as the complex harmful effects known to be 
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linked to the consumption of alcohol’186 should be ‘regarded as being necessary to ensure 
compliance with the requirements that stem from Article 35 of the Charter’.187 Drawing these facts 
together, it is possible to argue that the version of the right to health proclaimed in the CFREU has 
the same normative essence as the right to health proclaimed in the ICESCR, and that therefore 
there is reason for EU policymakers to take account of the obligations that are generated by Article 
12 ICESCR.  
 
The argument to be developed by the first half of this chapter is therefore that the obligations 
generated by the ICESCR (and echoed in the CFREU) to uphold the right to health justify the control 
of factors of the addictiogenic environment through legal intervention. The first stage in making this 
argument is to establish whether the right to health actually conveys protection on individuals 
against factors of the addictiogenic environment, and to what extent. The subsection below will 
therefore focus on the content of Article 12 ICESCR.   
 
B. Addictiogenic environment content of the right to health.  
Article 12 itself is quite vague. The meaning of a ‘right to health’ is not immediately apparent, nor is 
the answer to how a right to health is supposed to provide individuals with guarantees of protection 
against the addictiogenic environment. An examination of the basic nature of the right to health is 
therefore required.  
 
i. What does the ‘right to health’ mean?  
Having a right to something that cannot be tangibly identified and acted upon is worthless. As 
Hessler and Buchannan point out, the problem with having a right to ‘health’ is that ‘it seems too 
demanding … a right to health seems to imply a right to be healthy, which is an impossible 
standard’.188 The meaning of ‘health’ must therefore be established with more precision, to ensure 
that the right to health does not become an ‘unobtainable ideal’.189  
 
There is unfortunately no universally accepted definition of ‘health’. The World Health Organization 
Constitution defines it as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
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the absence of disease of infirmity’.190 This definition simply leaves us with the same problem 
though, as ‘well-being’ is just as vague a term as ‘health’.191 Indeed, the ICESCR drafting process 
rejected a suggestion to include the WHO definition of health in Article 12 due, amongst other 
things, to the fact that the ‘reference to social well-being was out of place’.192 The Ottawa Charter193 
also makes an effort to explain what ‘health’ entails, stating that health is ‘a resource [for] everyday 
life, not the objective of living. Health is a positive concept, emphasizing social and personal 
resources, as well as physical capacities’.194 This is hard to disagree with, but sheds no further light 
upon what ‘health’ means, only why health is essential.    
 
Thus, ‘health’ cannot easily be defined, making it a difficult subject for a human right. General 
Comment 14 resolves this difficultly by making it clear that the right to health should not be 
conceptualised as a guarantee of good health. As literature points out, trying to guarantee such a 
complex state of being through human rights norms would be ‘absurd’195 due to the difficulties in 
identifying what ‘health’ is and therefore what one is entitled to. Instead, as General Comment 14 
summarises, the right to health is a right ‘to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, foods, services 
and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health’.196 
 
Guaranteeing the provision of conditions in which individuals can seek to be as healthy as they 
possibly can is a far more attainable objective. Such a goal suggests that the subject of the right to 
health is access to the underlying determinants of health, rather than a nebulous concept of ‘good 
health’. It is far easier to identify these determinants – the Ottawa Charter for example outlines that 
‘fundamental conditions and resources for health are peace, shelter, education, food, income, a 
stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice and equity’.197 Most of these are tangible 
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objects or conditions that are possible to secure through public action. Thus, to guarantee a right to 
health is to guarantee access to the conditions that allow individuals to pursue the best level of 
health they can attain. Upon this understanding, this subsection will now consider whether the 
absence of a strong addictiogenic environment is part of this set of conditions. 
  
ii. Does the right to health guarantee the right to the absence of a strong addictiogenic 
environment? 
In order to uncover whether the absence of a strong addictiogenic environment is included in the 
conditions that are guaranteed by the right to health, we must first understand how the substantive 
content of the right to health is organised. According to General Comment 14, the conditions 
necessary for pursuit of the highest attainable level of health can be organised into four groups – 
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. Guaranteeing availability means ensuring that 
public health and health care facilities, services and goods are sufficiently plentiful.198 Guaranteeing 
accessibility means ensuring that public health facilities, services and goods are accessible to 
everyone on equal terms.199 Guaranteeing acceptability means ensuring that public health facilities, 
services and goods are ethically and culturally appropriate for all.200 Finally, guaranteeing quality 
means ensuring that public health facilities, services and goods are scientifically and medically 
acceptable and of good quality.201  
 
Guarantees of the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of the conditions necessary for 
pursuit of the highest attainable standard of health can be of two types – freedoms or entitlements. 
According to General Comment 14, freedoms are any guarantee that relates to control of one’s own 
health and body, while entitlements are any guarantee that relates to a system of health protection 
that provides equality of opportunity to attain the highest possible standard of health.202 A series of 
more specific guarantees are made by Article 12 in relation to certain population sub-groups, which 
are also elaborated on by General Comment 14.203 
 
An analysis of General Comment 14 shows that this framework of freedoms and entitlements on the 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of the conditions necessary for pursuit of the 
highest attainable standard of health should encompass the absence of a strong addictiogenic 
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environment. Firstly, there are direct references to potential objects of addiction - the right to ‘the 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’204 as set out in Article 12(2)(b) 
‘discourages the abuse of alcohol, and the use of tobacco, drugs and other harmful substances’.205 
There are also references that plausibly cover the factors of the addictiogenic environment – ‘the 
right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which 
people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health’.206 Since 
addiction is a life adaptation that often leads to serious negative health consequences, any factors 
that increase the likelihood of developing an addiction must be deemed to fall within the scope of 
this ‘wide range’. 
  
General Comment 14 also remarks that ‘there is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures 
taken in relation to the right to health are not permissible’.207 Some factors of the addictiogenic 
environment could easily be described as retrogressive – for instance the promotion of addictive 
objects through the organisation of state-run lotteries, or the frustration of effective addiction 
policies through deliberate obfuscation of evidence.208 Avoiding retrogressive action on the 
determinants of health should include the elimination of practices such as these that contribute to 
the creation of a strong addictiogenic environment. 
 
Furthermore, General Comment 14 notes that the right to health can be violated by ‘the failure to 
regulate the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the 
right to health of others’,209 the failure to ‘protect consumers … from practices detrimental to 
health’,210 and ‘the failure to discourage production, marketing and consumption of tobacco, 
narcotics and other harmful substances’.211 Several factors of the addictiogenic environment 
concern the actions of corporations, particularly their marketing and lobbying efforts,212 and how 
these actions encourage the development of pseudo-relationships and facilitate vocational 
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consumption. Consequently, the control of these factors should also fall within the scope of the 
obligation to protect individuals from third party violations of the right to health. 
 
The above analysis demonstrates that the absence of a strong addictiogenic environment should fall 
within the scope of the right to health, as interpreted by General Comment 14, and therefore that 
protection against the factors of the addictiogenic environment should be amongst the obligations 
that Article 12 ICESCR places on State parties. The next subsection will therefore investigate the 
nature of these obligations, as well as the question of whether the right to health places obligations 
on non-State actors.  
 
iii. Obligations placed upon States and non-State actors by the right to health 
Having established that Article 12 ICESCR (mirrored by Article 35 CFREU) should guarantee 
individuals a right to protection against strong addictiogenic environments, the obligations that this 
generates must now be considered. 
 
Two principles enshrined within the ICESCR condition the general scope of any obligations that are 
placed on States by Article 12. States are only obliged to act ‘with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights’213 included in the ICESCR. This means that States are not under an 
obligation to secure all the freedoms and entitlements conferred upon individuals by Article 12 on 
an absolute basis. Rather, States are obliged to ‘move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’214 
towards the full realisation of Article 12.  
 
States are also only obliged to fulfil their Article 12 obligations ‘to the maximum of [their] available 
resources’.215 General Comment 14 explains that the Covenant ‘acknowledges the constraints due to 
the limits of available resources’216 – clearly, States cannot spend huge sums of money in pursuit of 
every right conveyed by the ICESCR, and face difficult decisions over how to allocate their financial 
resources. However, States must nonetheless spend what they have available to them. General 
Comment 14 makes clear that if a State cannot spend more than a certain amount in pursuit of the 
right to health, they must show that ‘every effort has nevertheless been made to use all available 
resources at its disposal’217 and that a State violates its Article 12 obligation if it is ‘unwilling to use 
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the maximum of its available resources’.218 Thus, Article 12 does not place absolute obligations upon 
States as a general rule, but rather an obligation to act as effectively as possible, and to allocate as 
much resource to such action as they can manage.  
 
Within these limits, Article 12 places two types of legal obligation upon States – core legal 
obligations and specific legal obligations. Core legal obligations constitute exceptions to the two 
principles outlined above. They reflect the ‘minimum essential levels’219 of the rights conferred by 
Article 12, and they do place absolute obligations on States. A State ‘cannot, under any 
circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-complicate with the core obligations’220 of the right to 
health.  
 
Specific legal obligations are broken down by General Comment 14 into three types – obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right to health. Respecting the right to health places States under an 
obligation to refrain from any action that would generate negative health consequences for 
individuals.221 Protecting the right to health places States under an obligation to take action to 
control risks to the health of individuals.222 Finally, fulfilling the right to health places States under an 
obligation to ensure that their legal and political systems give sufficient recognition to the need to 
ensure that individuals are provided with conditions in which they can pursue their highest 
attainable level of health.223 
 
Using the examples provided by General Comment 14, it is possible to identify several ways in which 
States should be obliged to protect individuals from the effects of the addictiogenic environment. 
First, as is becoming clear by now, States are certainly under an obligation to control irresponsible 
activities of corporations that manufacture and market potential objects of addiction, in particular 
irresponsible marketing. The need to control the marketing of potential objects of addiction is 
specifically mentioned in General Comment 14,224 and as discussed previously, the evidence linking 
marketing to the increased appeal and consumption of addictive objects is considerable.225 
                                                          
218
 ibid, para 47.  
219
 ibid, para 43. 
220
 ibid, para 47.  
221
 ibid, para 34.  
222
 ibid, para 35.  
223
 ibid, para 36.  
224
 ibid, para 51.  
225
 Weintraub et al, n 154 above; P Bindle, ‘Exploring the Impact of Gambling Advertising: An Interview Study 
of Problem Gamblers’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Mental Health Addiction 541.  
 62 
Therefore, the existence of the right to health should oblige governments to control irresponsible 
marketing practices.  
 
Second, it is clear from General Comment 14 that States should be under an obligation to ensure 
that policymaking processes are conducted in such a way as to avoid strengthening the addictiogenic 
environment. A violation of States’ obligations will occur when there is a ‘failure to take measures to 
reduce the inequitable distribution of health facilities, goods and services’.226 Furthermore, States 
are under an obligation to ‘undertake actions that create, maintain and restore the health of 
populations’,227 in addition to an obligation to fulfil rights ‘when individuals or a group are unable, 
for reason beyond their control, to realise that right themselves’.228 Taken together, it is arguable 
that this places an obligation on States to mainstream consideration of the addictiogenic 
environment into all relevant fields of policymaking. This obligation should lead States to rethink 
implications of certain policy choices, such as the arrangement of social welfare structures in ways 
that marginalise certain groups,229 unwillingness to invest in the development of certain 
communities,230 the promotion of liberal trade policies,231 or policies that permit the dense 
availability of addictiogenic objects.232  
 
These processes are beyond the ability of most individuals or groups to change, making it even more 
important that States take responsibility for ensuring that they do not contribute to the causation of 
addictions. Individuals, especially vulnerable individuals such as children, are not in a position to 
address the impact of the addictiogenic environment on their chances of avoiding addiction, making 
the guarantees in the right to health an important tool for ensuring that those who do have such 
power will control factors of the addictiogenic environment on behalf of vulnerable individuals.233 
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that Article 12 places an obligation upon States to ensure 
that the policies they pursue outside the health and social protection fields are arranged in such a 
way to to avoid strengthening the addictiogenic environment.  
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A final example of obligations that Article 12 places on States in relation to the addictiogenic 
environment is an obligation to prevent the physical, social and cultural environment from becoming 
saturated with addictiogenic norms. In essence, States should not allow the environment in which 
their citizens live to become an environment in which addiction is celebrated, normalised or glorified 
in any way. Taking the observation in General Comment 14 that States should refrain from 
‘preventing people’s participation in health related matters’234 together with the observation that  
‘violations of the right to health can also occur through the omission or failure of States to take 
necessary measures arising from the legal obligations’,235 along with the nature of States’ obligations 
to respect the right to health, it is arguable that States should refrain from any actions that directly 
contribute to producing an environment in which vocational consumption of addictive substances 
could take place. By way of example, accepting sponsorship for the Olympic Games from 
corporations that produce potential objects of addiction would constitute a violation of this 
obligation.236 Organising and advertising state lotteries would constitute another.237 Both are 
instances where the State might have refrained from contributing to the strengthening of the 
addictiogenic environment, but did not. States should therefore ensure that they themselves are not 
directly contributing to the strengthening of the addictiogenic environment. 
 
Since only States are parties to the ICESCR, only States can have legal obligations placed directly 
upon them by Article 12. However, this does not mean that the existence of a right to health under 
international law will not generate the expectation that certain responsibilities should fall upon non-
state actors, whose actions have a direct bearing upon the enjoyment of the right to health. General 
Comment 14 acknowledges that other actors can contribute to the realisation of the right to health, 
not only with a section dedicated to the Obligations of Actors other than State Parties,238 but with 
references throughout the text. Of particular relevance to addiction policy are the references made 
to the responsibilities of private businesses, whose actions produce some of the major factors of the 
addictiogenic environment. 
 
General Comment 14 clearly acknowledges that the activities of corporations can influence 
individuals’ health, and places an obligation upon States to reduce the impact of this influence. 
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However, General Comment 14 also acknowledges at several other points that corporations should 
bear direct responsibilities to act consistently with the right to health. The General Comment states 
that ‘all members of society … intergovernmental and non-governmental organizitations, civil 
society organizations, as well as the private business sector – had responsibilities regarding the 
realization of the right to health’.239 It further states that the private business sector should be 
‘aware of, and consider the importance of, the right to health in pursuing their activities’.240 The fact 
that States are under an obligation to ‘provide an environment which facilitates the discharge of 
these responsibilities’241 further emphasises that corporate activities should be motivate by a 
respect for the right to health.  
 
It is therefore arguable that Article 12 provides a normative basis upon which States could impose 
legal obligations to act consistently with the right to health directly upon corporations. The 
imposition of ethical and potentially legal duties upon corporations who have a bearing upon the 
enjoyment of the human rights, including the right to health, has been encouraged in documents 
such as the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations242 and the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.243 The Norms state that ‘transnational corporations… 
have, inter alia, human rights obligations and responsibilities and … these human rights norms will 
contribute to the making and development of international law’.244 The drafters of the Norms even 
went as far as to voice their hope that through processes of interpretation and re-application, the 
Norms would ‘amount to more than aspirational statements of desired conduct’.245 Furthermore, 
the Guiding Principles set out that ‘the responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard to 
expected conduct for all business enterprises’,246 that ‘the responsibilities of business enterprises to 
respect human rights refers to internationally recognised human rights’,247 and that ‘in practice, 
                                                          
239
 ibid, para 56. 
240
 ibid, para 55.  
241
 ibid, para 42.  
242
 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights ( UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 26 August 2003) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. 
243
 J Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2011). 
244
 Preamble to the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, n 242 above. 
245
 D Weissbrodt and M Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97(4) The American Journal of International Law 
901, 913. 
246
 Ruggie, n 243 above. 
247
 ibid. 
 65 
some human rights may be at greater risk than others in particular industries or contexts, and 
therefore will be the focus of heightened attention’.248  
 
The existence of these internationally proclaimed expectations that corporations will act compatibly 
with human rights norms provides further evidence that corporations that produce and market 
potential objects of addiction should be responsible for acting in ways that will not contribute to 
strong addictiogenic environments. Of course, for industries whose very existence arguably 
contributes to a strong addictiogenic environment, such as the tobacco industry, fulfilling these 
responsibilities will be difficult – the inherent conflicts of interest in what they would be asked to do 
are often too great to overcome.249  
 
Consequently, this gives all the more reason for States to establish such responsibilities in law. In 
some States this has already been attempted. Argentina has included a horizontality provision in its 
Constitution that gives the ICESCR the same legal status as the Constitution,250 thus providing 
Argentine citizens with the possibility of invoking the right to health as found in the ICESCR against a 
private party, such as a corporation. The Irish constitution has also been interpreted to be 
horizontally directly effective where such a construction is possible,251 and contains a provision that 
requires the State to protect the public against unjust exploitation,252 which could plausibly be 
invoked in a horizontal action between a citizen and a corporation. Although no examples have yet 
surfaced of such constitutional provisions being used against corporations, the possibility 
nonetheless remains for States to constitutionalise a right to health in order to provide direct legal 
recourse for citizens against corporations who have violated their right to health.  
 
iv. Summary 
To summarise the above discussion, the right to health contained in Article 12 ICESCR and echoed by 
Article 35 CFREU obliges Member States and the EU to work towards ensuring that all individuals can 
benefit from conditions that will allow them to pursue their highest level of health, and this includes 
the absence of a strong addictiogenic environment. States hold legal obligations (and non-state 
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actors hold responsibilities that could be turned into legal obligations) to ensure that environmental 
conditions will not promote, encourage or facilitate the development of addictions. These 
obligations provide a compelling rights-based justification for government legal intervention to 
control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. Having explored a rights-based justification, 
the second half of this chapter will examine how ethical principles might be balanced in order to 
justify legal intervention to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. 
IV. Ethical justification 
A. Introduction 
As highlighted above, law is a coercive tool that can potentially be used to override individual 
preferences, and even individual freedoms, in pursuit of policy goals. This is particularly the case 
when it comes to controlling strong addictiogenic environments, since some of the policies that are 
most evidentially effective rely on abridging the freedoms of corporations, on foreclosing certain 
lifestyle choices from individuals, on influencing the expected behaviour of individuals in certain 
situations, or even on changing societal norms.  
 
These actions cannot be justified solely by reference to the existence of the right to health, since the 
actions, behaviour and norms abridged are often themselves protected by other fundamental rights. 
For example, corporate advertising is protected by the freedom of expression.253 Consequently, a 
means of explaining why the balance between conflicting rights should be struck in favour of 
protecting the right to health is needed. This means can be provided by the application of ethical 
principles of public health. Such principles can provide justification for the adoption of addiction 
interventions despite the fact that conflicting freedoms have been abridged in the process. Since 
there are a number of ethical principles that could be applied to the use of law for public health 
purposes, not all of which are supportive, the first subsection below will first consider ethical 
principles that do not support the use of law in addiction policy. The subsequent subsections will 
then consider the ethical arguments that do support intervention on the addictiogenic environment. 
Ultimately, it will be argued that the need to protect populations against the effects of the 
addictiogenic environment outweighs the need to preserve an individual’s supposed prerogative to 
choose to harm themselves. 
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B. Arguments from the principle of autonomy 
The principle of autonomy can be used to support a number of ethical arguments against lifestyle 
risk regulation in general, and could be raised in particular to support arguments that legal 
intervention is an inappropriate tool with which to combat addiction. The autonomy principle was 
originally applied in the medical and bioethical fields,254 and was developed out of a concern to 
ensure that the individual retained ultimate control over their body. However, it has become 
recognised that autonomy can be a useful principle in the field of public health as well. Autonomy in 
the context of public health is concerned more with decision making relating to an individual’s 
lifestyle.255 Autonomy in this context could be understood as the freedom to discern and consider 
lifestyle options, and the freedom to act on the resulting evaluations in a voluntary way.256 
Understood in this way, the principle of autonomy has been used to support the following ethical 
arguments against legal intervention on addiction issues. 
 
i. Anti-paternalism 
First is the argument that individuals are always the best judge of their own interests, and that 
policymakers have no way of knowing what would increase an individual’s well-being overall. This is 
a rejection of paternalism, a term which has traditionally indicated ‘interference with the liberty of 
another for the purposes of promoting some good or preventing some harm’257, but can which be 
more accurately understood as the exercise of government power over individuals to substitute the 
preferences of the individual for the preferences of governments. If an individual makes an 
autonomous decision that engaging with an object of addiction would increase their overall well-
being, policy makers are neither able nor entitled to override that judgement on the basis that they 
believe it is not in that individual’s best interests. Consequently, respect for individual autonomy 
means that policymakers should refrain from substituting their own lifestyle judgements for those of 
the individual in these situations, without more concrete overriding justification.258 
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This anti-paternalism argument relies upon the proposition that choices which result in harm to the 
individual cannot automatically be assumed to be irrational, and thus may not be overridden on a 
presumption that they were irrational.259 Choices which may be objectively negative for health may 
be subjectively good for well-being. A rational choice is simply a process in which benefits and 
detriments are weighed, and a decision is made that is consistent with that weighing and which 
maximises well-being.260 Therefore, it is logical that healthy or unhealthy decisions could be rational 
in different scenarios. Consequently, as White argues, ‘since public health policy makers have no 
way of knowing what a “better” choice means for each individual, they have no basis on which to 
judge that [the] choice was irrational or to know what I would have chosen if I had chosen 
“irrationally”’.261  
 
This argument has logical force, however the logic only holds if it is assumed that individuals are 
always able to conduct the weighing of benefits and detriments free from external influence. In 
situations that concern engagement with addictive objects, an individual could be considered to lack 
meaningful autonomy in two ways – if the individual’s decision making capacity is reduced in some 
way by the addictiogenic environment, or if the decision making situation is unfairly manipulated by 
the addictiogenic environment.  
 
An individual’s decision making capacity can be reduced when, for example, an individual is already 
in an addictive relationship, or is highly vulnerable to developing an addiction. Evidence shows that 
those in particularly vulnerable or already addicted situations are far more likely to possess reduced 
levels of capacity to decide against consumption. For example, individuals addicted to tobacco can 
suffer from the ‘loss of intellectual abilities’262 as a result of tobacco related illnesses, and college 
students can be particularly susceptible to developing internet addictions due to heightened 
developmental vulnerabilities combined with the expectation to use something that is in plentiful 
supply.263 This is not the full autonomy on which most ethical arguments against addiction 
intervention are based. When individuals are placed in a vulnerable position through addiction or 
the imminent development of an addiction, they feel that they have less choice, and less capacity to 
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choose than they might have had if they were placed in a less vulnerable situation.264 By simply 
placing vulnerable individuals in a less vulnerable position, decision making processes may be 
different. In such situations, interventions to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment 
may actually increase an individual’s autonomy, rather than abridge it.265 
 
An individual’s decision making situation can be unfairly manipulated when crucial pieces of 
information are withheld from individuals, or when attempts are made to influence the likely 
outcome of decision making in a particular direction. As Gostin notes, ‘people face constraints (both 
internal and external) on the capacity to pursue their own interests … personal behaviour is heavily 
influenced and not simply a matter of free will’.266 Such constraints might include marketing efforts 
that co-opt and exploit the behavioural decision-making biases of consumers in order to push them 
towards certain consumption decisions,267 or the withholding or covering-up of scientific information 
relating to health harms in an attempt to undermine consumers’ abilities to fully understand the 
implications of consumption decisions.268 In such situations, the process of weighing benefits and 
detriments is not wholly, or sometimes even partly, the individual’s own. Consequently, legal 
intervention that controls the factors of the addictiogenic environment in order to prevent these 
factors from manipulating individual choices would tend to increase the autonomy of individuals, 
rather than decrease it.269 
 
ii. The harm principle 
The second argument from the principle of autonomy against the use of law to control the 
addictiogenic environment is that due to the assumed intrinsic value of protecting and respecting a 
person’s autonomy,270 it is only ever permissible to restrict an individual’s autonomous choice to 
engage with addictive objects if their behaviour would cause harm to others. When an individual 
only harms themselves through their engagement with an addictive object, the intrinsic value of 
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preserving autonomy trumps the value of protecting their well-being,271 even if an addiction is 
developed. 
 
While the previous argument from autonomy was based upon the assumption that a rational 
decision may be objectively bad but still subjectively good for the individual, this argument from 
autonomy rests upon the proposition that even if a choice is subjectively bad for the individual, that 
choice is the individual’s alone to make. To override autonomous choice in this situation would be 
an offence to the idea that individuals should be free to decide how their lives should be spent.272 To 
declare that an individual is only entitled to make choices that increase their individual well-being 
constitutes a ‘denial of self-determination’.273 It is only if individual action affects the self-
determination of others that public authorities should exercise power to limit that  individual’s 
freedom.274 Thus, this argument from autonomy is essentially that individuals should be at liberty to 
act upon whatever their lifestyle convictions happen to be, no matter how distasteful they may 
seem to others, as such action does not compromise the freedom of others.275 
 
However, the harm principle rests upon the assumption that decisions relating to the use of 
potential objects of addiction can be clearly separated into those that harm only the individual and 
those that harm others. In fact, the boundary between so called self-regarding and other-regarding 
behaviours is hard to define. When an individual develops an addiction, the immediately observable 
harm – liver cirrhosis due to vocational alcohol consumption for example, or bankruptcy from 
vocational gambling – might well be confined to the individual, however there are several other 
proximate harms that are often not as easily visible. For example, friends and family are often put 
through emotional trauma as a result of an individual’s addiction, can be forced to pick up financial 
shortfalls suffered as a result of the addiction, or may have to look after offspring or spouses 
neglected by the addicted individual.276 Those suffering from non-communicable disease as a result 
of their engagement with objects of addiction impose costs on national health services.277 Addicted 
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individuals can also place burdens on employers through reduced productivity.278 Thus, it is quite 
hard to say that a choice in relation to potential objects of addiction will not have, or will not lead to, 
harms being suffered by others.  
 
Any legal intervention to control the addictiogenic environment should therefore be considered a 
population health exercise.279 An intervention that happens to restrict the autonomy of individuals 
who voluntarily choose to harm themselves is the same intervention that seeks to return autonomy 
to other individuals who would make non-harmful choices in the absence of a strong addictiogenic 
environment. Thus, the effect of a population level intervention upon some individuals within the 
population cannot easily be decoupled from its effects upon others within the population.280 As 
Martin points out, the legitimacy of public health intervention ‘focuses on the question of 
proportionality … only in circumstances where the individual can establish significant burden over 
and above that borne by members of the majority population will there be any grounds for 
challenge’.281 This being the case, the legitimacy of legal intervention to control factors of the 
addictiogenic environment comes down to the balancing of one group’s right to self-determination 
against another group’s right to the same thing. At this point, an argument based on the harm 
principle would appear to break down, since an assertion founded on the repugnancy of  restricting 
autonomy cannot surely be used to support action that would itself restrict autonomy.  
 
In summary, arguments from autonomy could be used to oppose the use of law in addiction policy. 
These arguments rely upon the presumption of both the absolute infallibility of and absolute 
superiority of an individual’s ability to self-determine. However, as has been suggested above, 
autonomous choice is not an absolute reality, since the addictiogenic environment is sometimes 
strong enough to alter an individual’s decision making in such a way that their choices are not truly 
autonomous. Furthermore, even if individual autonomy were absolute, the fact that public health 
policymaking must balance the health interests of the whole population, and arrive at an outcome 
that benefits the population as a whole, means that the preservation of the autonomy of some 
cannot be used to justify the erosion of the autonomy of others. Having explored the main ethical 
arguments against the use of law in addiction policy, we turn now to explore the ethical arguments 
that support it.   
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C. Arguments from the principle of social justice.  
The idea that society should be organised in a socially just manner flows from a number of distinct 
ethical values – fairness,282 equality,283 solidarity,284 and protection of the vulnerable.285 Taken 
together, these ethical building blocks can be understood to constitute an idea that ‘each person in 
society ought to receive his due and that the burdens and benefits of society should be fairly and 
equitably distributed’.286 From a public health perspective we could narrow this principle down to 
the idea that policymakers should be required to ‘advance human well-being by improving health 
and to do so by focussing on the needs of the most disadvantaged’.287 Specifically, an approach to 
public health practice that reflects the principle of social justice would focus on correcting ‘patterns 
of systematic disadvantage that undermine the well-being of people’,288 especially when some 
groups of people ‘whose prospects for well-being, including for health, are so limited that their life 
choices are not even remotely like those of others’.289 Understood in this way, it is arguable control 
of the factors of the addictiogenic environment should be the business of any society that aspires to 
be organised in socially just manner. There are two main reasons for this. 
 
First, in a socially just society that is nevertheless also founded on liberal values, powerful members 
of the society should not be permitted to exploit the hardships experienced by weaker and more 
vulnerable members of the society. Deliberately seeking to make profit of the expense of the health 
and well-being of those vulnerable members is a practice that certainly does not result in an 
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens, and is therefore to be discouraged.  
 
It is evident that free market conditions will always favour those with greater resources and 
power.290 This is particularly true for markets in addictive goods – multinational corporations are by 
far the largest producers and marketers of many potential objects of addiction such as tobacco, 
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alcohol and gambling services,291 and dominate the globalised marketplace. For example, just 10 
multinational corporations are responsible for nearly half of all global sales of branded alcoholic 
beverages.292 Such corporations therefore possess an immense amount of economic leverage, 
particularly over the consumers that are buying their products. Given that the objective of 
multinational corporations is to accumulate as big a market share as possible and will therefore look 
to secure a market advantage wherever possible, and given that consumers are reliably subject to a 
variety of cognitive flaws and vulnerabilities, multinational corporations take advantage of these 
decision making vulnerabilities in order to manipulate consumer choice and behaviour towards 
greater consumption.293 This is not least because the legal structure of corporations places its 
directors under a fiduciary duty to maximise profits on behalf of the company’s shareholders, even if 
this comes at the expense of public goods such as health.294 Thus, powerful and resourceful 
corporations that sell potential objects of addiction grow economically stronger, while the very 
customers who are being manipulated in order to feed this growth suffer ever greater health 
detriments.295  
 
In such situations, the position of individuals who are particularly vulnerable to developing addictive 
relationships is compounded - not only do corporations control the products and services to which 
individuals might turn for an addictive relationship, but they also actively attempt to make these 
products more appealing through marketing and branding activities, in an effort to encourage 
greater consumption.296 There is nothing fair or equitable or just in allowing multinational 
corporations with such power to profit at the expense of vulnerable individuals or communities.297 A 
society that aspires to be socially just should not allow the powerful to reap greater benefits by 
compounding the burdens of the already vulnerable.298 The pursuit of social justice would therefore 
support action that sought to even the balance of power between corporate actors and vulnerable 
individuals, by controlling factors of the addictiogenic environment that are related to the activities 
of addiction industries and other economic actors. 
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Second, the fact that preventable social inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of individuals to the 
influence of the addictiogenic environment should be seen as cause for a society that aspires to be 
socially just to intervene in order to reduce inequality and weaken the links between inequality and 
addiction development. 
 
There is a clear link between social inequality and the prevalence of addiction. For example, the 
negative consequences of licit and illicit drug use have been found to fall disproportionately upon 
poorer members of society.299 Social exclusion, social upheaval and socioeconomic deprivation all 
increase the chances that individuals will develop an addiction in response to the high levels of 
negative affect that such conditions generate.300 Stigmatisation of the use of potential objects of 
addiction, particularly by lower socioeconomic groups, exacerbates the negative affect generated by 
being socially disadvantaged in the first place, and consequently the harms arising from the use of 
potential objects of addiction.301 Finally, the experience of deprivation in childhood can be linked to 
higher risk of addictive behaviour in adulthood.302 Of course, the link between inequality and 
addiction does not take away from the fact that individuals from advantaged backgrounds can also 
suffer social dislocation. One however cannot ignore the fact that more disadvantaged individuals 
are far more likely to be put in positions where they risk becoming socially dislocated. Inequality, 
although not the only driver of addiction development, should therefore be considered a reason in 
itself to take action on the addictiogenic environment.  
 
Being poorer, less advantaged, less socially included and in general less well-off is linked to higher 
rates of addiction because individuals in such situations are more likely to be vulnerable to the 
influence of the three core groups of factors of the addictiogenic environment. Disadvantaged 
individuals are more likely to experience conditions that generate social dislocation.303 Not only is 
social dislocation more likely in the less well-off, the provision and promotion of potential objects of 
addiction exploits the less well off-to a greater extent. Studies have consistently found that deprived 
neighbourhoods are more likely to have greater densities of unhealthy food, tobacco and gambling 
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outlets,304 meaning that it is easier for less well-off individuals, already exposed to greater sources of 
negative affect, to access potential objects of addiction. The way in which addictive objects are often 
advertised through linking consumption to aspirational ideas and emotions means that it is more 
likely that individuals in disadvantaged or otherwise vulnerable positions will be enticed to engage in 
greater consumption of such objects.305  
 
The relationship between preventable inequality and the operation of the addictiogenic 
environment is sufficiently strong to warrant intervention in the name of social justice. In the words 
of Sunstein, ‘a society in which people “prefer” to become drug addicts … has a serious problem’.306 
For this reason, a society that seeks to uphold the principles of social justice would be justified in 
seeking to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment through legal intervention.  
 
D. Arguments from the principle of stewardship 
The second ethical argument that could be raised in favour of controlling the factors of the 
addictiogenic environment through legal intervention is founded upon the stewardship principle. 
The idea that mankind are stewards of the natural resources of the planet was first developed in 
religious texts,307 however over time the concept of stewardship was adopted in a political context, 
and extended to include the idea that mankind collectively has a responsibility for looking after itself 
as well as its resources. In such a context, stewardship could be understood as the proposition that 
‘liberal states have responsibilities to look after important needs of people both individually and 
collectively’.308 With respect to the health needs of populations, this responsibility translates into an 
ethical ‘obligation upon States to seek to provide conditions that allow people to be healthy’.309 
Further definitions of the idea of government stewardship focus upon agency – ‘willingness and 
ability to earn public trust by being an ethical agent in carrying out the republic’s business’310 – and 
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accountability – ‘willingness to be accountable for the well being of the larger organisation by 
operating in service, rather than in control of those around us’.311  
 
The principle that governments and other public authorities are stewards of the public good  
therefore requires them to act on behalf of their citizens to ensure that their health is protected, 
rather than put at risk. Based on this principle, it is possible to argue that governments should 
ensure that their citizens are not exposed to conditions that promote, encourage and facilitate the 
development of addictions. There are two building blocks to this proposition. First, individuals 
delegate power to a governing authority because they are unable to secure certain public goods 
themselves. Second, individuals delegate power to the governing authority to act on behalf of the 
community under a social contract, on the expectation that this power will actually be exercised to 
secure the public goods that could not be achieved through individual action. 
 
The election of a government is an acceptance of the fact that some ‘public goods’ cannot be 
secured by private individuals or groups.312 Health is just such a public good,313 being a basic 
requirement that is necessary for human functioning and the enjoyment of most freedoms.314 As 
Gostin notes, ‘acting alone, individuals cannot ensure even minimum levels of health … no single 
individual, or group of individuals, can ensure the health of the community’.315 Recognition that 
community action through a duly appointed authority that will act on behalf of the community is 
therefore essential if the community is to prosper. Citizens consequently ‘willingly forego the liberty 
of the hypothetical state of nature in favour of civil society where they can achieve, in the words of 
John Locke, “mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates”’.316 
 
In electing a government for the purpose of ‘mutual preservation’, a so-called ‘social contract’ is 
formed. The social contract might be broadly thought of as 'the collective will of a community … to 
live together in an enduring nation state’,317 and as Hodge and Eber note, a ‘government’s 
responsibility to safeguard the public’s health through law has been part of the social contract since 
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ancient times’.318 Therefore, the existence of the social contract is designed to ensure that the 
power, trust and responsibility delegated to a government is used only in service to and on behalf of 
the population. Governments acting in accordance with the social contract should therefore 
‘typically favour measures to promote the welfare of citizens’.319 As Kass explains, if a society’s 
government can be thought of as the agent of the society’s needs, then the social contract is an 
undertaking that the government ‘must substitute its capacities for those lacking in the [population] 
so that the welfare of the [population] is achieved’.320 A government that is delegated power for the 
purpose of securing public goods on behalf of a population is under an obligation to actually use 
those powers in order to actually secure those public goods.  
  
Control over the factors of the addictiogenic environment is an excellent example of a public good 
that is beyond the ability of individuals to achieve, and which should be subject to the social contract 
arising from the delegation of power to governments and other public authorities.321 As Alexander 
has argued, the strength of an addictiogenic environment depends on the level of control that the 
free-market is subject to.322 Private individuals or groups are powerless to change the direction of 
market forces, however governments do possess such power – power to regulate markets, shape 
social structures, prohibit undesirable conduct and reward desirable conduct – which is delegated to 
them as part of the social contract between individuals and their government. Alexander argues that 
‘concerted social action can domesticate today’s globalising free-market society, bringing dislocation 
[and consequently the addictiogenic environment] to heel’,323 and that this is possible because, 
collectively, we are ‘human beings whose qualities of reason, compassion, and courage come to the 
fore in times of crisis’.324 
 
If addictiogenic environments can therefore be controlled by public action for the good of the 
community, the principle of stewardship, which obliges governments to secure conditions for 
pursuing good health on behalf of citizens, would certainly justify the application of law in order to 
control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. 
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E. Balancing the ethical arguments 
The analysis above explored ethical arguments that both support and oppose the use of legal 
intervention in order to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. As with all complex 
policy problems that have an ethical dimension, fully reconciling the conflicts between ethical 
positions is very difficult.325 Therefore, a position must be reached that achieves a balance between 
the relevant ethical principles.326 Kass argues that a framework for analysing the ethics of public 
health should be adopted in order to guide such a balancing exercise.327 Her proposed framework 
involves consideration of six elements of the public health intervention in question – the goals and 
effectiveness of the proposed intervention, the potential burdens of the intervention and whether 
they can be minimised, and whether the implementation of the intervention and the balancing of its 
burdens and benefits is fair.328 Kass argues that ‘weighing alternatives according to this public health 
ethics framework should lead to an ethically acceptable option’.329 Applying the same approach to 
the ethical arguments for and against legal intervention in the addictiogenic environment therefore 
should reveal whether such intervention is justified.  
 
On balance, one can argue that, while it is important to preserve individual autonomy as much as 
possible, the addictiogenic environment presents a serious threat to population health, to which 
legal intervention can make an unparalleled contribution to controlling. The evidence supporting 
many legal interventions is compelling – the goal of legal intervention is clearly to do good for the 
population, and the outcomes achieved by legal intervention often cannot be achieved through any 
other non-coercive means. Gostin and Gostin summarise the position as follows:  
 
‘If paternalistic measures reduce illness and premature death significantly with minimal 
burdens on individual freedom, should they be out of bounds simply because they fail to 
meet a philosophical standard of self-sovereignty? Should a caring society refuse to act 
when its members suffer such high burdens of preventable disease? If so, public health 
agencies would become powerless to respond effectively to the most common causes of 
disability and death; personal lifestyle choices’.330 
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To this it could be added that interventions that seek to address the balance of power between 
powerful corporations and vulnerable individuals are certainly fair. It is very difficult to deny the 
equity of the argument that ‘many citizens are not benefited by growth, and at a minimum 
government should take steps to combat human deprivation and misery in the midst of growth’.331 
Furthermore, while individual experiences of addictive objects and addiction may subjectively harm 
or promote well-being depending upon their individual circumstances, thus either promoting or 
degrading individual autonomy, when addressing public health issues such as the addictiogenic 
environment, policymakers ‘must take a broad view of the determinants and, indeed, the 
sustainability of population health’.332 Thus, priority must be given in addiction policy to the needs of 
the population, rather than the needs of some individuals. Interventions that target the 
addictiogenic environment are designed to promote the health of populations above all else, and 
thus should be considered to balance the burdens of intervention in a way that maximises overall 
wellbeing.333  
 
The consequences of a strong addictiogenic environment for the creation of a socially just society, in 
which public goods are defended, generates a clearer imperative for action than the imperative for 
inaction generated by the need to protect an individual's capacity to choose to harm themselves. In 
line with the idea that ethical principles should be applied as an overall framework, the ethical 
principles that would support intervention are more convincing. The arguments from individual 
autonomy – raised against the proposition that socially just societies should control factors of the 
addictiogenic environment to protect their populations – are flawed, and do not stand up to 
scrutiny. Since the population of a society delegates power to governments to ensure the continued 
survival of the society, it would seem proper to lend more weight to protecting the population as 
opposed to individuals’ (uncertain) capacity for autonomy. Consequently, the application of a 
framework of ethical principles to the issue of addiction prevention would, it is argued, support legal 
intervention to control factors of the addictiogenic environment.  
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to set out the normative foundations upon which intervention to 
address the public health and social problems presented by the addictiogenic environment might be 
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based, in order to regain control over the factors of the addictiogenic environment, reduce 
preventable addiction, and contribute to stepping up actions in the fight against NCDs. Two 
justifications for the use of law in controlling the factors of Europe’s currently strong addictiogenic 
environment were put forward –a rights-based justification based on the right to health, and an 
ethics-based justification based on the principles of social justice and stewardship.  
 
The right to health guarantees the provision of conditions in which individuals can live a life free of 
health-damaging addictions, and the Member States and the EU are under legal obligations to work 
expediently towards achieving such conditions, and avoid any actions which might put that objective 
in jeopardy. A socially just society will seek to eliminate inequalities wherever they exist, and 
pronounced inequalities exist in how individuals and communities are affected by the factors of the 
addictiogenic environment. Moreover, public authorities that have been delegated powers to 
provide public goods, such as the absence of a strong addictiogenic environment, should use those 
powers in order to re-shape the addictiogenic environment, acting on behalf of individuals who 
cannot achieve this themselves. 
 
These normative cases for action provide strong justification for the use of legal interventions to 
control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. Objections may be made that law is a coercive 
force that has no business being applied in order to shape individual lifestyles. However, the first 
responsibility of governments is ultimately to protect their populations. Thus, as was demonstrated 
in this chapter, when individuals are being inequitably deprived of opportunities for achieving their 
highest level of health – opportunities that they not only expect their governing authorities to 
provide, but are entitled to receive – the well-being of populations must be prioritised above 
objections to government intervention in individual lifestyles.  
 
Having established that public authorities would have a justified case for the use of law in 
combatting preventable addiction, the next chapter of this thesis seeks to make the case for the 
particular involvement of the EU in this endeavor. As outlined in the first chapter, the EU’s Member 
States have made a commitment to stepping up actions in the fight against NCDs, an objective that 
they cannot achieve individually in the conditions of globalisation that currently shape and define 
how governments protect their populations. Fueled as it is by the relentless engine of global free 
market competition, the addiction phenomenon is an aspect of NCD development that especially 
cannot be tackled by individual countries acting alone. Supranational organisations such as the EU 
must contribute to controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment, if preventable addiction 
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is to be successfully reduced in Europe. The next chapter therefore discusses in more detail the 
rationale for EU involvement in addiction policy, and the legal powers that would permit this 
involvement.  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR – DESIRABILITY OF AND 
COMPETENCE FOR EU INTERVENTION  
I. Introduction 
So far, this thesis has argued that the addiction phenomenon may be understood according to an 
addictiogenic environment model, whereby certain factors of an individual’s environment will, if 
uncontrolled, promote, encourage and facilitate the development of addictions, together creating 
conditions in which individuals suffering hard times might consider adapting to a life of focused 
vocational consumption of an object of addiction, with which they establish a pseudo-relationship, 
in order to cope with the experience of social dislocation. It was then argued that, in order to control 
the factors that constitute the addictiogenic environment, the use of legal interventions could be 
normatively justified by the existence of right to health, social justice and stewardship obligations 
that are placed upon public authorities. 
 
In this chapter, the contribution that EU policymakers should be expected to make to addiction 
policy in Europe will be analysed. Chapter One highlighted two points. First, some factors of the 
addictiogenic environment are generated by the fact that markets for potential objects of addiction 
are no longer confined by national borders. The trade in and promotion of products such as alcohol 
and tobacco, and services such as gambling, transcends nations. As such, a transnational response is 
often needed. Second, the EU has an obligation enshrined by the Treaties to assist the Member 
States in the development of their public health and social agendas. Article 168(1) states that ‘The 
Union shall encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas referred to in this 
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Article and, if necessary, lend support to their action’ and Article 153(1) states that ‘the Union shall 
support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: … (j) the 
combatting of social exclusion; (k) the modernisation of social protection systems’. Since all Member 
States have committed internationally to stepping up action in the fight against NCDs, part of which 
should involve combatting the root causes of addiction, the EU should consequently be obliged to 
assist its Member States in constructing effective and evidence based addiction policies.  
 
The EU, however, operates on the basis of conferred powers, which means that the EU cannot 
simply contribute to addiction governance in any way it wishes. It can only contribute using the 
powers that are conferred upon the EU legislature by the Member States.334 Since the EU began as a 
project to create interdependencies in the economies of the Member States rather than a project 
that integrated economic and social concerns,335 public health and social policy concerns were not 
initially part of the EU’s mandate,336 and thus the EU’s powers in these fields are only just beginning 
to take real shape. The continuing bias towards achieving economic rather than social goals has 
meant that, despite the expansion of the EU’s competences the fields of public health and social 
protection, there is still significant antipathy towards the involvement of the EU in sensitive aspects 
of these fields,337 such as the control of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
Therefore, one cannot simply assume that, because some factors of the addictiogenic environment 
require a transnational response, the EU will be able to provide this response. Although it is true that 
the objectives of the EU have become gradually more socially and health oriented,338 the necessity 
of EU action in the addiction field will not be accepted as a given in most quarters. It must be shown 
that the EU should and could contribute to the control of the addictiogenic environment, in support 
of its Member States’ efforts to step up action in the fight against NCDs.  
 
The first half of this chapter will therefore analyse arguments for and against the granting of 
competences to the EU that would permit action on addiction, and will seek to develop a rationale 
for why the EU should use the powers it has been granted to contribute to the control of Europe’s 
addictiogenic environment. The second half of this chapter will subsequently analyse the EU’s 
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competences to act in the fields of public health, social protection and the internal market, to show 
that the the EU has all the legal powers that it needs in order to discharge its addiction policy 
responsibilities.  
II. Desirability of EU action on addiction issues 
As highlighted above, the EU must show that it is competent to act in a certain policy field before 
acting. In fields where the EU shares competence with the Member States, or where it is only 
competent to lend support to the Member States, the question of the intensity of action that is 
permitted is complex. This is especially the case when it comes to the phenomenon of addiction.  As 
the CJEU confirmed in its Aragonesa judgement, a case which dealt with the regulation of alcohol 
advertising, when no EU harmonisation exists in a certain field, ‘it is for the Member States to decide 
on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which that 
protection is to be achieved’.339 The Member States are therefore extremely keen to protect their 
right to deal with social and health issues that are not already covered by common European 
standards, such as the field of addiction policy, and have consequently opposed the extension and 
application of EU competences to such issues.  
 
A. Arguments against EU action on addiction issues 
Member States often wish to exclude EU action on sensitive public health and social questions, such 
as the prevention of addiction, because they are unwilling to allow external decision makers, 
perhaps with no foreknowledge of the social dynamics that exist within their national territory, to 
influence choices on how they safeguard the well-being of their own nationals.340 One factor 
underlying this concern is that ‘cultural meanings instilled in human beings standardize their 
choices’341 – any effort to manage or guide individual choice, for instance on the consumption of 
potential objects of addiction, must take account of the cultural biases instilled in individuals by their 
cultural upbringing, which will be different from Member State to Member State. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has highlighted this in its case law, for example recognising 
that the consumption of alcohol ‘is linked to traditional social practices and to local habits and 
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customs’.342 Consequently, the argument can be made that those best placed to factor the influence 
of cultural bias into the re-shaping of the addictiogenic environment are national and subnational 
level decision makers, and that responsibility for addiction policy should therefore be kept at the 
national level. National governments should not have their ability to balance sensitive cultural, 
public health and social concerns compromised by interference from European policy makers who 
may have very limited knowledge of the way in which individuals brought up in different cultures 
will react to certain legal interventions. It is certainty true that public health interventions should be 
culturally sensitive in order to be most effective,343 and given that dozens of different cultures exist 
within the European Union, the argument can be made that setting common standards of protection 
will have undesired effects in at least some Member States.  
 
Another reason why Member States are reluctant to allow the EU to intervene to any great extent 
on public health or social issues is that they are wary of inviting what might be perceived as 
interference from an organisation that is perceived to lack institutional capacity to understand or act 
on social or public health concerns. As mentioned above, the EU has ‘traditionally focussed on 
essentially economic tasks’,344 and its role in social and public health matters is seen as ‘weak and 
circumscribed’345 by the Member States. As Radaelli points out, EU policymaking is largely perceived 
as being technocratic – based on knowledge, rationalisation, and expert discussion.346 Add two 
further perceptions to this – that ‘the technocrat feels uneasy under conditions of political conflict, 
ideological debates, and controversies on distributive issues of social justice’,347 and that EU 
policymakers have ‘limited expertise in the field of public health’348 – and the result has been a 
deeply ingrained belief that EU policymakers are ill-equipped to effectively manage social and public 
health issues such as the addictiogenic environment. This belief is reinforced by the EU’s ‘absence of 
budgetary resources’349 in public health and social policy. All in all, it is understandable that the 
nature of EU decision making should be targeted when making arguments that the EU should not 
play a major role in public health or social policymaking.  
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Consequently, the Member States have been reluctant to hand over any measure of control to the 
EU that will allow EU intervention on the question of addiction. This is borne out by the high levels of 
opposition to EU involvement in policy fields related to addictive objects, opposition which often 
demonstrates that Member States reject EU involvement for more inward looking reasons. For 
example, during the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive, Poland voiced consistent opposition 
to the proposals – their reasoning was dominated by concerns that the Directive would have 
negative economic consequences for Poland on account of tax revenue lost from reduced tobacco 
sales, and by the fact that Poland is the largest manufacturer of flavoured cigarettes in the EU.350 The 
House of Lords European Union Committee’s report on a new EU Alcohol Strategy notes in its 
chapter on alcohol taxation that proposals to update EU alcohol tax directives dating from 1992 
were blocked in the European Council in 2010 and not discussed since, and notes in particular the 
opposition of British MEPs to reviewing alcohol excise rates on account of the large revenues that 
the UK receives in taxation from alcohol sales.351 EU harmonisation measures relating to online 
gambling and money laundering were also opposed by Maltese MEPs, unsurprising given Malta’s 
permissive stance towards gambling regulation, and thus its high stake in gambling revenues.352 
Clearly then, Member States are reluctant for the EU to intervene in policymaking on addictive 
objects, especially when national interests are at stake. Having considered the arguments against EU 
legal intervention to help control the factors of the addictiogenic environment, the next section will 
move on to consider arguments that support such intervention.  
 
 
B. Arguments for EU action on addiction issues 
Despite the reluctance of the Member States to allow the EU to have any significant role in addiction 
policymaking, there are sound reasons why the EU should contribute to control of the addictiogenic 
environment. The first is that several important factors of the addictiogenic environment involve the 
movement of products and services across borders. As Beaglehole and Yach argue, ‘the modern 
phase of globalisation’ has resulted in ‘the increasingly globalised production and marketing of 
                                                          
350
 See: M Zatonski, ‘Evidence-based policymaking? The case of Polish opposition to the EU Tobacco Products 
Directive’ (2016) 2(1) Journal of Health Inequalities 36, 38. 
351
 House of Lords European Union Committee, Eighth Report: A new EU Alcohol Strategy? (2015) available 
online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/123/12302.htm, para 126.  
352
 See V Pop, ‘Gambling in the EU: A long way from harmonised rules’ (euobserver.com, Berlin, 7 April 2014), 
available online at https://euobserver.com/economic/123649 (last accessed 22 September 2016).  
 86 
tobacco, alcohol, and other products with adverse effects on health’.353 When objects of addiction 
are produced by multinational corporations that operate on a global scale, it is inevitable that many 
activities of theirs that constitute factors of the addictiogenic environment, such as the marketing of 
products354 or political lobbying,355 are not constrained by national borders. The very fact that the 
vast majority of addictive objects are goods and services that circulate within the internal market 
means that activities conducted in relation to trade in these goods will have a cross border 
dimension.356  Using the globalised marketplace, corporations act as ‘vectors of disease’,357 that 
contribute to the addictiogenic environment without regard for national borders. The tactics that 
are used to subvert effective public health interventions358 can be applied either to national political 
processes or to supranational political processes.359 In fact, it is often relatively  easy for 
corporations to exert influence on the policymaking process at the supranational level due to the 
proliferation of entry points that exist into supranational decision making processes, such as those of 
the EU.360  
 
Consequently, ‘there is an increasing need to establish global norms, both legally binding and non-
binding, across many spheres to balance otherwise unrestrained influences of powerful actors’.361 A 
single Member State is not in a position to prevent a multinational corporation from acting in a 
particular way in another Member State, or at the supranational level. Furthermore, each Member 
State may attempt different (and potentially ineffective) ways of preventing that behaviour in their 
own territories. To take advertising as an example again, some Member States favour a self-
regulatory approach and others a legislative approach, yet a legislative approach is supported by 
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evidence as being effective.362 With a choice available, multinational corporations can rely on their 
rights of establishment within the European Union in order to advertise in all Member States in 
accordance with the rules of the least restrictive Member State. In this situation, the ability of a 
supranational regulator to set common rules would be a distinct advantage in tackling a factor of the 
addictiogenic environment that is able to move from one Member State to another in search of the 
most favourable regulatory conditions. Therefore, where the cross-border activities of multinational 
corporations are concerned, the EU is in fact in a better position to be able to put in place 
supranational standards that control those activities wherever the corporation responsible for them 
might operate. In such a situation, allocating competences to the EU to achieve exactly this would be 
a move to support the Member States in protecting the health of their populations.  
 
A further reason for allowing the EU to contribute to addiction policy is that, in order to tackle many 
factors of the addictiogenic environment, the possible conflicts between national policies and 
supranational rules will need to be resolved at the supranational level. Member States cannot ignore 
that fact that the internal market, while it serves their economic interests well, can sometimes be an 
obstacle to social and public health interests. Many potential objects of addiction, especially 
products such as alcohol and unhealthy foods, are perceived as ordinary commodities and services, 
363 trade in which provides significant economic gains to many Member State economies.364 
Consequently, any policy that seeks to restrict the promotion, availability or attractiveness of these 
objects will have to be reconciled with its trade restrictive effects. If the trade restrictive effects of 
addiction policies are considered too great, the policy may not be permitted to stand at all, under 
internal market law. A recent example of Member State efforts to protect public health coming into 
conflict with EU internal market law is the Scotch Whisky case, in which Scottish legislation setting a 
minimum price per unit at which alcoholic beverages could be sold was held to conflict with internal 
market rules on the free movement of goods, and to be potentially disproportionate the public 
health objectives pursued, on the basis that less restrictive means of achieving those objectives were 
available.365 This is a good illustration of how, at present ‘health policies … are scrutinized 
themselves in terms of their compliance with and contribution to industry, trade and economic 
policies’.366 
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As a supranational organisation, the EU is well placed to identify situations in which the adoption of 
evidence based addiction policies may conflict with the rules protecting free movement within the 
internal market – and to remove the possibility for conflict between national and supranational rules 
– by placing the control of the addictiogenic environment at the supranational level. Granted, this 
may not always be possible when the exact nature of the evidence based measure to be adopted is 
in dispute. However, where there is no dispute as to the nature of the action that should be taken, 
placing certain commonly pursued addiction interventions beyond the conflict of norms involved in 
balancing national public health and social legislation with the free trade objectives of the EU would 
enable progress to be made in addiction prevention. Since only the EU is in a position to address 
such conflicts of norms, there is a strong case for allowing the EU to take a more active role on 
public health issues such as the prevention of addiction.  
 
The arguments for and against EU involvement in addiction policy are both strong, yet there is a 
compelling case that many factors of the addictiogenic environment simply cannot be tackled 
effectively by Member States acting alone. This being the case, the Treaty itself supports the 
involvement of the EU in public health and social matters where they could add real value. The 
principle of subsidiarity, often cited by the Member States in order to keep the EU out of public 
health and social matters, conversely supports EU action where Member State action is not 
sufficient to achieve the desired objectives. It is contained in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union, and states that: 
  
‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States … but rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’.  
        
According to a dynamic interpretation of the subsidiarity principle – and such an interpretation is 
encouraged by the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaties367 – the EU 
should act where it is demonstrably in a better position to the Member States to act, which is the 
case when it comes to factors of the addictiogenic environment that are transnational in nature, 
which cannot be effectively tackled by any one Member State acting alone, and in fact may be 
exacerbated by Member States taking divergent action. The EU therefore not only should, but must, 
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be involved in helping the Member States to tackle transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment, if these factors are to be addressed effectively.  
III. EU competence for action on addiction issues 
A. Introduction 
The previous section argued that, despite legitimate concerns that the EU should not be involved in 
the making of public health or social policy on account of potential insensitivities to cultural 
idiosyncrasies and lack of expertise, there are certain areas of addiction policy where the EU could in 
fact add value to the efforts of the Member States to control the factors of the addictiogenic 
environment. In such areas – where transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment are 
concerned – EU action is not only desirable but necessary.  
 
However, as highlighted above, the EU operates on the basis of conferred powers, meaning that EU 
policymakers cannot simply act in any way they please in order to tackle transnational factors of the 
addictiogenic environment. Under Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union: 
 
‘under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.’ 
 
Thus, despite there being a clear rationale for EU involvement in addiction policy, actual intervention 
can only take place within the limits of the EU’s conferred powers.  
 
This section will analyse the competences of the EU that would allow it to contribute to addiction 
policy. The analysis will seek to show that some of these competences contain more power than 
might be first thought, meaning that the EU not only has the reason but the means to provide useful 
and effective support to the Member States as they seek to control addiction development. 
 
The analysis below will consider three fields of EU competence that could be used to provide the 
legal basis for EU action on the addictiogenic environment. The first section below will explore the 
EU’s competence in the field of public health, contained in Article 168 TFEU. The second section will 
consider the EU’s competence in the field of social protection, contained in Articles 151 TFEU and 
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153 TFEU. The final section will examine the EU’s internal market competence contained in Article 
114 TFEU.  
 
  
B. Article 168 TFEU – Public Health 
i. The development of the EU’s public health competence 
The health of the public had been a concern of EU political activity for many years before the EU was 
formally given a competence in public health. As Greer points out, health ministers had been 
meeting at EU level since the 1970s, and a number of EU level programmes had been set up,368 for 
example the Europe Against Cancer Programme.369 The EU was first given competence to act in the 
field of public health in the Maastricht Treaty,370 which entered into effect in 1993. Article 129 EC 
provided the EU with a complementary competence to encourage ‘cooperation between the 
Member States … and, if necessary, lend support to their actions’ in the field of public health. The 
granting of this competence was viewed at the time as either ‘setting limits to the expansion of EU 
level activities in the public health field’371 or as ‘little more than a formalization of earlier 
arrangement’.372 In any event, Article 129 EC ‘represented a compromise between those 
governments of Member States who did not want any EU mandate in health, and those who wanted 
to go further’.373  
 
The BSE crisis provided impetus for the revision of the public health competence at the Amsterdam 
Treaty.374 As a result of the ‘strong desire of the Member States and the Community institutions not 
to repeat the errors made in the BSE affair’,375 Article 152 EC was introduced into the Treaty, which 
now required that all policies at EU level ‘ensure’ rather than just ‘contribute to’ a high level of 
human health protection.376 The reforms introduced at Amsterdam however were small, and no new 
substantive powers relevant to the control of factors of the addictiogenic environment were given to 
the EU.  
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This did occur in the most recent update to the public health competence, which was made by the 
Lisbon Treaty.377 Article 168 TFEU remains complementary in nature, however an interesting 
addition was made from the perspective of addiction governance. Article 168(5) TFEU adds a specific 
power to adopt measures in relation to alcohol and tobacco, and is ‘the first explicit reference to 
tobacco and alcohol ever made in the EU treaties’.378 It therefore provides a legal basis for the EU to 
act directly on matters of addiction prevention that are related in some way to alcohol and tobacco 
control. This has gone some way to closing the competence gap that exists between the EU’s formal 
powers in the field of public health and its policy ambitions, even if not fully closing it.379  
 
ii. The complementary nature of Article 168 TFEU 
Article 6 TEU lists ‘protection and improvement of human health’ among the areas of 
complementary Union competence, and Article 168(1) TFEU states that the Union action in the field 
of public health ‘shall complement national policies’. According to Working Group V of the European 
Convention, which was working on drafting the Constitutional Treaty in 2002, the nature of powers 
currently known as complementary competences (the Working Group proposed renaming them 
‘supporting measures’) are ‘treaty provisions giving authority to the Union to adopt certain 
measures of low intensity with respect to policies which continue to be the responsibility of the 
Member States’.380  
 
The fact that the powers given to the EU in public health are complementary in nature appears to 
confirm ‘the primacy of the responsibility of the [M]ember [S]tates’381 in fields such as addiction 
policy. Accordingly, some have argued that ‘there is very limited room for manoeuvre in public 
health law at Union level’.382 However, the fact that the powers granted by Article 168 are 
complimentary do not necessarily limit what the EU can contribute to addiction policy at the 
supranational level. Article 168 TFEU permits actions of low intensity, but there is nothing to suggest 
that actions of low intensity cannot be of high effectiveness.  
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iii. The potential of Article 168(5) TFEU for EU addiction policy.  
Article 168(5) TFEU, as stated above, contains the first specific reference to alcohol and tobacco that 
has occurred in the Treaties. It states that: 
 
‘The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure (...) may also adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human 
health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges (…) and measures 
which have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and 
the abuse of alcohol, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States’.  
 
Article 168(5) TFEU potentially gives the EU a useful source of power for acting in the field of 
addiction prevention. Not only are alcohol and tobacco specifically flagged as objects that the EU has 
a mandate for acting on, but the provision generally gives power to act in order to ‘combat the 
major cross-border health scourges’. Multinational corporations whose actions constitute vectors of 
disease and factors of the addictiogenic environment are just such a cross-border threat to health, 
for example. Thus, the potential of Article 168(5) TFEU as a legal basis that could provide the 
foundation for the EU to engage in the control of supranational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment should be examined carefully.  
 
a. Incentive measures 
Understanding the meaning of ‘incentive measures’, and the difference between those and 
‘measures’, which are also referred to in Article 168(5) TFEU, is key to unlocking the potential of this 
provision for EU action on addiction. Examination of the development of the provision shows that 
inclusion of both terms is the result of imprecise drafting, and that within Article 168(5) TFEU they 
both refer to the same thing. Article 152(4)(c) EC of the Nice Treaty – the precursor to Article 168(5) 
TFEU – used only the term ‘incentive measures’ and excluded harmonisation. Other provisions 
within the public health competence that did not exclude harmonisation referred to ‘measures’. Fast 
forward to the Lisbon Treaty, and Article 168(5) TFEU still refers to ‘incentive measures’ and still 
excluded harmonisation, and other provisions – for example Article 168(4)(a)-(c) TFEU – only refer to 
‘measures’, and contain as specific derogation from complementary competence to permit 
harmonisation. Clearly, two levels of intensity of action are maintained still in the public health 
competence – acts of higher intensity that envisage harmonisation, and acts of a lower intensity that 
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do not. Article 168(5) TFEU is clearly intended to confer powers of low intensity, and thus we should 
not be confused by reference to two apparently different types of power. 
 
Low intensity ‘incentive measures’ have been argued to only confer the ability to adopt non-binding 
acts, however there is nothing in the provision to prevent incentive measures being Regulations or 
Decisions – indeed the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ is envisaged – in which case incentive 
measures could be binding. Grimonprez points out that if a European incentive measures is designed 
to encourage certain behaviour by actors within the Member States, then ‘Member States may be 
obliged, first, to adapt their legislation so that beneficiaries can satisfy the conditions’383 that are 
necessary in order to take advantage of the incentive offered. This does not amount to 
harmonisation of Member State laws through the back door – harmonisation substitutes Member 
State for European control over the direction of certain aspects of policy, and in the scenario above 
‘there is no pre-emption. Member States keep their basic competence … but they have to exercise it 
in compliance with EU law containing incentive measures’.384 As Hervey explains, if a European 
measure requires compliance with ‘procedural obligations to report within certain timeframes [or] 
provide information within certain parameters’, there is no substitution of the basic Member State 
prerogative to direct policy within the policy field.385  
 
Incentive measures offer several advantages over traditional command-and-control legislation. They 
are ‘ethically less problematic than coercive measures’,386 making them simpler to justify in sensitive 
policy fields. Incentive measures offer policy makers lower contracting costs, are able to 
accommodate diversity, are flexible, can be adopted quickly, and offer the possibility for 
incrementalism.387 An example of a strong incentive is a financial incentive – ‘public health will 
always turn on allocational decisions’,388 so giving actors enough financial incentive to choose 
approaches that will benefit public health is one powerful way to influence the direction of public 
health policy. Hervey points out that ‘although the EU’s budget is modest, the EU institutions have 
traditionally used the provision of financial incentives to promote the integration process’,389 and if 
the EU can use its own money as an incentive, or incentivise other actors to use theirs, the EU can 
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act as a ‘supranational policy entrepreneur to cultivate shifts towards a particular idea’390 in the 
addiction field. In summary, ‘people respond to incentives’391 and therefore ‘understanding the 
incentives of all the players in a given scenario’392 can make incentive measures adopted under the 
legal basis provided by Article 168 TFEU, even if non-binding, a powerful tool through which the EU 
could discharge its supranational responsibilities on addiction.  
  
b. Prohibition of harmonisation 
Understanding what is covered by the prohibition on harmonisation in Article 168(5) TFEU is also 
crucial to unlocking the potential of this provision for EU action on addiction. There are two ways in 
which the phrase ‘excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ 
could be interpreted. First, the wide interpretation, which is that EU law ‘must not modify existing 
national public health legislation’.393 A wide view of harmonisation is that EU laws will ‘not merely 
displace but replace individual national political choices’.394 Second, the narrow interpretation, 
which is that EU law must not constitute the purposeful ‘de jure’395 homogenisation of national 
rules. This narrower view of harmonisation means that if EU law has the ‘indirect effect of 
harmonizing … [this] does not necessarily mean that it conflicts with the prohibition on 
harmonization’.396 
 
The wider understanding is supported by the case law of the CJEU. In UK v Parliament and Council, 
harmonisation was understood as ‘measures for the approximation’ of national laws, following the 
letter of the Treaties.397 Furthermore, in the recent Poland v Parliament and Council judgement, it 
was held that ‘by using the words “measures for approximation” … The authors of the Treaty 
intended to convey on the EU legislature a discretion, depending on the general context and the 
specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonized, as regards the methods of approximation 
most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields with complex technical 
features’.398 In light of these judicial statements, we should understand harmonisation to mean a 
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process that encompasses various methods, whether direct or indirect in their effect, of substituting 
national legislative initiative for that of EU legislative initiative. Thus, the prohibition on 
harmonisation (what cannot be done) is consistent with the understanding of what incentive 
measures entails (what can be done) – the overall position is therefore that Article 168(5) TFEU 
provides legal basis for any EU act that seeks to organise or incentivise the way in which Member 
States adopt laws relating to addiction, but does not provide legal basis for any EU action that would 
seek through any means to remove control over a particular substantive policy decision from the 
Member States. That power must be found elsewhere in the Treaties.  
 
iii. Summary 
The above analysis shows that Article 168(5) TFEU could provide sufficient power for the EU to be 
able to take a range of non-harmonising actions that organise and guide the activates of the 
Member States in addiction policy. While the public health competence cannot provide the legal 
basis for setting common EU standards, it can act as the legal basis for the creation of strategic 
plans, the allocation of EU funds, the issuing of recommendations and the convening of forums, all 
of which, if employed in order to support and inform the application of more coercive interventions 
in order to enhance their effectiveness, are options for EU contribution that should not be ignored. 
The fact that the EU has responsibilities in addiction governance does not mean that the EU must 
necessarily discharge these responsibilities through legislative action399 – it means that the EU has a 
responsibility to discharge certain functions of addiction governance that cannot otherwise be 
achieved by the Member States. If these functions can be achieved through Article 168 TFEU, then 
the powers it provides should not be neglected, on the misplaced belief that complimentary 
competences offer little power to the EU.  
 
C. Article 153 TFEU 
i. The development of the EU’s social competences  
The EU’s social competence has evolved to be one of the ‘most complex competences within the 
Treaties’400 – therefore understanding its development will better aid an understanding of how it 
might be expected to underpin EU intervention in addiction governance.  An embryonic social 
competence – more a social aspiration401 resulting from market integration spill-over402 – was 
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included in Article 117 EEC of the Treaty of Rome403 with the sole purpose of creating a European 
labour market.404 The initial reluctance of the founding Member States to include social standards in 
the European integration project405 created a ‘political decoupling of economic integration and 
social-protection issues’,406 that successive Treaty amendments have found difficult to piece back 
together. 
 
The first explicit EU social competence came in the Single European Act of 1986, however no powers 
relating to social protection were included. Progress slowed when the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989407 had to be excluded from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
due to UK opposition, and was instead annexed to the Treaty as a Protocol on Social Policy.408 The 
formal powers of the EU therefore remained unchanged, reflecting the continuing ‘refusal of 
Member States to countenance an amendment to the Treaties that would result in the 
establishment of a broad EU competence in the field of social welfare’. 409  
 
A change in UK government in 1997 broke the political deadlock over EU social policy, facilitating the 
inclusion of the 1989 Charter along with the 1961 European Social Charter410 in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997.411 Amsterdam also updated the objectives of the European Economic 
Community to include ‘a high level of employment and social protection … [and] the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life’,412 and introduced Articles 136 and 137 EEC. Despite this 
progress, the EU’s legal competence was still restricted to supporting and complementing the 
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Member States in building the European labour market,413 demonstrating that the Member States 
were still ‘ambivalent’414 towards the role of the EU in social protection policy.  
 
In March 2000 however, the Lisbon European Council committed the EU to becoming ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, and to  ‘ensuring that the emergence 
of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social 
exclusion and poverty’.415 This ‘crucial point’416 for EU social policy ‘attempted to rebalance the 
economic and social dimension’,417 of EU policymaking, and consequently the Nice Treaty of 2000 
finally updated the EU’s social competence to include powers in fields including social security, the 
combatting of social exclusion and the modernization of social protection systems.418  
 
Despite these additions, it is arguable that the Lisbon Summit did more to entrench economic biases 
than to resolve them. It described Europe’s people as its ‘main asset’, while suggesting that social 
exclusion can be tackled ‘by creating the economic conditions for greater prosperity’.419 Moreover, 
the emphasis was on ensuring that the ‘new economy does not compound the existing social 
problems’,420 rather than on ensuring that the pursuit of social protection will not hinder economic 
development. This subtle re-entrenchment of social policy as an agent of productivity indicates that 
the Lisbon Summit did not particularly change anything.421 As Armstrong points out ‘a decade on 
[after the Lisbon Summit] … joblessness was on the rise and social cohesion strained’.422 The so-
called Lisbon agenda was subsequently revised in 2005 and the work on social inclusion and 
protection was suspended.423  Despite the rhetoric, the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 left the EU’s formal 
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competences in social policy unchanged from Nice,424 arguably confirming the stagnation of EU 
social policy,425 and doing ‘little to bolster the EU’s social policy toolkit’.426 This must be seen as a 
product of the continuing position that ‘the member States do not wish to delegate control and thus 
prefer a scheme of “soft” and flexible cooperation to “hard” legislation’.427 Consequently, it may be 
far more difficult to extract power for EU action on transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment from the EU social competences than is the case for the public health competence.  
 
ii. The nature of the EU’s social competences 
While the EU’s current public health competence is distinctly complimentary in nature, the EU’s 
current social competence cannot be so easily categorised. Some aspects of social policy are subject 
to shared competence. Article 4(2)(b) states that ‘social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty’ 
will be a shared competence of the EU. Looking to the objectives of social policy as set out in Article 
151 TFEU that are relevant to addiction policy, ‘the Union and the Member States … shall have as 
their objectives … proper social protection …and the combating of exclusion’. It furthermore states 
that ‘to this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which take account of 
the diverse forms of national practices … and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the 
Union’s economy’. These definitions are vague and, as Craig notes, harmonisation is mentioned ‘in 
guarded tones’.428 Examining the detailed list of EU social powers set out in Article 153 TFEU does 
not help either, as this Article too does ‘not provide explicit guidance as to which areas fall within 
shared competence, and which do not’.429  
 
Articles 153(1)(j) and (k) TFEU confer a power on the Union to ‘support and complement the 
activities of the Member States’ in the fields of social exclusion and the modernisation of social 
protection systems respectively – both fields in which the EU could make important contributions to 
addressing social dislocation factors of the addictiogenic environment. Although social policy is 
prima facie an area of shared competence, these particular provisions appear to confer no such 
power. They are excluded from the fields in which the EU may adopt ‘by means of directives, 
minimum requirements for gradual implementation’.430 Furthermore, the language of Article 153 
TFEU, which permits the EU to ‘support and complement’ the Member States, ‘does not fit naturally 
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with shared competence’,431 hinting instead that such powers are, instead, complimentary. Thus, the 
EU’s competence to act in the fields of social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection 
systems does not appear to be a shared competence.  
 
These powers may instead be coordinating competences, which confer powers on the EU to ‘provide 
“arrangements” for the Member States to exercise their competences in a coordinating manner’.432 
This, however, is unlikely. Although Article 5(3) TFEU states that ‘The Union may take initiatives to 
ensure coordination of Member States’ social policies’, the list of coordinating competences in 
Article 2(3) TFEU does not include social policy. As Armstrong points out, the fact that the EU shall 
coordinate only economic and employment policy according to Article 2(3), but may also ensure the 
coordination of Member States’ social policy according to Article 5(3) TFEU, is a by-product of two 
things: the Member States’ historic unwillingness to formally divest any further social powers to the 
EU, but their recognition of the Lisbon Agenda’s vision for European coordination of social policies 
through governance instruments such as the Open Method of Coordination.433 Thus, Article 5(3) 
TFEU represents a compromise over the formal consitutionalisation of the Open Method of 
Coordination as a tool of EU competence,434 yet does not confer upon the EU the right to control the 
coordination of Member State social policies. In any event, if it is accepted that ‘the adoption of 
Union acts resulting in some degree of harmonisation would be constitutionally permitted’435 under 
a coordinating competence, then the powers conferred in Article 153(1)(j) and (k) cannot be 
coordinating competences. This is because harmonisation of the Member State’s social policies is 
absolutely precluded, both formally according to Article 153(2)(a), which states that the EU may 
adopt measures ‘excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’, 
and on a practical level by virtue of the fact that ‘the present diversity of national social-protection 
systems and the political salience of these differences make it practically impossible for them to 
agree on common European solutions’.436   
 
The EU’s powers in the field of social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection systems 
must therefore be seen as complimentary competences, despite the fact that social policy is not 
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listed in what appears to be a finite list of such competence in Article 6 TFEU.437 However ‘when 
reading the TFEU as a whole … it becomes clear that there are other important areas in which the EU 
is limited … to supporting etc action’.438 It can therefore be argued that Articles 153(1)(j) and (k) 
TFEU are complimentary in nature. Article 153 TFEU opens with the statement that the EU ‘shall 
support and complement the activities of the Member States’ in the fields therein. Furthermore, 
according to Article 5(2) TEU, ‘competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
with the Member States’  – if exclusive, shared or coordinating competences are not conferred by 
Articles 153(1)(j) and (k) TFEU, then primary competence in those fields must remain with the 
Member States, leaving any powers that are conferred as complimentary, since such powers by 
virtue of Article 2(5) TFEU must be exercised ‘without thereby superseding [Member State] 
competence in these areas’. Finally, Articles 153(1)(j) and(k) TFEU do not confer the power to adopt 
directives or harmonisation measures according to Article 153(2)(a) TFEU, and cannot ‘affect the 
right of the Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and 
must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof’, therefore meaning that they will not 
permit the creation of common standards.  
 
It therefore appears that the EU’s competences in the fields of social exclusion and the 
modernisation of social protection systems are, as with its competences in public health, 
complimentary in nature. The EU will therefore be able to contribute to addiction governance in 
these fields through action that supports but does not replace the activities of the Member States. In 
order to understand how this contribution could be maximised, it will be necessary to examine the 
primary legal tool that has been developed for the exercise of EU social competences, the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), and it is to an analysis of what OMC processes can contribute to the 
control of factors of the addictiogenic environment that we now turn.  
 
iii. The Open Method of Coordination – the EU’s social competence tool 
Unlike the EU’s public health competence, Article 153 is more explicit in defining the actions that the 
EU is permitted to take under its complimentary competence. Article 153(2)(a) states that the 
Parliament and Council ‘may adopt measures designed to encourage cooperation between Member 
States through initiatives aimed at improving knowledge, developing exchanges of information and 
best practices, promoting innovative approaches and evaluating experiences’. The tool envisaged for 
the implementation of such measures was the OMC.   
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The OMC was created in order to reconcile the need to promote the constitutional equality of 
economic and social imperatives with the need to work within the constraints imposed by the 
diversity of European social systems. As Ferrera explains,439 the increasing desire for cooperation in 
and improvement of social protection in Europe led to the Commission requesting the extension of 
OMC processes (the foundations for which were laid by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties in 
relation to economic and employment policy440) to social exclusion through two Communications.441 
The Commission noted the growing intent of the Member States to promote inclusion, that ‘the 
European Union wishes to make a political commitment to this end’ and that this could be achieved 
through ‘open forms of cooperation between Member States rather than … [through] a heavy 
coordination process’.442 The OMC was duly extended to social inclusion at the Lisbon Summit, 
which proclaimed that ‘policies for combating social exclusion should be based on an open method 
of coordination combining national action plans and a Commission initiative for cooperation’.443 
Thus an OMC was established in the social exclusion field, yet was not given a Treaty basis at Lisbon 
to match those for economic and employment policy.  
 
The label ‘OMC’ in fact describes a variety of processes that provide an organisational framework for 
the activities of the Member States.444 In essence it is ‘an experimentalist approach to EU 
governance based on iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common European 
objectives and organised mutual learning’.445 Each OMC process can be slightly different in 
emphasis, content and goals, however will share two basic characteristics: ‘policy choices remain at 
the national level and European legislation is explicitly excluded’.446 An OMC process typically aims 
to encourage the convergence of Member State policy towards a common standard through a 
combination of common indicators, national and subnational targets and policies, the setting of 
implementation timetables, exchange of best practice, progress monitoring, periodic reporting, and 
peer review.447 The purpose of OMC is thus to act as ‘a cognitive and normative tool for defining and 
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building consensus around a distinctive “European” (or perhaps more accurately “EU”) “Social 
Model” and policy paradigm based on shared values and objectives’.448 It is therefore unsurprising 
that this mode of policy making was seized upon to break the political impasse over how the EU 
should contribute to policymaking on social exclusion.449   
 
OMC processes offer several opportunities for addiction policymaking. Primarily, OMC processes 
offer a method of promoting common social solutions to common social problems where there is no 
formal EU power to harmonise. OMCs are attractive in these situations on account of being ‘a 
mechanism that may help to solve pressing national socioeconomic issues … without mandating 
conformity in commitments or mode of implementation’.450 Engaging with OMCs is appealing for 
states because it is an alternative to doing nothing in sensitive fields, where pressure nonetheless 
exists to do something.451 Furthermore, an OMC process ‘transcends the dichotomies of national vs. 
European and formal vs. informal policymaking’452. It is an option in sensitive social policy areas, 
such as the combatting of social dislocation, which allows Member States and EU institutions to side-
step arguments over the boundaries of European competence or the application of the subsidiarity 
principle. Unanimous decision making is still required for the use of European competences in the 
social field, and thus an OMC offers an ‘essential mechanism for progress’.453 Finally, by simply 
encouraging and facilitating discussion among the Member States on shared problems such as the 
addictiogenic environment, OMC processes raise ‘the political salience and ambitions of … social 
inclusion policies at the national as well as the EU level’454 and contribute to ‘broad shifts in national 
policy orientation and thinking, involving the incorporation of EU concepts and categories into 
domestic debates’.455  
 
The OMC is not without flaws. There are no formal enforcement mechanisms to ensure that 
commitments made in an OMC process are actually carried out,456 meaning that actual policy 
progress relies solely on the political drive of the Member States participating in the OMC.457 
Furthermore, for all the deadlock that might be relieved through an OMC process, the Member 
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States ‘continue to operate under exactly the same legal and economic constraints of economic 
integration which limit their policy choices when they are acting individually’.458 The OMC would be 
no solution to the ‘constitutional asymmetry’459 between internal market and social policy 
imperatives. Moreover, while OMC processes may be a way of influencing Member States to adopt 
common solutions to common social problems, the influence of such debates can work two ways. 
The Member States can exert their own influence back on the process,460 meaning that some 
Member States may be pressured into making fundamental structural alterations to their social 
protection systems that may not be suitable or affordable for that Member State.461   
 
In summary, the OMC is a process that holds promise for enabling the EU to actually use its social 
competences in a way that may be able to generate discussion on factors of the addictiogenic 
environment that promote social dislocation. It is true that there is an absence of hard data available 
to assess whether OMC processes are effective or not,462 however, despite the many criticisms that 
the OMC has drawn in the literature,463 it is nevertheless the case that the process is available to EU 
policy makers in the field of social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection systems, and 
has the potential to be implemented in ways that could add value to addiction policy.464   
 
D. Article 114 TFEU 
Articles 168 TFEU and 153 TFEU provide legal bases for the EU to take action to support the Member 
States in addiction policy, however neither competence supports the creation of common standards 
at EU level. While it was noted above that the EU’s responsibilities in addiction governance do not 
simply mean that the EU must seek to legislate, the creation of supranational standards in response 
to some transnational threats to the health of European citizens should certainly be seen as one of 
those responsibilities, especially when it involves a conflict of norms between the national and EU 
level. In order to discharge these responsibilities, the EU must rely on powers other than those 
provided by the public health and social competences.  
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Article 114 TFEU, one of the EU’s general competences, has historically been the Treaty provision 
relied upon in these circumstances. Article 114 TFEU provides a legal basis for the EU to harmonise 
Member States laws for the purpose of ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market. 
Article 114(1) TFEU reads as follows:  
 
‘The European Parliament and the Council shall … adopt the measures for the approximation 
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’.  
 
Since Article 114 TFEU grants powers specifically for the development of the internal market, it 
offers the EU an ideal opportunity to ensure that the development of the internal market can be 
reconciled with the implementation of measures that would effectively protect individuals from the 
influence of the addictiogenic environment. Article 114 TFEU is therefore a potentially powerful and 
valuable tool for tackling some of the deepest rooted and most intractable factors of the 
addictiogenic environment, namely the policymaking biases that prioritise the pursuit of free market 
ideals over the protection of health. The sections below will explore the conditions for recourse to 
Article 114 TFEU, and the ways in which it might be employed to control transnational factors of the 
addictiogenic environment.  
 
i. Conditions for recourse to Article 114 
The test for recourse to Article 114 was laid out in the now famous case of Germany v Parliament 
and Council (Tobacco Advertising 1), in which Germany argued that the EU’s internal market 
competence did not provide sufficient legal basis for the adoption of Directive 98/43/EC on the 
prohibition of tobacco advertising within the EU. The Court went to great lengths to ensure that the 
power granted by Article 114 TFEU will be used for internal market building rather than internal 
market regulation. Indeed, it asserted that ‘to construe [Article 114 TFEU] as meaning that it vests in 
the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would … be incompatible 
with the principle … that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on 
it’.465  
 
To this end, the Court set out a test that somehow managed to be both detailed in terms of the 
conditions that the EU legislature must fulfill, yet incredibly vague in how these conditions might be 
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interpreted. A measure seeking to rely on Article 114 TFEU must be ‘intended to improve the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market’.466 It must ‘genuinely have 
as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’.467 And it must ‘in fact [pursue] the objective stated by the community legislature’.468 In 
other words, to be based on Article 114 TFEU, a measure must intend to improve the internal 
market, and must pursue a course of action that theoretically and practically achieves this. 
 
In addition to the test, the Court made a number of follow up statements regarding the 
interpretation of the test when the measure in question has other objectives besides the building of 
the internal market – helpfully for our purposes, the other objective in the case was the protection 
of public health. The Court stated that the fact that harmonisation is excluded in Article 168(5) TFEU 
‘does not mean that harmonizing measures adopted on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty 
cannot have any impact on the protection of human health’.469 It also stated, that provided the 
conditions above were met, ‘the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that 
legal basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be 
made’.470 The way in which the test for recourse to Article 114 TFEU was formulated means that it is 
highly probable that the EU’s harmonisation powers can be used in order to control transnational 
factors of the addictiogenic environment, so long as some contribution is also made to removing an 
obstacle to free movement within the internal market. The subsection below will illustrate how the 
interpretation of the test following Tobacco Advertising 1 has turned this probability into a virtual 
certainty.  
 
ii. Interpretation of the conditions for recourse to Article 114 
The way in which the Tobacco Advertising test was applied, especially in the follow up case of 
Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising 2) has meant that, while the Court were at 
pains to ensure that Article 114 TFEU did not become a floodgate provision that gave the EU 
competence to adopt harmonising legislation on virtually any subject, this is precisely what Article 
114 TFEU has evolved into. In attempting to set conditions that would tie the use of Article 114 TFEU 
to internal market building, the Court actually provided a generous and malleable drafting guide471 
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for the use of Article 114 TFEU to achieve objectives in virtually any policy field that has an internal 
market dimension.  
 
If the CJEU were truly worried about Article 114 TFEU turning into a general regulatory power, one 
might think that the first line of defense against such a development – the application of general 
principles of EU law such as proportionality or subsidiarity – would have been pursued with greater 
vigour in subsequent cases. However, the application of the proportionality and subsidiarity 
principles by the CJEU to exercises of Article 114 TFEU has done little to constrain and more to 
permit the use of the internal market competence for public health purposes.  
 
The CJEU’s approach to proportionality was demonstrated in the Swedish Match case.472 The Court, 
in upholding a total ban on the marketing of snus (an oral tobacco product), held that ‘only if a 
measure adopted in this field is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective’,473 will its 
legitimacy be called into question. Further evidence of a light touch approach to proportionality can 
be seen in the more recent case of Vodafone, in which Article 114 TFEU was the legal basis for 
regulation of mobile phone roaming charges. In this case, the CJEU admitted that it has:  
 
‘accepted that in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the Community legislature must 
be allowed a broad discretion in the areas in which its action involves political, economic or 
social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and 
evaluations’.474 
 
The CJEU here confirmed its choice to defer to the EU legislature on all political, economic or social 
decisions relating to how and why Article 114 TFEU should be used. With this, the value of 
examining whether the real reasons for the use of Article 114 TFEU are proportionate are all but 
eliminated. Advocate General Kokott confirmed this position in her Opinion on Poland’s challenge to 
the revised Tobacco Products Directive, emphasising that the margin of discretion means that ‘an 
infringement of the principle of proportionality by the Union legislature can be taken to exist only 
where the EU measure concerned is manifestly disproportionate’.475 The EU accordingly ‘now seems 
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to have a broad discretion in how to exercise its broad discretion’,476 thus further reducing the limits 
placed on the use of Article 114 TFEU.  
 
If the principle of proportionality cannot place limits upon the use of Article 114 TFEU, then what of 
the principle of subsidiarity? Since the subsidiarity principle is essentially a form of ‘federal 
proportionality’477 there is no reason for its application to the use of Article 114 TFEU to be any more 
effective than the proportionality principle. Vodafone confirms this – the CJEU dedicated just two 
paragraphs to evaluating the compliance of the contested Regulation with the subsidiarity principle, 
simply accepting the reasoning put forward by the EU legislature without further scrutiny, rather 
than attempting to actually assess the added value of Union action.478 Advocate General Kokott 
confirmed this weak approach to how the subsidiarity principle is applied to the use of Article 114 
TFEU – ‘the Court can reasonably review only whether the Union’s political institutions have kept 
within the limits of the discretion conferred on them in the exercise of their competences in the light 
of the principle of subsidiarity’.479     
 
Thus, with each subsequent application, interpretation and reapplication of the test formulated in 
Tobacco Advertising 1, the EU legislature has become more adept at framing measures in terms of 
how they will improve the internal market, when their true purpose and effect is to further some 
other policy objective. The Court has seemingly also been increasingly prepared to ‘find some 
connection between national disparities and the four freedoms so as to trigger Article 114, without 
too close an inquiry as to the reality of the impact on these freedoms’.480 This cycle of interpretation 
has led to the development of a ‘threshold so apparently low and potentially subjective as to no 
longer guarantee that a given proposal manifests any meaningful and demonstrable connection to 
the internal market’.481  
 
As a result, ‘providing the drafting is well-chosen, the Court has no plausible basis on which to set 
aside the legislative act’,482 an eventuality that has been borne out on several occasions that are 
relevant from the point of view of addiction policy. These shall be analysed in the final subsection 
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below to show how the powers granted by Article 114 TFEU could be applied to create common 
European standards that control transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
iii. Applications of Article 114 in addiction policy  
The powers for public health intervention that are provided by the EU’s internal market 
harmonisation competence are significant, and could be put to good use in discharging the 
responsibility that the EU has for addressing transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment. 
Based on the already approved uses of Article 114 TFEU, the following analysis seeks to explore the 
types of intervention that could realistically be made under the internal market competence.  
 
Article 114 TFEU could be used to implement bans on the marketing of products that are traded 
across borders. Advertising bans were, of course, the subject of the Tobacco Advertising litigation 
itself, and the CJEU clearly indicated, even before setting out its test, that ‘in principle, therefore, a 
Directive prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products in periodicals, magazines and newspapers 
could be adopted on the basis of [Article 114] of the Treaty’.483 More stringent marketing measures 
have also been approved by the Court, for example in Swedish Match, where it was held that 
‘requiring all the Member States to authorise the marketing of the product or products concerned 
(…) or even provisionally or definitively prohibiting the marketing of a product’484 may be an 
appropriate response under Article 114 TFEU. Total marketing bans were also upheld by the CJEU in 
Alliance for Natural Health485 and Arnold André.486 Consequently, one might conclude that bans on 
advertising, sponsorship or other forms of marketing in relation to addictive objects other than 
tobacco, such as alcohol or unhealthy foods, are legally possible under the powers granted by Article 
114 TFEU.  
 
Another intervention that the EU might adopt, and which has been subject to speculation in the 
literature, is the adoption of plain packaging for tobacco products.487 Such an intervention has been 
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highly controversial,488 yet it is predicted that it would result in a significant reduction in the appeal 
of tobacco products, thus making it a prime candidate for inclusion in addiction policy. Its adoption 
at EU level would rely on the EU legislature establishing that there is a barrier to internal market 
operation resulting from disparities between the Member State’s approaches to tobacco regulation, 
or the risk of significant distortions of competition from these approaches, and that mandating plain 
packaging is a proportionate response. Following the judgements in Poland v Parliament and Council 
and Phillip Morris v Secretary of State for Health489 from the CJEU and British American Tobacco and 
Secretary of State for Health490 from the UK High Court, the legality of EU legislation on plain 
packaging has received a significant boost. In Poland v Parliament and Council and Philip Morris the 
CJEU confirmed that Article 114 TFEU is an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of measures 
mandating larger health warnings on tobacco products and banning characterising flavours, and 
found that such measures were proportionate, while in British American Tobacco the UK High Court 
spoke out in favour of the proportionality of plain packaging measures, Mr Justice Green stating that 
‘the Secretary of State has adduced ample evidence to support the suitability and appropriateness’ 
of plain packaging regulations, and that he ‘rejects[s] the submission that there is a less intrusive but 
equally effective way of addressing the Government’s health concerns’.491 With these votes of 
confidence, it would appear that the EU legislature could pursue the adoption of plain packaging 
measures using the legal basis provided by Article 114 TFEU.  
 
A further intervention that could be adopted using the powers provided by Article 114 TFEU might 
be the investigation of multinational corporations that are suspected of irresponsible practices that 
contravention EU regulations – for example the rules on alcohol marketing laid down by the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive,492 but which the First Application Report on the Directive 
suspected were regularly circumvented.493 At present no truly effective way exists to investigate 
compliance with EU rules such as these. The ability to set up conduct scrutiny authorities under the 
authority of Article 114 TFEU has however been addressed by the CJEU in other fields. In the case of 
UK v Parliament,494  the CJEU held that Article 114 TFEU would provide the legal basis for the 
enactment of a Regulation that gave powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority, 
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which could be used to investigate natural and legal persons. In its judgement the Court held that 
‘nothing in the wording of Article 114 TFEU implies that the addressees of the measures adopted by 
the EU legislature on the basis of that provision can only be Member States’.495 Thus, there is the 
possibility that in the addiction policy field, Article 114 could be used to create conduct scrutiny 
authorities that would be able to police compliance with EU public health standards.  
III. Conclusion 
Following the conclusions reached in the previous two chapters – that the addiction phenomenon 
may be explained by an addictiogenic environment model, and that the use of legal intervention in 
order to control factors of the addictiogenic environment that promote, encourage and facilitate the 
development of addictions is justified – this chapter has sought to demonstrate why the EU should 
contribute to efforts to control the addictiogenic environment, and that it has sufficient competence 
to be able to implement a range of useful and effective interventions that would target transnational 
factors of the addictiogenic environment, and would add value to the addiction policy activities of 
the Member States. 
 
Although there are good arguments for keeping the EU out of sensitive areas of national 
policymaking, this chapter sought to show that control over the addictiogenic environment cannot 
be exerted by the Member States alone. Some factors of the addictiogenic environment transcend 
national borders, making it impossible for Member States to control them at their source. Any 
efforts that are made may even risk rebounding against the protection given by EU law to the free 
movement of goods and services. The purpose of this chapter was therefore to show that 
comprehensive and coherent control of the addictiogenic environment therefore requires the input 
of the EU, either in a coordinating or regulatory capacity.  
 
This chapter furthermore explored the legal competences of the EU that will enable it to discharge 
its responsibility to contribute to the control of transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment. Not only does the EU have competence to take action in the public health and social 
fields to support the addiction policy activities of the Member States, it also, perhaps more 
importantly, has the power to harmonise conditions within the EU internal market so as to take the 
lead in addiction policy when common European standards are necessary to be able to exert control 
over transnational addictiogenic environment factors.  
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Thus, this chapter has sought to show that the EU has both the power and the mandate to 
contribute to the legal control of the addictiogenic environment. However, the actual contribution 
of the EU to supporting the addiction policies of its Member States has been poor to date. In fact, 
even the Member State policies that it should be lending support to have not been sufficiently 
focused and evidence-based, a situation that can be attributed in part to the EU’s lack of 
intervention. Across all levels of policymaking, one can observe that the addictiogenic environment 
has not been approached coherently as an addictiogenic environment, and its factors are often not 
tackled in a coherent manner. At times, the environmental or social aspects of addiction causation 
are neglected altogether. Despite the wealth of evidence supporting the existence of an 
addictiogenic environment, and despite legal intervention being justified, strong legal interventions 
are not always likely to result from the way in which addiction is currently approached by national 
and EU policymakers. The next two chapters will therefore conduct an analysis of current 
approaches to addiction prevention, first focusing on the Member States, then on the EU, to assess 
the extent of these inadequacies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE – CURRENT MEMBER STATE 
APPROACHES TO ADDICTION POLICY 
I. Introduction  
Chapter Two argued that the development of addictions could be explained by an addictiogenic 
environment model, and raised the point that, in order to tackle Europe’s currently strong 
addictiogenic environment, a coherent strategic approach is needed. This purpose of this chapter is 
to analyse how addiction issues have been addressed so far in the Member States, to evaluate 
whether evidence of the addictiogenic environment is being reflected in current national 
approaches to addiction policy design.  
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Since the EU has not yet engaged directly with the question of addiction, and has no named strategy 
on addiction, EU Member States have taken responsibility for addressing the issues raised by the 
addiction phenomenon. Ysa et al have produced a useful categorisation of the approaches taken, 
which shows that the way different countries deal with addiction issues is extremely varied, and fall 
along a broad spectrum from comprehensive approaches to sectoral approaches.496 Comprehensive 
approaches to addiction generally place emphasis upon tackling addiction as a phenomenon, 
comprise a number of interventions designed to reduce the likelihood of addiction development, 
and cover multiple potential objects of addiction. Member States that approach addiction sectorally, 
on the other hand, address addiction as one of a range of issues within policies that focus on 
individual objects of addiction. Interventions within the policy may not be specifically aimed at 
reducing addiction per se, but will be aimed more generally at reducing harmful consumption of the 
object in question.  
 
The work of Ysa et al shows that the Member States are diverse in how they deal with addiction 
issues for a number of reasons, including culture, political organisation, views of addiction, 
treatment services, and more. Clearly, there is no one-size-fits all way to govern addiction, and 
indeed no perfect solution to the problem.497 If certain actions are particularly necessary in Member 
States in order to address particular factors of the addictiogenic environment, they should be taken. 
For example, in Greece 40 per cent of the adult population smoke, with half of adolescents in certain 
areas being regular smokers, making Greece the Member State with the highest rates of nicotine 
addiction by a large margin.498 These rates of prevalence call for particularly strict national tobacco 
policy,499 on a scale that might not be politically acceptable in other countries where smoking is less 
prevalent amongst the general population. 
 
Despite the need for Member States to address addiction using interventions that work best in their 
national circumstances, it is also clear from earlier analysis that approaching addiction sectorally 
does not address the root causes of addiction, but rather treats addiction as one problem out of a 
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range of problems related to a single object, some of which may be completely unrelated to health 
or social protection. Sectoral approaches to addiction do not reflect the evidence on the common 
aetiologies of addiction, and by only tackling addiction within the context of individual objects of 
addiction are merely addressing the manifestations of addiction rather than dealing with the factors 
that are responsible for the development of addictions. Member States that employ sectoral 
approach to addiction, though they might have extremely well developed and effective policies on 
individual objects,500 are unlikely to be making progress in tackling the addictiogenic environment in 
a coherent and comprehensive way. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover best practice that is taking place in addiction policymaking 
in the Member States, and to investigate the extent to which the Member States are basing their 
addiction policies on evidence of the addictiogenic environment. The focus of this chapter will 
therefore be on Member States that have adopted comprehensive approaches to addiction 
prevention. For reasons of brevity, the chapter will restrict itself to conducting three case studies on 
the addiction policies of Germany, France and Spain. These three States all appear to have 
comprehensive national strategies on addiction. The analysis of these strategies will focus on the 
extent to which they have been designed in line with what evidence tells us of the existence of an 
underlying addiction phenomenon, the environmental determinants of addiction, and the existence 
of an addictiogenic environment.  
II. Germany  
On 15 February 2012, the German federal government adopted a National Strategy on Drug and 
Addiction Policy (herein referred to as the National Strategy).501 This was adopted as a replacement 
for the previous Action Plan on Drugs and Addiction from 2003. According to the foreword of the 
Federal Drug Commissioner, it ‘places Germany’s drug and addiction policy on a modern footing’.502 
Analysis of this National Strategy reveals it to be highly holistic in its approach to the addiction 
phenomenon and committed to allocating responsibility for addiction policy across multiple levels. 
In these respects, it reflects the available evidence. However, the Strategy is compromised by an 
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overly narrow focus on the individual, and this draws the strategy away from strong legal 
interventions that would seek to reshape an individual’s environment. Consequently, the Strategy 
cannot be said to wholly reflect evidence that environmental factors of addiction development are 
amongst the most influential and prevalent. Indeed, this National Strategy does not focus on the 
addictiogenic environment exactly, but on how individuals experience it, and due to this the 
National Strategy can only be seen as addressing part of the addiction problem.  
 
The National Strategy is concerned specifically with the phenomenon of addiction and the 
development of addictive relationships, rather than with the manifestations of addiction, and thus it 
can be described as comprehensive. This much is clear from the Introduction to the Strategy, which 
recognises that ‘addiction is linked to personal misfortune’,503 and that ‘the development of an 
addiction has its roots in a complex network of previous individual experiences, certain living 
situations, interaction with other people, emotional disturbances, the influence of a significant 
figure and the availability of addictive substances’.504 Clearly, the Strategy is based on the 
understanding that the causes of addiction ‘go beyond just an addictive substance or behaviour’.505 
This has led the drafters to address addiction in a holistic manner. It is stated that ‘the focus of our 
drug and addiction policy is not on addiction or on addictive substances’,506 but is instead on the 
problems that underlie the development of addiction, and this is evident from the substance of the 
strategy. 
 
Consequently, the National Strategy sets out an ‘integrative approach to addiction policy’507 which 
takes ‘both legal and illegal addictive substances into consideration’.508 This is firm holistic thinking, 
and reflects evidence that addiction is caused by factors that run deeper than the simple 
overindulgence or dependence on a particular object of addiction. The first step to effectively 
controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment is to recognise that the same factors can 
generate an addiction to many different objects of addiction, irrespective of whether those objects 
are legal or illegal to consume.509  
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Granted, despite the National Strategy professing to cover addictive substances and behaviours, the 
Strategy as a whole tends towards referring to ‘substances’, ‘drugs’ and ‘consumption’, indicating 
that the Strategy is more concerned with addictive objects that can be ingested, rather than 
addictive behaviours. However addictive behaviours are not ignored. Thus the second step to 
addressing the addiction phenomenon, rather than addiction manifestations, has been overcome – 
namely recognising that a behaviour can can be an ‘object’ of addictive consumption just as much as 
a substance. This reflects evidence that behaviours such as gambling can be extremely appealing to 
those suffering social dislocation as the object of an adaptive lifestyle,510 and just as destructive as 
any substance.511 In the section of the National Strategy that sets out its Goals, addiction to Internet 
usage and gambling are specifically recognised as ‘new c[h]allenges [sic] in relation to addiction 
policy’,512 and addictive substances and behaviours are referred together on an equal footing on 
multiple occasions.513 Pathological Gambling and Online Media Addiction are included as Sub-Areas 
of the National Strategy, on a equal footing with Sub-Areas on Alcohol, Tobacco, Prescription Drugs 
and Illegal Drugs.514 By including so many different manifestations of addiction, the National Strategy 
increases the likelihood that interventions are designed with root causes of addiction in mind, and 
that these interventions will will be implemented for as many different manifestations as possible. 
 
In addition to its focus on holisticism, the German National Strategy also makes significant effort to 
outline how responsibility for addiction prevention efforts should be shared between different levels 
of government, and between various types of stakeholders. The Introduction to the National 
Strategy specifically declares that ‘the many different joint efforts and initiatives to prevent 
addiction and to reduce the harmful consumption of and dependency on addictive substances and 
behaviours are thus to be coordinated with each other on the national and international level’.515 In 
particular, the National Strategy recognises that: 
 
‘in our federal system, numerous people and organisations are active in the area of 
addiction prevention and addiction services. This spectrum includes municipal governments, 
the Lander, the federal government … providers of services on various levels also play a role 
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…the diversity of the many parties involves requires comprehensive coordination and 
integration in to a single network’.516  
 
The fact that the National Strategy is organised in a multilevel way reflects evidence that no one 
actor has the solution for complex policy problems such as that presented by the addictiogenic 
environment, and  that therefore responsibility should be dispersed among all actors who are able 
to contribute to solving the problem.517 
 
A good example of effective allocation of responsibility can be found in one of the declared 
Cornerstones of the National Strategy – ‘Reaching More People in a Local Context – Expanding 
Addiction Prevention in the Workplace’518 – which recognises that employers, insurers, and related 
stakeholders can utilise workplaces, a local environment which most people experience on a regular 
basis, to conduct effective local level addiction prevention work. This reflects a large body of 
evidence that suggests that problems at work can be a significant contributor to the build up of 
stress and negative affect, precursors to social dislocation.519 The National Strategy also attempts to 
ensure that various local stakeholders work together in pursuit of common objectives: ‘in order to 
achieve better integration, policy must focus on the interfaces between the systems of providing aid, 
so that no addict gets lost in it … Networks and integrated care approaches… are one way of 
effectively managing interfaces’.520 
 
The importance of integrating international action is also made clear in the National Strategy. A 
whole section of the National Strategy called ‘International and European Drug and Addiction Policy’ 
is dedicated to explaining how ‘drugs and addiction are global problems that require joint activities 
by all parties in the international community’521 and how ‘Germany cannot meet the challenge of the 
drug and addiction problem solely though national policies’.522 This is a hugely important step in 
building an effective approach to addiction, one which recognises and reflects crucial evidence that 
some causal factors for addiction are transnational in nature, and can only be effectively controlled 
through joint state action at international level. The German National Strategy acknowledges that 
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action by the German Federal Government will not be sufficient to reduce preventable addiction in 
Germany – the contribution of international actors must also be integrated into their plans.  
 
Thus, there are several aspects of the German National Strategy that are solidly grounded in the 
evidence available on how addictions are developed – interventions are targeted at the root causes 
of addiction, and responsibility for interventions is given to actors that are best placed to carry them 
out. However, one important aspect of the German approach has not been designed in line with 
available evidence. The National Strategy focusses on ‘individuals with their specific problems’,523 
and by this very fact places insufficient emphasis upon the evidence that environmental factors drive 
the development of addictions to a far greater extent than factors related to individuals. 
Consequently, parts of the National Strategy may not prompt interventions of the highest 
effectiveness. There are several reasons for this.   
 
First, focussing on individuals and their problems implies that individuals themselves are the 
problem, and creates contradictions in the overall approach. Although addiction is ‘not a matter of 
personal failure’524 according to the National Strategy, its goal is nevertheless to ‘promote personal 
responsibility’.525 The real problem, however, is that making addiction a matter of personal 
responsibility and trying to ensure that individuals are ‘approaching the use of pleasurable and 
addictive substances responsibly … and finding the right balance’,526 belies the well-evidenced fact 
that personal responsibility is only a small part of the development of addictions.527 More important 
in the development of addictions are deep social inequalities, corporate behaviour and weak 
legislation, over which individuals have no control. The focus on individuals and how they interact 
with the addictiogenic environment therefore sidelines a range of more important factors connected 
to the constitution of the addictiogenic environment itself, and consequently the policy tools 
necessary to tackle them. For example, of the eight interventions detailed in the Alcohol Sub Area, 
only one could be described as combatting a factor that contributes to creating the addictiogenic 
environment – alcohol advertising.528 There is no mention of other effective methods of weakening 
the addictiogenic environment, such as taxation or outlet density regulations. The other seven 
interventions relate in some way to how individuals experience and attempt to recover from 
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addiction, with many of them relying on information and education provision. This approach forces 
individuals to take on responsibility for problems that in vast part are not of their making. This is not 
only an unfair but an inefficient way of tackling addiction.  
 
Second, a focus on the individual leads to a strategic approach that is highly medicalised in nature. 
Two of the four Levels of the National Strategy are Counselling and Treatment and Harm Reduction, 
with the other two dedicated to Prevention and Repression of illegal drug supply. This medical focus 
is even confirmed in the Introduction – ‘this national strategy is intended as a health policy 
guideline’.529 Based on the fact that evidence suggests that the factors contributing to addiction 
causation are multifactoral and varied, policy should go beyond merely health interventions in order 
to be effective, embracing a wide range of policy fields.530 The factors comprising the addictiogenic 
environment stem from the arrangement of economic policy, to social conditions, to business 
freedoms and beyond, and thus addiction policy cannot simply be an extension of health policy. 
Unfortunately the German National Strategy, despite understanding that addiction is a phenomenon 
with root causes, understands these root causes according to the disease model. 531 The result is a 
health policy driven, medicalised approach to addiction, which ignores relevant policy fields on 
account of the overriding concern to help individuals avoid and recover from the disease of 
addiction. 
 
Finally, a focus on the individual naturally also leads to contradiction through the natural 
prioritisation of some individuals over others. The National Strategy claims that addiction 
interventions should ‘be better targeted and focus more strongly on high-risk groups’ and that ‘for 
every addictive substance or behaviour, the groups at greatest risk must be identified and addressed 
directly’.532 However, this contradicts evidence that suggests that vulnerability is not a characteristic 
inherent to certain easily identifiable groups of people, but is a dynamic concept that is created by 
the environment in which an individual is placed.533 Any number of people could be or become 
vulnerable to addiction and thus be in need of protection, especially in light of the extensive nature 
of the addictiogenic environment. Consequently, despite identifying categories of high-risk 
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individuals that cover quite a wide range of people – ‘people who have had negative experiences’534 
and ‘stress situations’535 for example – such an approach could not hope to provide individually 
tailored treatment536 (as the National Strategy claims) to all those who may be likely to develop an 
addiction.  
 
In summary, the above analysis of the German National Strategy on Drug and Addiction Policy 
reflects a lot of the evidence available on the operation of the addictiogenic environment, 
particularly regarding the need to address the underlying root causes of addiction and the need to 
allocate policy responsibility to those best suited to taking action. However, the fact that addiction is 
primarily developed in response to environmental factors, and that deep structural factors will 
promote the conditions in which addiction is likely to be developed, is not reflected particularly well. 
Thus the German approach to addiction is compromised in an important way, making it unlikely that 
it will be fully effective in achieving its goal of helping individuals to overcome addictions.  
III. France 
The French Government established the Interministerial Mission for the Fight against Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (herein referred to as ‘the Mission’) in 1982, with the purpose of ‘organising and 
coordinating the State’s activities regarding the fight against drugs and drug addiction’.537 On 17 
October 2012 the Prime Minister tasked the Mission with constructing a renewed strategy to 
combat drugs and addiction,538 and on 19 September 2013 the Government Plan for Combating 
Drugs and Addictive Behaviours 2013-1017 (herein referred to as the ‘Government Plan’) was 
launched. In the Preface to the Strategy written by the French Prime Minister, this newest 
Government Plan responds to the need for ‘society at large, as well as the authorities as a whole, to 
take action’539 to meet the challenges of addiction, and in doing so will ‘mobilise all of the ministers 
concerned, that is to say effectively the government as a whole, in the fight against drugs and 
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addiction’.540 Analysis of this French Government Plan shows that it is very different to the German 
National Strategy. It is characterised by an effort to tackle addiction across multiple policy areas, 
displaying greater understanding of the role of the addictiogenic environment in the development of 
addiction. However, it does not adequately recognise the complexity of the addictiogenic 
environment problems, and the consequent need to allocate policy responsibility amongst multiple 
actors.  
 
Unlike the German National Strategy, this French Government Plan starts from a desire to employ a 
whole of government approach to addiction policy. The very fact that the Plan is coordinated by a 
body called the Interministerial Mission is evidence of this intent. Within the Mission Statement of 
2012, the response to addiction is described as a ‘transverse policy to which each Ministry needs to 
contribute in its own field of competence, to match the efforts required by the fields of public 
initiative for which is is responsible as a whole’.541 This is a positive decision to mainstream addiction 
policy into all relevant policy fields. Mainstreaming is a policy approach whereby all government 
departments are requested not only to contribute to addiction policy within their own policy field, 
but to ensure that their contribution to addiction policy is coherent with the policies adopted 
generally within their policy field. Thus, fiscal policymakers for example are requested to consider 
how fiscal policy can contribute to addiction prevention, and ensure that fiscal policy generally does 
not undermine the objectives of addiction prevention. Mainstreaming is an approach to 
policymaking that has been recognised to be essential to the successful resolution of problems with 
public health and social justice dimensions,542 such as addiction prevention, and it is therefore a 
good sign to see a mainstreaming approach adopted by the French Government Plan.  
 
Under the mainstreaming approach, numerous suggestions are made for intervention that are 
related to policy fields other than public health. These are often linked back to root causes of the 
addiction phenomenon to demonstrate their relevance. For example, price rises are encouraged for 
tobacco.543 Second-chance schooling is encouraged for the ‘social and professional integration of 
disadvantaged young people’.544 Furthermore, the plan makes extensive provision for 
multidisciplinary research into addiction ‘in order to gain a more accurate understanding of the 
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factors of vulnerability to addictive behaviours’.545 Finally, the Plan acknowledges that ‘legislative, 
regulatory and administrative measures contribute to ensuring an environment conducive to the 
prevention of addiction by providing a framework for the social and economic context within which 
drug use takes place’.546 This all demonstrates that the focus of the Government Plan is upon 
tackling the factors making up the addictiogenic environment, and not simply on addressing the 
most obvious symptoms of addiction. 
 
The Government Plan even attempts to mainstream consideration of the addictiogenic environment 
into addiction treatment. In a section entitled ‘Promoting the Social and Occupational Dimension of 
Overall Healthcare, the Plan states that:  
 
‘therapeutic strategies aimed at patients presenting addictions need to include psychological 
and social follow-up work. Long-term treatment of addictions, combined with social and 
occupational rehabilitation work, including housing, are key elements of the success of such 
healthcare … To this end it will be appropriate to build upon the tools recommended in the 
long-term plan against poverty and for social inclusion. The overall objective is to succeed in 
ensuring stable places of residence’.547  
 
By linking addiction treatment with an aspect of addiction prevention, the Government Plan has 
managed to integrate treatment and prevention, demonstrating that both can contribute in a 
coherent manner to tackling the addictiogenic environment.  
 
The French Government Plan is also designed in a way that reflects the evidence on root causes of 
addiction. The 2012 Mission letter lays the foundation for a holistic approach by declaring that: 
 
‘a consistent and coordinated approach to the prevention of addictive behaviours requires 
the elaboration of an active policy including tobacco, alcohol, psychotropic prescription 
drugs and narcotics. The phenomena of “poly-drug use”, the practice of doping and non-
substance based addictions (for example gambling addiction) need to be taken into 
account’.548     
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This is followed up in the Introduction to the Plan, which acknowledges that ‘reality calls for a 
rethinking of the focus of our policy for combatting drugs and addictive behaviours’.549 Throughout 
the Plan, reference is made to ‘addictive behaviours’ to describe the result of an addictive 
relationship being formed, and specific references are made to gambling and other forms of 
behavioural addiction.550 This, like the German approach, reflects the body of evidence that suggests 
that the process of addiction development has common causes, and can manifest in an addiction to 
a number of different objects. 
 
In particular, a priority of the Government Plan, according to the pillar on ‘Basing Policies for 
Combatting Drugs and Addictive Behaviours upon Research and Training’, is understanding addiction 
development in relation to both substances and behaviour. In particular the Plan recognises, that 
there is a need to ‘improve knowledge of addictive behaviours as “social practices”’,551 and 
specifically when it comes to behavioural addictions, that ‘addictive behaviours involving gambling 
and video games constitute an emerging area of research’552 which requires support. It is therefore 
evident that the Government Plan takes the need to develop the evidence base on behavioural 
addictions seriously.  
 
Despite this French Government Plan strongly reflecting the available evidence on the holistic nature 
of addiction development, and the need to address the addictiogenic environment through the input 
of all relevant policy fields, it is weak in reflecting the evidence that suggests responsibility for 
addressing addiction issues should be shared across multiple levels. The multilevel allocation of 
policy responsibility is not emphasised strongly in the strategic outline of the Government Plan. In 
fact, where multiple levels of government are mentioned, it is in terms of the central government 
providing support to regional levels of government, rather than the sharing of responsibility 
between national and regional levels of government.553 The priorities of the Plan are to be 
‘implemented with the support of the network of heads of drug addiction projects, placed in close 
relation with the prefects, at the departmental and regional levels. In order to ensure consistence of 
public initiative it is important to make sure that the regional health agencies are involved in the 
reflection and work undertaken by the heads of project’.554 Consequently, the role of the sub-
national level is seemingly to simply act as a tool of the national level strategy, rather than as a 
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partner to the national level. Furthermore, ‘the MILDT regional and departmental heads of project 
organise the territorial implementation of public policy for combating drugs and addictive 
behaviours, in association with ARS and local education authorities, while respecting these different 
bodies respective areas of competence’.555 Thus, regional offshoots of the central addiction 
governance authority are responsible for implementing centrally designed addiction policy at the 
regional level, with local authorities only ‘associated’ with this implementation. This insistence on a 
centralised response does not capture the advantages of sharing policy responsibility among 
governing levels,556 and indeed the available evidence which suggests that some factors of the 
addictiogenic environment are generated at the local level and must therefore be dealt with by local 
policymakers who are able to implement a tailored solution.557  
 
The way in which the supranational level is integrated into the Plan also demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of the purpose of governing on multiple levels. Instead of recognising the need for 
European and international solutions to be factored in to the national level strategy, the French 
Government Plan sees the existence of the supranational level as an opportunity to promote French 
ideas for addiction policy. The Government Plan states that ‘at the international level, the MILDT will 
contribute … to the elaboration of the French position in international and European bodies ... in 
particular, the MILDT will promote France’s overall integrated approach’.558 While it is true that the 
international level should act as a forum for sharing ideas about public health and social problems, 
and may facilitate the diffusion of effective policy between countries,559 addressing the addictiogenic 
environment requires that national governments must also work together to produce distinct 
supranational policies that should then be factored into national approaches. The French 
Government Plan does not appear to recognise this.   
 
A small section of the Government Plan is dedicated to Reinforcing Coordination at National and 
International Levels,560 however the emphasis of this section is very much on managing subnational 
implementation of addiction policy, rather than facilitating the contribution of subnational level 
policymakers. Similarly, the supranational level is seen as a tool of national strategy, rather than a 
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fundamental level of the governance approach within a nation, to which some responsibility should 
be given to facilitate pursuit of the priorities identified by the national government. According to the 
Plan ‘the European Union constitutes a major channel and level for the policy conducted at the 
national level’.561 Furthermore, holding the presidencies of supranational bodies engaged with work 
related to addiction apparently ‘constitute[s] a favourable period for promoting our policy’.562   
 
In summary, the French response to addiction shows a good awareness of how environmental 
factors combine to influence the likelihood of addiction development, and there are a number of 
evidence based interventions that target important aspects of the addictiogenic environment. 
However, the strategy is short-sighted when it comes to allocating responsibility for these 
interventions. The complex nature of the addictiogenic environment cannot be efficiently or 
effectively addressed by relying upon action dictated solely by national governments, yet the French 
Government Plan seems to overlook the need for a cooperative approach that allocates 
responsibility for design, and not just implementation, to the most suitable level of authority. 
IV. Spain  
Spain’s current approach to addiction governance is contained within the National Drug Strategy 
2009-2016 (hereafter referred to as the Strategy),563 a document adopted in early 2009, together 
with a complementary Action Plan adopted in October 2009. The current Strategy is an evolution 
upon previous strategies, which according to the current version date back over 25 years, and which 
‘represents the huge institutional, social and scientific agreement to guarantee an homogenous, fair 
and quality response, in the whole national territory for the next eight years, approaching the drug 
problem’.564 It is ‘the result of the ideas and contribution of experts, Administrations as well as the 
25 years of experience in the National Plan on Drugs’.565 The Strategy makes a bold claim to be: 
 
‘a strategy with a humanitarian perspective emphasising the respect to the rights of the 
affected individuals; that also promotes the approximation to the population at risk it 
protects the public health, alleviates the suffering of the affected individual, offers 
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information and the required skills of responsible decision making and reduces damages 
produced by drug abuse in the abuser as well as in the entire society’.566 
 
These are bold claims indeed – and analysis shows that the Spanish Strategy appears to succeed in 
capturing the complexity of the addictiogenic environment, combining action across multiple policy 
fields with the allocation of responsibility over multiple levels. Like the German and French 
approaches though, the Spanish Strategy has one major weakness, which is that it fails to reflect the 
evidence that suggests that all addictions should be addresses simultaneously as manifestations of 
the same set of causal factors. 
 
The Strategy is impressive in its breadth. It clearly attempts to embrace an all-of-government 
approach, which indicates that the evidence supporting a mainstreamed approach to tackling 
addiction has been properly considered. The Strategy is claimed to ‘represent … agreement on the 
priorities among all agents who participate in the National Plan on Drugs’567 and describes a complex 
networked process in which several different bodies and organisations contribute to controlling 
addiction. This spirit of cooperation is reflected in the Guiding Principles and General Objectives of 
the Strategy, which anchors the Strategy in ‘the most widely accepted and supported approach – 
and that for which there is most evidence of success … to act through568 a combination of measures 
which simultaneously intervene in the spheres of exposure and access to psychoactive 
substances’.569 Thus, the need for an evidence based approach to addiction policy is specifically 
recognised in the Strategy.  
 
The Strategy actively encourages action across the policy spectrum, where there is sufficient 
evidence to justify such action.570 The focus on constructing ‘a multifactor, inter-sectorial and multi-
disciplinary focus and approach, [which] aspires to an optimisation of efforts and resources by 
means of coordination and cooperation between the different agents’571 has even led the drafters of 
the Strategy to explore ‘other health strategies’ and ‘other sectorial plans’ so that ‘their impact and 
inter-relationships were considered’.572 Transdisciplinarity and translational collaboration between 
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multiple fields is recognised to be an important aspect of effective public health policy making.573 
The Strategy not only encourages policy learning, but also attempts to define how different 
addiction policies might be linked together in a coherent manner. There is a whole section dedicated 
to coordination, which starts by acknowledging that addiction is caused by ‘a wide range of 
determinants and dimensions’574 and that this calls for ‘vital collaboration of all agents with 
responsibility in the sectors of activity concerned’.575 The rationale for this is even explained – 
‘coordination facilities both better planning of interventions executed by the agents involved as well 
as a more rational and efficient use of all resources’.576 Thus, the Spanish approach has clearly been 
designed with evidence on policy coherency in mind, in order to avoid a simple collection of 
individual and possibly contradictory policies.577  
 
The Spanish Strategy not only does well in reflecting the evidence on the complexity of policy 
problems such as addiction, it also clearly reflects the need for a multilevel approach to addiction. 
The need to allocate policy responsibility to the most appropriate level of government, or the most 
appropriate set of stakeholders is noted in the Introduction to the Strategy, which acknowledges 
that ‘coordination and collaboration between the national civil services … and the regional 
administrations plays a fundamental role at the heart of the framework’578 and that: 
 
‘at the design phase, the Strategy has taken into account the main national and international 
planning documents currently available. On the one hand, the plans on drugs and Strategies 
of the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, and on the other, those of a range [of] 
comparable countries, with very particular reference to the strategies and action plans 
approved by the European Union. Local government has also been involved, through its 
representative body’.579  
 
As can be seen, unlike the French Government Plan, the Spanish Strategy views the subnational and 
supranational levels of government as building blocks of the national strategy, rather than as tools of 
it. The Strategy acknowledges that the competence of different administrations over different 
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aspects of policy must be respected in constructing an effective approach to addiction.580 This 
translates, for example into the following approach to demand and supply reduction of psychoactive 
substances: 
 
‘in the field of demand reduction, the greatest involvement and commitment basically 
corresponds to the administrations with responsibility and competences in health, social and 
educational areas. Actions in this field must necessarily be of a transversal character … 
therefore they will have to involve the public administrations in different territorial spheres 
with jurisdiction in the field itself … the areas of supply reduction is a special jurisdiction of 
the national police force’.581 
 
Division of responsibility is more likely to result in specific problems being dealt with by those with 
the greatest knowledge to achieve the best result,582 and therefore the Spanish Strategy should be 
seen, in this respect, as successful in implementing an evidence based response to addiction.  
 
However, in other respects, the Spanish Strategy is distinctly less evidence based. The Strategy 
recognises that ‘obviously there is addictive behaviour which does not involve the use of 
psychoactive substances, and this behaviour can product serious undesirable effectors on people’s 
health and quality of life’.583 However, as its name suggests, it explicitly excludes these behavioural 
addictions from its scope – ‘nevertheless, whilst recognizing the steady growth of these addictions in 
today’s society, attention to them and treatment of this type of addiction is not included within the 
framework of this Strategy’.584 This is disappointing given the Strategy’s apparent commitment to 
being founded upon ‘strategic, holistic approaches’,585 and given the Strategy’s commitment to 
basing action on scientific evidence. There is a clear rejection of evidence that suggests that 
addiction is a phenomenon, and that all addictions share essentially the same root causes.  
 
Although the word ‘holistic’ is used several times throughout the Strategy,586 this refers primarily to 
the fact that coordination between various actors and policy areas is necessary, rather than to the 
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fact that root causes of addiction should be addressed. A distinction should be drawn between two 
concepts – holisticism, meaning the need to target root causes rather than manifestations, and 
horizontality, meaning the need to employ a broad range of policy fields and policy actors across the 
policymaking spectrum.  
 
While true holisticism is rejected by the Spanish Strategy, there is nonetheless an attempt to go 
beyond manifestations of addiction, even though a clear distinction between holisticism and 
horizontality is not drawn by the Strategy. At the beginning of the section on Coordination, the 
Strategy states that ‘the phenomenon of drugs and drug addictions is due to a wide range of 
determinants and dimensions. In order to facilitate the development of a consistent policy in 
relation to the phenomenon and its derived manifestations, it is … necessary to consider the 
different perspectives’.587 Furthermore, when introducing its Guiding Principles, the Strategy notes 
that ‘many of the actions are specific to a limited number of the spheres, but there are also many 
which have common objectives. Logically, efforts should focus on the earliest identified stages or 
risk factors and should therefore especially target the area of protection against the most global 
factors of risk caused by exposure to drugs’.588 Recognition of evidence of an addiction phenomenon 
is therefore made in the Strategy, even if behavioural addictions are excluded from its scope.  
 
Overall, the Spanish Strategy is probably the most complete of the three comprehensive approaches 
to addiction analysed in this chapter, and therefore probably likely to stand the best chance of 
sufficiently weakening the addictiogenic environment to the point where noticeable reductions in 
addiction prevalence may be observed. However, the Spanish Strategy, like the German and French 
efforts, is still flawed in an important way, because it tries yet ultimately fails to implement the kind 
of holistic approach that is required in order to make serious inroads into weakening the 
addictiogenic environment. 
 
V. Conclusion 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the three case studies conducted in this chapter. First, no 
Member State will address addiction in the same way, and nor should it have to. There is an infinite 
number of potential combinations of policies and organisational structures that Member States 
could adopt, and this is a good thing – there are an infinite number of subtle variations of the main 
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identifiable factors of the addictiogenic environment. Member States should therefore be free to 
address national idiosyncrasies in whatever way they think most appropriate, and be able to design 
interventions that control their particular addictiogenic environments in whatever manner best 
reflects the ways in which their populations experience it.  
 
Second, it is possible to identify three key principles of addiction policymaking from analysis of the 
three Member State approaches above: the targeting of the root causes of addiction rather than 
specific manifestations, which we could call holisticism; the contribution of multiple fields of 
policymaking and multiple stakeholders to policymaking, which we could call horizontality; and the 
division of policymaking responsibility across multiple levels of public authority, which we could call 
multilevel governance. These three principles, when implemented well, could constitute a 
framework of best practice for responding to the addictiogenic environment. We could, and should, 
learn much from how Member States that embrace these principles in their addiction policies 
operationalise them. However, as was clear from the analysis conducted above, none of the 
Member State approaches considered above, despite claiming to be comprehensive, were able to 
effectively operationalise all three principles.  
 
Thus, neither the German, French, nor Spanish approaches to addiction policymaking have utilising 
the available evidence to the best extent. This appears to be reflected in statistics on the prevalence 
of addiction in these countries, which suggest that the strategies analysed above are not having the 
desired impact. For example between 2011 and 2015, alcohol use, soft drug use and smoking all rose 
in France.589 The Spanish Strategy’s failure to integrate behavioural addictions is reflected in the fact 
that an estimated 5% of Spanish high school students display signs of internet addiction.590 It might 
therefore be concluded that in order to ensure that the most effective approach to addiction 
policymaking is being taken, national policymakers should ensure that their strategies reflect all 
three principles identified above – holisticism, horizontality and multilevel governance.   
 
Three Member States with an apparently good grasp of what addiction is, and how it might be 
approached, have all failed to fulfill the potential that a comprehensive approach to addiction offers 
for effective control of the addictiogenic environment. Why might this be? The central contention of 
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this thesis is that the EU could and should make a greater contribution to efforts to reduce the 
prevalence of preventable addiction in Europe. One reason for why the Member States are not 
performing as effectively as they could in controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment 
may be that the EU has not been contributing effectively to addiction policymaking at the 
supranational level. In order to be effective, multilevel governance requires that all levels of 
authority to which responsibility is allocated must actually discharge that responsibility. 
Furthermore, in the case of difficult policy issues, coordination between Member States allows the 
sharing of best practice that could lead to some Member States being able to adopt policies that are 
superior to the approach they would previously have taken.  
 
The next chapter will develop the argument that the ways in which the EU has contributed to 
addiction policy to date have not only been sparse (save some contributions made in the tobacco 
field) in comparison to the responsibilities that it could and should take on, but have not been 
entirely conducive to allowing the Member States to discharge their own responsibilities in addiction 
policymaking.   
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CHAPTER SIX – CURRENT EU APPROACHES 
TO ADDICTION POLICY 
I. Introduction 
Detailed case studies of three Member State strategies that claimed to be comprehensive showed 
that three principles of best practice in addiction policy could be identified – holisticism, 
horizontality and multilevel governance – however that none of the Member States studied have 
been able to combine them all into their approaches to addiction policymaking. It was hypothesized 
that this may be due, in part, to the EU’s lack of engagement with addiction issues, which may be 
causing some factors of the addictiogenic environment to be dealt with at the wrong level or not at 
all, and may be preventing the Member States from learning from each other when policy learning is 
appropriate. This chapter therefore seeks to uncover whether the EU has been doing all it can to 
discharge the responsibilities that have been and should be allocated to it for the control of the 
addictiogenic environment, and to ensure that Member States are able to discharge their own 
addiction policy responsibilities free from interference. 
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The EU does not have a specific, codified strategy on addiction, and no specific overarching policy 
approach. This is consistent with the relationship between the Member States and the EU that has 
been established in the public health and social protection fields. Consistent with the nature of its 
competences in these fields, and the existence of transnational elements of the addictiogenic 
environment, the EU does however have responsibilities to contribute to the control of the 
addictiogenic environment, with a view to supporting the Member States as they work towards the 
ultimate objective of stepping up the fight against NCDs. In order to assess how well the EU has 
fulfilled these responsibilities, this chapter will focus on assessing what the EU has accomplished in 
individual policy fields that focus on specific objects of addiction. Three such policy fields will be 
considered here – tobacco, alcoholic beverages and gambling services.  
 
Aside from the fact that it is the only object of addiction that will eventually kill one in two regular 
users,591 the EU’s tobacco control efforts have been chosen as a focus field because most EU 
harmonising measures relevant to the prevention of addiction have been adopted on tobacco. 
Analysis of these measures, in particular the Tobacco Advertising Directive592 and the Tobacco 
Products Directive,593 will allow an examination of the extent to which the EU has used its 
harmonisation competence to address cross-border addiction issues, as well as the extent to which 
it has fulfilled its obligations to mainstream public health concerns into internal market policy.  
 
The EU’s policy on alcoholic beverages has been chosen as a focus field because it is the only 
addictive object for which the EU has at some point adopted a codified strategy under its public 
health competence - the 2006 EU Alcohol Strategy. Examining alcohol policy will permit an 
assessment of how the EU has used its complementary competence in relation to addiction issues. 
Furthermore, EU alcohol policy has been substantially conditioned by the subsidiarity principle – 
therefore examining the EU’s approach to alcoholic beverages will enable an assessment of the EU’s 
attitudes towards multilevel policymaking. 
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Gambling services have been chosen primarily because gambling services are addictive objects that 
are routinely provided by Member States, and as such it will allow a comparison between how the 
EU has approached addictive objects that are exclusively produced and marketed by the private 
sector and how it has (and indeed can) approach addictive objects that are produced and marketed 
by both private and public authorities. Since gambling services are also behavioural objects of 
addiction, examining the extent to which the EU has engaged with gambling services will facilitate an 
assessment of the EU’s commitment to encouraging holisticism in addiction policy, in addition to 
permitting further exploration of how the EU has interpreted the requirements of multilevel 
policymaking.  
 
By contrast, psychotropic drugs have been excluded as a focus field of this chapter. Tobacco, 
alcoholic beverages and gambling services are part of the global free market. Psychotropic drugs, 
however, are not. Although common objects of addiction, consumption of which can lead to serious 
health harms,594 psychotropic drugs are subject to a global prohibition regime.595 Three United 
Nations Conventions, adopted in 1961,596 1971597 and 1988598 oblige UN member states to create a 
number of criminal offences relating to natural and synthetic narcotic substances, including their 
possession, acquisition, and distribution.599 Under this regime, states are required to maintain some 
form of formal drug prohibition,600 and consequently policy experimentation is mostly foreclosed.601 
Amendment of one or more of the three UN Treaties, or their complete renunciation, would be 
required in order to permit such experimentation, yet such a development is unlikely.602 Drug 
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prohibition as a policy strategy has also been subject to sustained criticism in the literature,603 and 
calls for reforming drug control policy away from global prohibition are plentiful.604 
 
In light of this, there is very little EU law to draw upon in the field of psychotropic drug control, from 
the perspective of analysing the contribution of the EU to the public health and social protection 
aspects of addiction prevention. The little EU coordination in the field of drug control that does exist, 
the EU having designated drug policy an area of subsidiarity, has been focussed on the prevention of 
crime.605 Thus, given the dearth of EU law in the field, the fact that this thesis adopts a public health 
and social protection approach to addiction prevention, and given the inflexible and arguably 
ineffective nature of global prohibition and the widespread criminalisation of drug use and users, it 
will be difficult to conduct a meaningful analysis of the efficacy of the EU’s contribution to addiction 
governance in this field. 
 
This is not to say that the conclusions of this thesis will be inapplicable to psychotropic drugs. While 
it is true that psychotropic drugs are not subject to the free market, this does not mean that the 
operation of the free market is not responsible in part for generating the conditions in which an 
individual might turn to an addictive relationship with psychotropic drugs. According to the 
addictiogenic environment model of addiction, all addictions, whatever the manifestation, are an 
adaptation in response to social dislocation arising from the individual’s environment, an adaptation 
which is made easier by environmental factors that increase the pseudo-relationship capacity of 
potential objects of addiction and which facilitate their vocational consumption. Addictions that 
manifest themselves in relation to psychotropic drug use still fit this model of addiction irrespective 
of whether the use of psychotropic drugs is criminalised or not – individuals addicted to 
psychotropic drugs have still experienced social dislocation,606 are still engaging in a pseudo-
relationship with their object of addiction,607 and (despite the illegality of their actions) have still had 
vocational consumption of that object facilitated.608  
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Thus, a comprehensive holistic, horizontal and multilevel addiction strategy should be able to reduce 
preventable addiction to psychotropic drugs just as much as any other preventable addiction. The 
fact, however that trade in psychotropic drugs has been outlawed by the global prohibition regime 
makes it difficult to analyse whether control over the addictiogenic environment is being achieved 
with any effectiveness at EU level, since this is not the current objective of drug control in Europe.609 
For this reason, psychotropic drugs are not included as focus fields of this chapter, however one 
must keep in mind that this does not mean that addictions to psychotropic drugs, as a manifestation 
of the addiction phenomenon, are to be excluded from the conclusions that are drawn from the 
analysis conducted in this thesis.  
 
By analysing the direct and indirect contributions of EU law to addiction governance across the three 
chosen focus fields of tobacco, alcoholic beverages and gambling services, this chapter seeks to 
show that the EU has been poor in providing a supranational regulatory environment in which the 
Member States can build addiction strategies that reflect the principles of holisticism, horizontality 
and multilevel governance. The direct contribution of EU law through secondary legislation and soft-
law strategies has been erratic – opportunities to mainstream addiction concerns into other policy 
fields are rarely seized, and interventions have not always made best use of the available evidence. 
Interventions that do promote mainstreaming and are evidence-based have tended to be confined 
to the tobacco field, the only field in which true political consensus has been generated. 
Consequently, holisticism and horizontality are certainly not promoted by what little EU addiction 
policy there is. The indirect contribution of EU law – scrutiny of national rules by the CJEU for 
compatibility with EU internal market provisions and general principles of EU law – has often proved 
a confounding influence upon the ability of the Member States to adopt their desired addiction 
interventions. CJEU jurisprudence, particularly in the alcohol and gambling fields where EU 
harmonisation measures are virtually absent, has generally speaking hindered an appropriate 
multilevel allocation of responsibility for addiction policy, as Member States have often been 
prevented from discharging responsibilities that they are perhaps more suited to discharging, or 
from adopting measures that cater to their own national circumstances.  
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II. Tobacco 
 
Tobacco control has been the field in which the EU has been most active in terms of NCD prevention, 
as well as in terms of addiction prevention. To date, the EU has enacted four pieces of secondary 
legislation that contribute to discharging supranational responsibility for addiction policy – the 
Tobacco Products Directive,610 the Tobacco Advertising Directive,611 the Tobacco Excise Directive,612 
and the Council Recommendations on Smoke-Free Environments.613 In addition, the EU has also 
organised educational awareness campaigns on the health risks of tobacco since 2005.614  
 
Multilevel governance in controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment requires that the 
level of authority most suited to accomplishing a particular task should assume responsibility for 
undertaking those tasks.615 The EU has been undertaking initiatives in the tobacco control field for 
over thirty years, and in that time has been relatively active in discharging its responsibilities for 
contributing to policymaking where supranational action is necessary.616 A notable number of 
harmonisation measures have been enacted in the tobacco field, covering a good range of 
addictiogenic environment factors,617 and the capacity of tobacco to be an object of addiction has 
been expressly recognised and addressed. The Tobacco Advertising Directive acknowledges that 
tobacco products have ‘high potential to create addiction’,618 which in their capacity as an ‘addictive 
product’ is noted to be ‘responsible for over half a million deaths in the [EU] annually’.619 The 
Tobacco Products Directive also recognises the potential for non-traditional tobacco products, such 
as electronic cigarettes, to be objects of addiction.620 Although the EU’s tobacco policy is not 
expressly focussed on addiction, certain harmonised rules appear to be directly and specifically 
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concerned with tobacco’s potential to become an object of addiction, which indicates that EU 
tobacco policy is addressing certain factors of the addictiogenic environment. For example, Member 
States are required to ‘on the basis of scientific evidence, prohibit the placing on the market of 
tobacco products containing additives in quantities that increase the toxic or addictive effect of 
those products’,621 a policy which addresses the fact that economic operators may try to increase 
the appeal of tobacco through palatable flavours,622 thus contributing to the pseudo-relationship 
potential of such products.  Furthermore, the packaging of electronic cigarettes is required to carry 
warning labels attesting to the addictive nature of nicotine’,623 a policy which addresses the fact that 
cigarette manufactures may be attempting to re-normalise smoking behaviour624 through the 
promotion of less hazardous nicotine delivery mechanisms, in order to recreate an environment in 
which smoking can become an acceptable vocation.  
 
The CJEU have supported the legitimacy of such action, which has been based on the EU’s internal 
market harmonisation powers in Article 114 TFEU. After establishing that the EU’s harmonisation 
competence can only be used for public health interventions that also genuinely have as their 
objective the targeting of problems with a cross-border dimension,625 the CJEU held in Tobacco 
Advertising 2 that the cross-border nature of tobacco advertising legitimised the use of Article 114 
TFEU by the EU legislature to create harmonised standards prohibiting the advertising of tobacco 
products across television, radio, printed press and information society media.626  In Poland v 
Parliament and Council, in which the 2014 Tobacco Products Directive was challenged, particularly 
with regard to the prohibition on characterising flavourings, the CJEU was progressive in factoring 
the EU’s international public health commitments into its decision. On the basis that the EU is a 
party to the legally binding Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),627 and that the FCTC 
obliges parties to pursue a number of evidence-based tobacco control initiatives, the CJCEU held 
that the EU was entitled to pursue its ban on characterising tobacco flavours. It also held that Article 
114 TFEU was an appropriate legal basis for the measure since its objective was, in addition to public 
health goals, to prevent regulatory disparities from emerging between the Member States.628 
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Despite consistent recognition that the EU is permitted to use its harmonisation competence for 
public health purposes, direct recognition that the EU should use these competences has been rare 
in the CJEU’s public health jurisprudence.629 Therefore the Poland v Parliament and Council ruling 
represents an important milestone in establishing that the EU is responsible for the control of 
transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment630 – which in this instance was the 
manipulation of potential objects of addiction by economic operators and their subsequent trade 
across borders, the transnational element being the fact that economic operators might take 
advantage of less stringent tobacco product regulations in one Member State in order to trade in 
more attractive tobacco products across the internal market. 
 
The CJEU have not only supported the EU in its efforts to take responsibility for transnational aspects 
of tobacco addiction policy, they have also supported the Member States in adopting strong 
interventions that are either more appropriately adopted at the national level or are currently too 
divisive to adopt at EU level. In particular, the CJEU has upheld Member State interventions on the 
price of tobacco products. For example a very recent judgement upheld the legitimacy of a form of 
minimum pricing of tobacco, which mandated that tobacco products could not be sold below the 
recommended retail price set by the manufacturer.631 This measure was held to fall outside the 
prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction altogether, and thus 
was not in conflict with EU rules on the free movement of goods.632 By way of further example, the 
CJEU has also upheld legislation fixing certain rates of excise duties on the sale of cheaper tobacco 
products.633  
 
The EU’s interventions in the field of tobacco control also demonstrate an effort, within that field at 
least, to encourage horizontal policy thinking. As noted above, EU tobacco legislation covers a 
number of different fields – the advertising of tobacco products, the composition of tobacco 
products, and the price of tobacco products – at the very least indicating a desire to address tobacco 
control issues on several fronts at EU level. The CJEU’s case law has also provided promising support 
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for horizontal action on addictive objects at EU level. First, the Court has upheld the validity of 
pursuing public health objectives through other policy fields – for instance it has stated several times 
that fiscal measures, taxation in particular, are important instruments of tobacco control.634  
Furthermore, the Court has consistently recognised in its tobacco control case law that the EU has 
an obligation to mainstream public health concerns – in other words to ensure that ‘health 
protection must be considered in all fields of Union action’635 – and has used this obligation to 
support internal market harmonisation measures that support public health objectives.  
 
For example, in Tobacco Advertising 2 the Court noted that, due to the mainstreaming provisions, 
the exclusion of harmonisation in the field of tobacco and alcohol under the EU’s specific public 
health competence in Article 168(5) ‘does not mean, however, that harmonising measures adopted 
on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty cannot have any impact on the protection of human 
health’.636 Furthermore, the Court relied on a combination of the mainstreaming provisions in Article 
168(1) TFEU and Article 114(3) TFEU in upholding the legitimacy of the Tobacco Products 
Directive.637 Thus, in the tobacco control field, the EU legislature has taken some encouraging steps 
in pursuit of the mainstreaming obligations imposed by the Treaty, supported by the CJEU. Although 
the internal market competence could still be used as the foundation for far more action in tobacco 
control,638  and despite the fact that health impact assessment in EU policymaking has so far been 
poor,639 the progress made so far in the tobacco field could, arguably, be seen as an embryonic 
horizontal approach to governing this particular object of addiction.640  
 
How can the EU’s relative success in the tobacco field at promoting policies that target important 
factors of the addictiogenic environment be explained? Current successes can be traced back to the 
steady accumulation of evidence that irrefutably showed that smoking is not only harmful to 
individual health, but also a critical population health issue, which has grown to epidemic 
proportions.641 The mounting evidence on the need for strong action at international level 
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precipitated a convergence in political agreement. A critical mass of supporters of tobacco control, 
state and non-state actors alike, began to agree that strong action on tobacco was in the shared 
interest of the international community.642 Within the EU, the Tobacco Advertising Directive was 
finally enacted following decisive changes in government in Member States that had previously 
opposed tobacco legislation.643  Similarly, the election of Gro Harlem Brundtland to the office of 
WHO Director General, with her committed tobacco control agenda, was the tipping point that 
ignited policy activity at WHO level.644 The result was the adoption of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control – a binding public health treaty that legally commits its signatories, of which the EU 
is one, to concerted, evidence based action to combat tobacco related harm – the existence of 
which has ‘been employed as a catalyst to encourage broader participation in and engagement with 
tobacco control issues’.645  
 
Although the adoption of the FCTC has ‘generated global momentum for increased regulation of 
tobacco’,646 and in particular has provided crucial legal impetus for legitimising tobacco control at EU 
level,647 the existence of the FCTC alone is not sufficient to ensure that EU policy action on tobacco 
and tobacco addiction will continue to develop in a horizontal, holistic and multilevel way. Aside 
from the concerns expressed in the literature on the implementation of the legal norms of the 
FCTC,648 the greatest obstacle to the development of effective EU action on tobacco control remains 
the global tobacco industry. It is true that the image of legitimacy that the tobacco industry built for 
most of the twentieth century has been steadily eroded in recent years – revelations from internal 
tobacco industry documents,649 class action litigation against the industry,650 and the industry’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC): Can we use tobacco control as a model for other 
non-communicable disease control?’ (2011) 125 Public Health 847, 849. 
642
 On the building of this critical mass, and particularly the role of non-state actors in this process, see: H 
Mamudu et al, ‘The Nature, Scope, and development of the Global Tobacco Control Epistemic Community’ 
(2011) 101(11) American Journal of Public Health 2044.   
643
 F Duina and P Kurzer, ‘Smoke in your eyes: the struggle over tobacco control in the European Union’ (2004) 
11(1) Journal of European Public Policy 57.  
644
 R Roemer et al, ‘Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’ (2005) 95(6) American 
Journal of Public Health 936, 938; H Mamudu and S Glantz, ‘Civil society and the negotiation of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control’ (2009) 4(2) Global Public Health 150, 153.  
645
 J Collin et al, ‘The framework convention on tobacco control: the politics of global health governance’ 
(2002) 23(2) Third World Quarterly 265, 275.  
646
 O Cabrera and L Gostin, ‘Human rights and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: mutually 
reinforcing systems’ (2011) 7(3) International Journal of Law in Context 285, 290.  
647
 Alemanno and Garde, n 142 above.  
648
 Beaglehole et al, n5 above. 
649
 L Bero, ‘Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documents for Public Health and Policy’(2003) 24 Annual 
Review of Public Health 267.  
650
 L Gostin, ‘The “Tobacco Wars” – Global Litigation Strategies’ (2007) 298(21) Journal of the American 
Medical Association 2537.  
 141 
behaviour in reacting to regulation651 have seen to this. However, the tobacco industry remains a 
powerful political player, and has used a number of overt and covert tactics to assert its influence 
over the policymaking process.652 This has resulted in lengthy adoption processes for most EU 
tobacco interventions, which have ended up noticeably weaker on account of the industry’s 
influence.653 Thus, the industry has continued to influence policymaking despite the commitment 
the FCTC parties have made, under Article 5(3) to ‘protect [these] policies from commercial and 
other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law’. Full and rigorous 
implementation of this provision by the EU institutions should therefore be seen as a priority if EU 
tobacco control is to encourage further effective action on the factors of the addictiogenic 
environment.  
 
In summary, the EU has made some good progress towards encouraging horizontal policymaking in 
the tobacco field, and by legislating in fields such as tobacco advertising and tobacco products has 
begun to take on responsibility where cross border trade presents issues. However, outside the 
tobacco control field the EU has been far less successful, and this chapter now turns to an analysis of 
EU efforts in the field of alcohol control. 
III. Alcoholic Beverages 
The EU has been far less successful in addressing addiction issues in the context of alcoholic 
beverages. The EU Alcohol Strategy, adopted in 2006 but now expired, codified the EU’s policy 
making approach to alcohol.654 Legislative interventions on alcohol are sparse -  two Directives on 
alcohol excise duty were adopted over twenty years ago,655 and the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive contains some provisions that directly concern alcohol. Aside from these interventions, and 
in the absence of harmonisation in the field, control of alcoholic beverages has been left to the 
Member States.656  
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The EU has been notably poor in responding to calls upon it to accept greater responsibility for 
action on addiction issues in the alcohol control field. From 2001 there have been multiple calls from 
the Member States for the EU to use its competences to provide support in tackling alcohol related 
harm,657 including specifically on addiction issues, on which subject the 2001 Council Conclusions on 
a Commission Strategy to reduce alcohol related harm ‘recalls the European Union Drugs Strategy 
2000 to 2004 which emphasises the need for measures addressing addiction in general, including 
alcohol and tobacco’.658 In the end, the EU Alcohol Strategy has provided nothing of the sort. Keen to 
respect the principle of subsidiarity in a policy field that is complex and highly contentious,659 and in 
which socio-cultural arguments are often raised in order to stave off EU intervention,660 the EU has 
operationalised the principle to extreme lengths.661 For fear of infringing the subsidiarity principle, or 
perhaps as a convenient excuse to avoid action,662 the EU Alcohol Strategy has been drafted in such 
a hands-off way that it provides virtually no useful supranational support to the Member States, 
especially on addiction issues.  
 
First, the prospect of EU harmonisation measures is specifically excluded by the Strategy,663 meaning 
that factors of the addictiogenic environment that operate across borders, such as the global alcohol 
industry, will remain unaddressed by coherent cross-border action, despite the Strategy recognising 
that ‘where there is a cross border element, better coordination at, and synergies established with, 
the EU level might be needed’.664 Second, as a Strategy that purported to respond to the ‘need for 
further actions and cooperation at EU and national level’,665 the Strategy is remarkably sparse on 
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novel, evidence based interventions – in fact the substance of the Strategy is primarily dedicated to 
summarising best practice that is already going on in the Member States.666 This does nothing to 
fulfill the ‘role of the EU as an overarching cooperative body’,667 when it has been requested to 
‘focus on measures with a European added value’.668 This is especially so in relation to addiction 
issues. While addiction was specifically raised as an issue before the release of the Strategy, it 
contains only an isolated reference to the prevalence of alcohol addiction,669 and vague assertions 
that EU action on certain cross-border factors of the addictiogenic environment such as alcohol 
advertising could be addressed in the future. Needless to say the EU has failed to address cross-
border alcohol advertising,670 and more recent calls for action from the Member States show that 
the few allusions to alcohol addiction have not led to a response that in any way discharges the 
supranational responsibilities of the EU to control transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment.671  
 
The EU Alcohol and Health Forum, set up in 2007 as the ‘cornerstone’672 and driver of the Strategy’s 
policy objectives at EU level, is also a disappointment. Although intended to be a mechanism to ‘step 
up actions relevant to reducing alcohol-related harm’673 – including, one would think, the issue of 
alcohol addiction – in reality the forum has become dominated by industry members who make 
most of the commitments, most of which are ineffective information provision interventions.674 
Asking industry operators that produce objects of addiction to regulate themselves in ways that 
reduce their profitability was always liable to introduce overwhelming conflicts of interest into the 
EU alcohol policymaking process.675 Foreseeing this might have prompted EU policymakers to 
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involve the alcohol industry on the basis of capacity, where ‘agents who have the capacity to address 
a problem more effectively or efficiently should assume the responsibility to do so’,676 not on the 
basis of culpability, where ‘agents who are to some degree “culpable” in a causal and moral sense, 
should take responsibility for the effects of their action’.677 The EU Forum was, unfortunately, set up 
on contradictory terms – while Forum members should be ‘capable of playing an active role in 
reducing alcohol-related harm’678 the Founding Charter also invites ‘all interested stakeholders … 
that pledge to step up actions relevant to alcohol related harm’.679 The implications of universal 
Forum membership were not thought through, and the result has been that supranational policy 
responsibility has been given to stakeholders whose actions are a major cross-border factor of the 
addictiogenic environment. This breakdown in the allocation of policy responsibility resulted in the 
collapse of the Forum, when all participating public health NGOs resigned in protest at the above 
situation.680 Consequently, there is currently no strategic direction at EU level on how the EU is to 
take responsibility for transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment pertaining to alcohol.  
 
In the absence of EU action, the Member States have proceeded to address alcohol addiction 
according to their own priorities. As these policies usually restrict cross-border trade,681 the CJEU is 
often called upon to assess the way in which Member States have balanced their free trade 
obligations with their concern, and indeed responsibility under the Treaties682 and their WHO level 
commitments,683 to reduce the prevalence of alcohol addiction. In light of the Member States’ 
international public health responsibilities, the fact that in the absence of harmonisation the 
Member States may decide how and to what extent they wish to protect the health of their 
populations, and the fact that the EU appears to have abdicated its own responsibility for alcohol 
addiction governance, it might be reasonable to expect that the CJEU would maintain a margin of 
discretion with respect to the compatibility of Member State public health policies with the free 
movement provisions of the Treaty. As the Court stated in Ahokainen and Leppik in 2006:    
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‘Member States enjoy a margin of discretion in determining, having regard to the particular 
social circumstances and to the importance attached by those States to objective which are 
legitimate under Community law, such as the prevention of alcohol abuse … the measures 
which are likely to achieve concrete results’.684 
 
However, the recent case law of the Court appears to remove this margin of discretion. Instead, the 
Member States are seemingly expected to prove that alcohol control measures that restrict trade, 
many of which also combat factors of the addictiogenic environment, are necessary.685  
 
The legitimate objective of preventing alcohol addiction is directly acknowledged in several alcohol 
control cases, where the suitability of measures adopted to combat alcohol addiction is also upheld. 
In Commission v France and Aragonesa, advertising was recognised to be linked to addiction 
prevalence.686 In Heinonen the Court recognised that addiction policy is part of Member States’ 
wider efforts to protect public health.687 Thus, the Court has built some awareness that a concern to 
address alcohol addiction requires certain policy actions, and can form part of a broader public 
health strategy. Unfortunately, this awareness has not been translated into an understanding of how 
difficult it is to prove that one element of a holistic policy approach is worth the restriction on trade 
that it specifically causes.688 In fact, later cases seem to pay less heed to the place of addiction issues 
in Member States alcohol control policy, and do not appear to apply any margin of discretion – in 
Rosengren the CJEU declared that certain alcohol importation restrictions did not demonstrate an 
‘irreproachable level of effectiveness’,689 and in Scotch Whisky the CJEU effectively analysed whether 
minimum unit pricing could offer anything more to the pursuit of public health protection than 
taxation,690 rather than whether the Member State was entitled to consider that the imposition of 
minimum unit pricing would strike a necessary balance between public health and free trade 
concerns. As a consequence, it is now significantly more difficult for Member States to justify bold 
alcohol addiction policies, due to the hard task of definitively proving the public health effects of 
very specific policies that are designed to operate as part of an overarching strategy, which itself 
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may be balancing public health and trade issues.691 This is particularly disappointing in light of the 
EU’s refusal to accept responsibility for alcohol addiction issues. In terms of the allocation of policy 
responsibility to the appropriate level of authority, the CJEU’s response to Member State alcohol 
policies has effectively led to the situation where some effective addiction interventions are barred 
at the national level, yet will not be compensated for by action at supranational level.692 This is a 
serious impediment to the ability of Member States to deal with the complex nature of addiction 
policymaking, an impediment which the EU should take responsibility for resolving.  
 
The EU institutions have not only disrupted the effective allocation of alcohol addiction policy to the 
most effective levels of authority, they have also failed to encourage the development of a 
horizontal approach to such policy. There are no references to addiction, alcoholism or dependence 
in any EU legislation outside of the EU Alcohol Strategy, and indeed public health concerns in general 
have been engaged with to a disappointingly low extent. The Television Without Frontiers 
Directive693 and its successor the Audiovisual Media Services Directive were opportunities for the EU 
to lay down strong standards in its cross-border media and broadcasting policy that protected 
individuals, children in particular, from certain factors of the addictiogenic environment such as 
irresponsible alcohol advertising.694 Instead, the limited number of the Directive’s provisions that 
apply to alcohol are weak and easy to circumvent695 – a situation that has prompted Member States 
to adopt more stringent rules, which in turn provides leads to further CJEU scrutiny, and further 
potential failures of multilevel governance.696 Another notable failure to consider the potential 
contribution that other EU policies could make to alcohol control was the exclusion of alcoholic 
beverages from the scope of mandatory disclosure requirements that are imposed upon other 
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foodstuffs by Regulation 1169/2011.697 As has been noted previously, Article 168(1) TFEU requires 
that ‘a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation 
of all Union policies and activities’, while Article 114(3) TFEU requires that internal market proposals 
relating to health ‘will take as a base a high level of protection’. The EU’s failure to act on these 
mainstreaming obligations stands in stark contrast to its work in the tobacco control field, and is 
made all the more noticeable by the fact that the EU Alcohol Strategy has expired, leaving these few 
legislative provisions as the EU’s only concrete engagement with alcohol control issues, let alone 
alcohol addiction issues.  
 
How can the disparity between the EU’s alcohol control and tobacco control efforts be explained? 
How could two objects that may equally become objects of addiction come to be treated by the EU 
institutions so differently. A significant factor is the difference between the sociocultural role of 
alcohol compared with tobacco, which has resulted in political agreement being far more difficult to 
reach in the alcohol control field than in the tobacco control field. Alcohol, unlike tobacco, is a far 
more heterogeneous product than tobacco. The variety of alcoholic beverages produced and 
marketed within Europe is enormous,698 with types and methods of alcohol consumption also 
varying considerably between Member States.699 This heterogeneity is often raised by stakeholders 
to support arguments that the regulation of alcoholic beverages within Europe should be guided by 
the subsidiarity principle.700 These circumstances have meant that it has been very difficult to 
generate political agreement on what common regulations could be applied to alcohol at the 
supranational level. States are simply not yet prepared to make the necessary effort to identify 
commonalities between how they approach alcohol, agree common standards of protection to 
which they can all subscribe, and engage in policymaking that would formalise these common 
commitments.701 What are now well established policymaking conditions in the tobacco field and 
which led to the creation of the FCTC, are sadly absent in the alcohol control field. This goes some 
way to explaining the failure of the EU to engage with its supranational responsibilities in alcohol 
addiction policymaking, and means that the prospect of binding EU rules is somewhat distant.  
 
Another significant factor that may explain the lack of progress on alcohol control compared with 
tobacco is that the alcohol industry is still seen by the EU and its Member States as a partner to be 
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trusted, rather than a vector of disease702 to be controlled at arm’s length.703 As discussed above, the 
tobacco industry has been relegated to near pariah status, enabling most policymakers to agree 
upon the fact that it should be excluded from policymaking. The alcohol industry by comparison is 
not yet seen as a pariah – in fact, despite similarities with the tobacco industry in how it operates to 
weaken policy, the alcohol industry is still trusted as a policy partner,704 has been actively invited 
into policy discussions at European level as we saw from the above discussion on the EU Alcohol 
Forum, and is still allowed to co-opt debates and influence government positions on policy from a 
privileged position.705  Thus, the industry has been allowed to steer debates on addiction towards 
the issue of personal responsibility706 and away from their own substantial contribution to the 
addictiogenic environment, which has resulted in the policymaking process loosing focus707 on 
effective interventions in a way that has not been allowed to happen for tobacco.  
 
In summary, the EU has responded poorly to calls for it to accept greater policymaking responsibility 
in the alcohol control field, and this has meant that supranational addiction issues relating to alcohol 
have been left virtually untouched. The way in which the CJEU’s alcohol case law has developed has 
also made the Member States’ job of dealing with addiction issues more difficult. By comparison, the 
EU’s efforts in the field of gambling services serve as an even more interesting litmus test of the EU’s 
approach to the addiction phenomenon, and it is to an analysis of these efforts that this chapter 
now turns. 
IV. Gambling Services 
Gambling is perhaps even more sensitive as an addiction issue than alcohol708 – as Van den Bogaert 
and Cuyvers put it, ‘how to regulate an activity which is perceived as morally objectionable and 
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socially harmful, yet which generates significant revenue (often earmarked for desirable social 
purposes) and seems impossible to prevent anyway?’.709 In the case of an object of addiction that is 
not only perceived differently between Member States, but which many Member States directly 
organise and profit from, it is extremely difficult for EU level policymakers to build consensus for a 
common European regulatory approach. Due to the fact that many governments profit greatly from 
gambling through state-run monopolies, any effort to set common standards of social or health 
protection ‘would be met by enormous political resistance from those groups that would lose from 
harmonization’.710 The difficulty of regulating gambling at EU level is further increased when one 
considers that, unlike products that have the capacity to move across borders, services provided 
exclusively within the national territory, such as land based casinos, do not have a strong cross-
border dimension. Despite the fact that travelling across borders to receive gambling services in 
other Member States gives such services a cross-border dimension,711 land-based gambling services 
are, practically speaking, beyond the scope of EU policymaking.712  
 
Consequently, EU policy makers are limited in options, and therefore have not sought to harmonise 
any aspect of gambling services provision. The only field in which the Commission has been able to 
put forward policymaking proposals is online gambling. In 2011 the Commission published a Green 
Paper on online gambling in the Internal Market,713 and in 2012 adopted a Communication on the 
same topic.714 These documents raised the point that online gambling takes place in an ‘inherently 
cross-border environment’,715 and that due to the ‘development of the internet and the increased 
supply of on-line gambling services’716 it is ‘more difficult for the different national regulatory 
models to co-exist’.717 On this basis, following the release of the Green Paper and the 
Communication, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on the subject,718 which aims to 
‘safeguard the health of consumers and players and … minimise eventual economic harm that may 
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result from compulsive or excessive gambling’719 by setting out ‘principles for a high level of 
protection of consumers, players and minors as regards online gambling services’.720 Further EU 
engagement with gambling policy extends to two European Parliament Resolutions on Online 
Gambling from 2011721 and 2013,722 a set of Council Conclusions on Online Gambling,723 and the 
establishment of an Expert Group on Gambling.724  
 
In quantitative terms, the EU’s engagement with gambling appears even more sparse than with 
alcohol. However, in a field as complex, morally charged and sensitively balanced as gambling, in 
which building the necessary consensus for regulation at international level is incredibly difficult, a 
successful multilevel governance approach does not necessarily mean that all levels must legislate. 
Harmonisation represents only one way in which the EU might discharge its responsibilities for 
addressing transnational addiction factors.725  Thus, despite the difficulties in creating harmonised 
gambling control standards, the EU legislature has made reasonable efforts to discharge its 
responsibilities to assist the Member States in addressing gambling addiction issues of a cross-
border nature. 
 
The EU has engaged in a genuine process of consultation, implementation and feedback, in order to 
respond to calls that were made by successive European Council presidencies from 2008 to 2010726 
and the European Parliament in 2009727  for EU level action on cross-border gambling services. The 
publication of the Green Paper was welcomed by the European Parliament as a step that would 
‘facilitate pragmatic and realistic consideration of the future of [online gambling] in Europe’.728 The 
Commission was therefore attentive to the calls from Member States, and the need for action at the 
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supranational level. The publication of the Communication followed, which acknowledged that ‘it 
does not appear appropriate at this stage to propose sector specific EU legislation’, but recognised 
that ‘there was an almost unanimous call for policy action at EU level’.729 The Communication was 
designed to answer this call by encouraging Member States to adopt ‘a combination of initiatives 
and relevant measures’ that were ‘based on available evidence’.730 The Communication contains a 
section dedicated to ‘preventing problem gambling or gambling addiction’, which acknowledges that 
greater evidence is needed, including on ‘the determinants’ of gambling addictions – in other words 
the factors of the gambling addictiogenic environment.731 Such evidence was indeed sought through 
the Commission co-funded ALICE RAP project, a recently concluded five year research project that 
aims to build a better understanding of how addiction is developed and what harm it causes.732  
Through this process, the Commission showed an appreciation of its role as a supranational policy 
entrepreneur733 by reacting attentively to the requests of Member States in relation to gambling, 
and to gambling addiction, which was raised as a specific area of concern.734 
 
Following the publication of the Communication, the European Parliament issued a further 
Resolution that offered positive feedback on the Commissions’ efforts,735 but ultimately requested 
further action, particularly to include provisions recommending that Member States mandate that 
advertising for online gambling must carry warnings on the risk of gambling addiction. The 
Parliament ‘call[ed] on the Commission and the Member States to introduce effective measures to 
raise awareness of the risks of gambling addiction’,736 yet did not envisage proposals for 
harmonisation to be part of this.737 The Commission’s response was the publication of its 
Recommendation on online gambling. This Recommendation notes and acts upon the calls for 
greater action on gambling addiction738 – multiple provisions of the Recommendation pertain to the 
prevention of problem gambling specifically, or to important factors of the addictiogenic 
environment for gambling, so much so that one could consider problem gambling to be one of the 
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driving concerns of the Recommendation. Indeed under Article 1, one purpose of the 
Recommendation is to ‘safeguard health and to also minimise the eventual economic harm that may 
result from compulsive or excessive gambling’. The Commission indeed encourages Member States 
to ensure that gambling advertising carries warnings on problem gambling risks,739 and recommends 
standards for the regulation of gambling advertising,740 while encouraging Member States to ensure 
that economic operators have policies in place for identifying potential problem gamblers.741 It 
furthermore recommends that gambling advertising should not target vulnerable individuals and in 
particular those who have had gambling problems.742  
 
The Recommendation can be seen as offering supranational coordination that directly addresses 
several important aspects of the addictiogenic environment for gambling,743 and which is 
commensurate with the action requested by the Member States and the powers available to the 
Commission. One might therefore conclude that, in the gambling sector, the EU has gone some way 
towards discharging its responsibilities for addressing transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment. This is interesting given that the political sensitivity of the gambling field is even 
greater than in the alcohol or tobacco fields. There is certainly evidence that the Commission has 
made an effort to discharge its supranational responsibilities despite its limited ability to adopt 
legislation, in contrast to the alcohol field where the Commission has actively resisted the calls of the 
Member States for action despite its capacity for legislative action.  
 
One might legitimately ask how the Commission has managed to discharge its responsibilities in 
relation to gambling services, while actively resisting them in relation to alcoholic beverages. Putting 
these limited successes in their broader regulatory perspective shows that the above progress may 
be rather meagre in context. It should be recalled that the Communication and the 
Recommendation released by the Commission are both non-binding instruments, as requested by 
the Member States. This in itself perhaps explains why the Commission was able to propose such 
extensive and direct recommendations for action. Free from having to build the political consensus 
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necessary for Member States to agree to bear the ‘costs of regulation’,744 the Commission was able 
to go far further with its suggestions than it would have been able to had it been called upon to 
initiate proposals for harmonisation. The absence of any desire for binding legislation in the 
gambling field of course means that the EU’s ability to mainstream gambling addiction issues into 
other EU policy fields is extremely limited, and is evidenced by the fact that gambling services have 
been specifically excluded from the scope of the Services Directive,745 the E-Commerce Directive,746 
and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive,747 three important pieces of internal market legislation 
that could otherwise have contributed to resolving conflicts between competing market 
liberalisation and consumer protection imperatives.748 Furthermore, other pieces of EU secondary 
legislation that are applicable to gambling have been revealed as not imposing any strong controls 
on gambling services.749 Consequently, the total lack of desire for harmonised standards at EU level 
in the gambling field can be seen as something of a double edged sword – while giving the 
Commission freedom to discharge supranational level responsibilities using non-binding 
mechanisms, it also appears to have shut down its ability to promote horizontality in the governance 
of gambling addiction issues.   
 
Thus, it could be argued that the EU’s policy engagement with gambling addiction issues is almost 
the reverse of its engagement with alcohol addiction issues. Despite the fact that Member States 
guard their ability to regulate gambling services even more jealously than they do their ability to 
regulate alcoholic beverages, which therefore should have demanded an ever more subservient 
response from the Commission, in actual fact the Commission has been freed from virtually any 
legislative responsibility. In the place of common European standards, the Commission has therefore 
created an extensive yet relatively superficial set of soft-law measures, more reminiscent of a wish 
list than an actual effort to coordinate Member State action. Thus, while the Commission has shown 
intent to discharge responsibility for supranational action on the factors of the addictiogenic 
environment, the direct impact of this intent upon transnational factors of the addictiogenic 
environment in the gambling field may be quite minimal.  
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Due to the fact that there is no harmonisation at EU level in the gambling field, Member States are 
free to regulate gambling services as they see fit,750 provided they do so within the bounds of the 
Treaty provisions on the freedoms of establishment and services,751 and the principle of 
proportionality.752 As highlighted above, gambling services are unusual objects of addiction because 
Member States may be financially conflicted over gambling regulation in a way that they are not 
over alcohol and tobacco regulation. This has an impact upon gambling regulation, since Member 
States will have an incentive to encourage some manner of expansion of gambling opportunities.753  
Consequently, the CJEU has had an opportunity in its gambling case law, which has been extensive 
since the first preliminary reference in Schindler in 1992,754 to provide clarification on the balance 
that must be struck under EU law between economic gains, public health protection, and free 
movement in the regulation of gambling services.   
 
However, the CJEU’s case law has done anything but clarify the responsibilities and obligations of 
the Member States in relation to the governance of gambling addiction. The CJEU’s assessment of 
whether restrictions on the free movement of services755 and the freedom of establishment756 made 
by gambling regulation can be justified revolves, as with alcohol control, around whether national 
measures are suitable and necessary to achieve legitimate objectives.757 In Gambelli the CJEU 
accepted, based on the decisions in Schindler, Laara and Zenatti, that consumer protection 
(subsequently interpreted to include addiction758) and the prevention of crime could constitute 
legitimate objectives that would justify restrictions on services and establishment.759  By reading the 
judgements in Zenatti, Gambelli and Placanica together, gambling regulation will be suitable for 
achieving either of those objectives when it aims at a genuine diminution of gambling 
opportunities760 in a consistent and systematic manner761 and employs methods that are necessary 
to achieve such consistency.762  
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However in Placanica, the CJEU recognised that when a Member State seeks to expand the gambling 
opportunities it controls through a monopoly in order to increase tax revenue, the restrictions to 
services and establishment made by the monopoly cannot be justified by consumer protection (and 
addiction) concerns763 – instead, they must be justified by concerns to combat crime.764 In such a 
situation, when seeking to channel gamblers into a ‘reliable, but at the same time attractive, 
alternative to a prohibited activity’765 in an effort to combat crime, Member States may pursue a 
policy of controlled expansion, in order to ensure that their chosen gambling channel is indeed 
attractive.766  
 
This outcome did not exactly cover the CJEU in glory – in essence the above case law provides 
Member States with a way to continue profiting from an object of addiction, as long as the way in 
which this is done is consistent with the prevention of crime. This was, at least, not contradictory. 
However, in Ladbrokes, the CJEU introduced exactly such a contradiction. The CJEU expressly 
rejected previous findings in Laara and Placanica that the channelling argument could only be used 
when the objectives raised to justify national gambling regulation that permitted expansions in 
gambling opportunities were related to the prevention of crime, not the prevention of addiction. 
Ladbrokes held that ‘the fact remains that those two objectives must be considered together, since 
they relate both to consumer protection and to the preservation of public order’.767 Despite the case 
law that the Court refers to in order to back up this claim, the fact remains – to use the CJEU’s own 
words – that the channelling argument was specifically introduced into the proportionality analysis 
in relation to the objective of preventing crime only. Consequently, the Court erroneously continued 
on to hold in Ladbrokes that ‘a fair balance has to be drawn between demand for the controlled 
expansion of authorised games of chance with the aim of making the provision of such games 
attractive for the public and the need to reduce as far as possible consumer addiction to such 
games’.768  
 
The result is to advise Member States that, in order to be compatible with EU law, their rules must 
strike a balance between a practice that, at the CJEU’s own admission, is ‘in principle, difficult to 
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reconcile’769 with preventing gambling addiction, and an objective that was expressly acknowledged 
not to justify such a practice. The Ladbrokes case created a contradiction in the assessment of the 
proportionality of Member State policies on gambling addiction that has never been fully reconciled 
by subsequent CJEU case law. This is evidenced by the myriad variations of what is ‘necessary’ to 
ensure that channelling and controlled expansion is consistent with the prevention of addiction – 
examples include tolerating private expansion not subject to a monopoly while the monopoly is 
restricted,770 advertising not being ‘measured’ in nature,771 and the extent of unlawful activity not 
being ‘significant’.772 The consequence of this persistent contradiction is that Member State efforts 
to organise their approach to gambling addiction in a horizontal way have been seriously 
undermined. The Court had an opportunity to assist the Member States in balancing their financial 
conflict of interest in gambling regulation, but instead seem to have exacerbated it, expressly 
allowing Member States to continue drawing profit from their organisation of gambling 
opportunities despite the fact that this will not contribute effectively to controlling the addictiogenic 
environment.  
  
The use of the channelling argument has had another undesirable side effect for addiction 
governance, in that the balance struck between the prevention of gambling addiction and free trade 
is not consistent with that struck in relation to other objects of addiction, notably alcoholic 
beverages. The CJEU has been consistent in holding that Member States are entitled to operate a 
state-owned or state-run monopoly on gambling in preference to open competition between private 
operators, in order to ensure that consumers are channelled towards gambling opportunities that 
are controlled and legal.773 In Sporting Exchange the CJEU highlighted the ‘detrimental nature of 
competition in the market’,774 which arises from the fact that ‘operators would be led to compete 
with each other in inventiveness in making what they offer more attractive and, in that way, 
increasing consumers’ expenditure on gaming and the risks of their addiction’.775 This fact ‘may 
justify a restriction on the activity of economic operators’.776 The CJEU appears to justify this by 
reference to the fact that, unlike competition in a traditional market, competition ‘between several 
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operators authorised to run the same games of chance’777 is what leads to more inventive and more 
attractive offerings.  
 
This whole line of jurisprudence stands in stark contrast with the approach of the CJEU to Member 
State intervention and competition in the alcoholic beverages market, where restrictions on trade in 
alcoholic beverages have been held incompatible with the Treaties on the basis that they distort 
competition – for instance in Scotch Whisky the CJEU considered a minimum unit pricing measure to 
be a ‘serious obstacle … to the operation of fair competition in that market’.778 It could be argued 
that many alcoholic beverages that are commonly drunk in hazardous ways are extremely similar in 
their physical properties, and differ only in how inventive producers can be with their branding and 
marketing efforts.779 The CJEU has therefore been inconsistent on whether it is desirable or not to 
discourage competition between free market operators for the purpose of combatting addictions. 
Since corporate activity and the operation of the free market are important factors of the 
addictiogenic environment, this inconsistency may also undermine the capacity of Member States to 
develop a truly holistic approach to addiction governance.  
 
In summary, the EU has less scope to legislate in the field of gambling services in order to discharge 
its responsibilities for supranational addiction governance. Instead it has been playing a coordinating 
role, which still discharges responsibility, yet cannot create actual binding standards of protection. 
This must be achieved by the Member States. Yet the way in which the CJEU has developed its 
gambling jurisprudence makes this a difficult and somewhat confusing endeavour. Not only has the 
case law grown to be highly complex, it also appears to be inconsistent with case law developed in 
relation to other objects of addiction – a fact which does little to encourage behavioral and 
substance addictions to be addressed holistically 
V. Conclusion 
In the absence of a specific strategy dedicated to addiction prevention, the EU might at least have 
ensured that in fields where addiction is a major concern, such as the tobacco, alcohol and gambling 
fields, some attention was devoted to the problems of addiction, in addition to heavy and hazardous 
consumption. It appears though, from an analysis of the EU’s direct and indirect engagement with 
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addiction issues, that addictive consumption of potentially harmful objects has not been adequately 
addressed.  
 
The result has been that transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment – such as the 
marketing strategies of multinational corporations, or the conflict between trade promotion 
obligations and public health protection obligations – are not being effectively controlled. What is 
more, the evolution of EU case law at times prevents Member States from discharging their own 
responsibilities for addiction policy.  
 
This outcome has some important consequences for the overall control of the addictiogenic 
environment in Europe. Firstly, the absence of EU action on transnational addictiogenic environment 
factors means that Member States are forced to adopt responsibility for these issues, else they 
would be left unaddressed. This then leads naturally to transnational factors being dealt with in 
disparate ways. When Member States’ actions are invariably incompatible with the economic 
objectives of the Union, the resulting case law may then contribute to causing even further 
problems for the multilevel allocation of responsibility  for addiction policy between the Member 
States and the EU. Second, a lack of action, or weak action, on particular transnational factors of the 
addictiogenic environment allows those factors to gain a stronger foothold, entrenching the effects 
of the addictiogenic environment – for instance, multinational corporations, once invited into the 
policymaking process, are very difficult to dislodge, without a wholesale shift in policymaking 
approach. Finally, the EU’s failure so far to make good on its mainstreaming obligations have made it 
hard for both the EU and the Member States to prioritise public health concerns over economic 
concerns. The consequence is that constructing a truly horizontal approach to addiction governance 
is difficult.  
 
If this situation is left to unfold, then the addictiogenic environment will remain strong in Europe, 
and millions of cases of preventable addiction will cause high levels of mortality and morbidity. A 
fresh approach to addressing addiction is needed. Setting out how this fresh approach might be 
designed is the task of the remaining chapters of this thesis, starting in the next chapter with a 
discussion of the normative policymaking principles that might inform the design of such renewed 
strategic action on addiction prevention. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – DESIGNING A 
RENEWED AND MORE INTENSE 
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ADDICTION 
I. Introduction  
This thesis has put forward the case that addiction can best be explained as an adaptation to the 
experience of social dislocation, and that an addictiogenic environment exists, which promotes, 
encourages and facilitates the development of addictions. It is normatively acceptable for legal 
intervention to be applied in order to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment, and the 
EU could and should contribute to such control at the supranational level in order to support the 
efforts of the Member States in reducing the currently high prevalence of preventable addictions 
across Europe. The thesis has also shown that, despite having developed some good building blocks 
of effective addiction policy, the Member States have not been able to design approaches to 
addiction policy that address the root causes of addiction in a coordinated way, which makes the 
best use of available evidence. The thesis has furthermore argued that the EU has, in particular, 
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failed to support the multilevel approach that is needed in order to address addiction most 
effectively, failing overall to act on transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment and to 
make best use of the powers available to it in order to add value to the actions of the Member 
States.  
 
To summarise this in a different way, EU policymakers are normatively entitled, and legally 
empowered, to support the Member States in controlling the addictiogenic environment, yet have 
not engaged well with the responsibilities they owe to the Member States in their efforts to address 
this important public health and social problem. The result is, to date, an incoherent and only 
partially evidence-based set of approaches to the addiction phenomenon across Europe, where 
transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment are left unchecked, and the Member States 
fail to learn from each other’s best practices.  
 
This chapter will argue that in order for a renewed, more intense response to addiction policy to be 
successful, especially at EU level, addiction policy design must be more closely aligned with the 
available evidence on the operation of the addictiogenic environment, and the effectiveness of the 
available legal interventions. Through the analysis of Member State approaches to addiction, it was 
revealed that addiction policy will be most effective when it is based on three principles – 
holisticism, horizontality and the multilevel allocation of responsibility. In essence, these principles 
hold that addiction policy must target the basic root causes of addiction rather than its 
manifestations, must draw upon all relevant policy fields, and must allocate policy responsibility to 
the most appropriate level of responsibility. This chapter will argue that in order to ensure that 
addiction policy at any level, especially the EU level, properly reflects theses ideas, the design of 
addiction policy must focus on a clearly defined and very specific set of goals, and must be guided by 
carefully chosen operational paradigms that will ensure that policymakers select the most 
appropriate and effective legal interventions for the objectives they wish to accomplish. The chapter 
will therefore set out a template of effective addiction policy design, in which actions are closely 
aligned with objectives and evidence.   
II. Design of effective addiction policy  
Policy design, as Howlett et al note, ‘involves the deliberate and conscious attempt to define policy 
goals and connect them to instruments or tools expected to realise those objectives’.780 Thus, the 
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starting point for any well-designed strategic approach to addiction is to identify the ultimate 
objectives of the strategy and then to articulate clear goals that reflect those objectives. The 
ultimate objective of adopting a renewed and more intense strategic approach to addiction is to 
exert meaningful control over the factors of the addictiogenic environment. This ultimate objective 
must however be broken down into more specific policy goals that identify how particular parts of 
the addictiogenic environment will be dealt with, so that the overall problem of taming the 
addictiogenic environment becomes more manageable. The analysis below will first argue that 
articulating the problem to be solved as accurately and precisely as possible will increase the 
chances that legal intervention to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment will be 
correctly targeted, and thus ultimately successful.  
 
The analysis will then address the second element of policy design highlighted above – the 
connection of goals to instruments that are likely to achieve those goals. The clearest of goals cannot 
be achieved unless they are properly matched to appropriate interventions. Interventions that do 
not match the goals they pursue are likely to inflame, rather than solve a problem such as addiction. 
Thus, policymakers should follow a method for ensuring that the most appropriate interventions will 
be adopted for each goal of an addiction strategy – a policymaking paradigm – which will guide 
policymakers in interpreting the problem, and in finding solutions that are likely to be most effective 
in solving it.  
 
A. The importance of clear strategic goals 
The process of identifying policy goals for a focussed, strategic approach to controlling the 
addictiogenic environment is an essential one to get right. Efforts to reinvigorate addiction policy in 
Europe will only be successful if action is targeted at the right problems.  
 
For EU level addiction policy in particular, setting clear goals for renewed efforts to address 
transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment will be important to the process of uniting 
the policy approaches that have developed in different fields of EU public health and social policy. A  
new strategic approach to addiction at EU level should aim to ‘address the perceived shortcomings 
of previous, more ad hoc, policy regimes’,781 and the success of such an endeavour depends heavily 
on the establishment of a ‘policy domain with coherent policy goals’.782 Consequently, precise 
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articulation of what the objectives of more intense addiction policy are will be necessary in order to 
provide a sufficiently well-defined policy domain.  
 
Clearer goals will also give measures adopted within the Strategy a greater chance of withstanding 
legal challenge. As has previously been highlighted, the proportionality of measures is assessed 
based on the legitimate objective being pursued. The Scotch Whisky decision is an excellent example 
of unclear goals undermining the defence of a measure designed to improve public health. Although 
in reality the legitimate objective of minimum unit pricing is to reduce the consumption of high-
strength-low-price alcohol by hazardous and harmful drinkers, with the side effect of reducing 
population consumption generally,783 these two goals were presented as twin legitimate objectives 
before the CJEU, leading the CJEU to question the necessity of minimum unit pricing when taxation 
seemed to offer greater benefits in relation to achieving both a general and a specific objective.784 
The legality of the measure was ultimately put in jeopardy on account of the failure to properly 
articulate its goals. Thus, articulating the goals of strategic action on addiction in an unambiguous 
way is crucial for ensuring that any policies adopted in pursuit of them can be defended, should they 
conflict with free trade norms. 
 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the addictiogenic environment model suggests that 
there are three elements in the development of any addiction – the experience of social dislocation, 
the creation of a pseudo-relationship, and engagement in vocational consumption. In order for any 
strategic approach to addiction to be successful, it is argued that these three processes must be 
targeted, in a coherent manner. To successfully target the right problems, clear goals must be 
articulated that pull together not only existing relevant approaches that might be worth continuing 
with, but also new courses of action. A clearly articulated goal of strategic action, focussed on one 
particular element of addiction development, will provide policymakers with ‘a statement of key 
principles that rationalize existing goals and thus constitute the “architecture” of the new policy 
domain’785 – the new policy domain in this case being either the prevention of social dislocation, the 
discouragement of pseudo-relationships, or the removal of vocational consumption opportunities. 
The ultimate objective connecting this network of policy domains within an overarching addiction 
strategy is control over and weakening of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
                                                          
783
 See Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 3 September 2015 in Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky 
Association [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:527, paras 115-120. 
784
 Scotch Whisky, n 365 above, para 47-48.  
785
 Rayner and Howlett, n 781 above, 101. 
 163 
With the foregoing in mind, one might articulate potential goals of an addiction strategy as follows. 
The promotion of social dislocation is one element of the addictiogenic environment. If certain 
factors within an individual’s environment promote the development of social dislocation, then it 
would appear logical to name these factors as problematic, and to target them. Any factor of the 
environment that causes or leads to the cause of feelings of non-belonging should be targeted, any 
factor of the environment that causes acute levels of unnecessary stress to individuals, any factors of 
the environment that results in an individual feeling denigrated or degraded is included, and any 
factor that causes an individual to under-value themselves. Many of these effects are identifiably 
and tangibly produced by the design or operation of social institutions, and those institutions should 
be understood to be the root of the problem. Thus, the goal of addiction strategy in relation to 
preventing social dislocation from occurring might be articulated as reforming the design or 
operation of social institutions to ensure that they do not exclude, acutely stress, denigrate or under-
value any individual.  
 
The encouragement of individuals to begin pseudo-relationships with potential objects of addiction 
is another element of the addictiogenic environment. Again, where certain factors of an individual’s 
environment encourage such pseudo-relationships, it is logical to identify these factors as 
problematic. Thus, any factor that raises the acceptability or status of an object of addiction within 
society should be targeted, any factor that boosts the visibility of that object, any factor that 
increases the appeal or attractiveness of that object while hiding its harmful features, or any factor 
that leads to commoditisation of the object. Usually these outcomes are achieved through the 
promotion of profitably traded objects, though not always – sometimes these effects are the result 
of government policy itself, policy which promotes economic growth at the expense of the health of 
the population.  Consequently, a further goal of any addiction strategy, with the encouragement of 
pseudo-relationships in mind, might be articulated as: preventing actors that have an economic 
stake in the increased consumption of addictive objects from intentionally or unintentionally making 
those objects more acceptable, visible, attractive or commodified.  
 
The facilitation of vocational consumption is the final element of the addictiogenic environment. As 
with the previous two factors, intervention must target factors of the individual’s environment that 
can be considered problematic in this regard. Consequently, any factor that raises the availability of 
objects of addiction should be targeted, as must factors that make objects of addiction more 
accessible, and factors that make such objects more affordable. These outcomes are often the result 
of government policies that permit economic operators to run long opening hours, allow them to 
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saturate neighbourhoods with outlets, or allow them to offer cheap deals on addictive objects. In 
short, if policy allows economic operators to increase access to potential objects of addiction, then 
increase access they will. Thus, a final goal of any addiction strategy, connected to vocational 
consumption, might be articulated as: restricting the ability of economic operators to increase the 
availability, accessibility and affordability of potential objects of addiction.  
 
Having discussed the formation of goals of strategic approaches to addiction, the next sub-section 
considers how interventions might be selected to put these goals into effect, by examining the 
identification of suitable policymaking paradigms for addiction policy.  
 
D. The importance of well-chosen operational paradigms 
In order to ensure that the most effective action is being taken in pursuit of the chosen goals of 
renewed addiction strategy within Europe, guiding principles are needed that will assist 
policymakers to consistently identify interventions that match the goals being pursued. Just as NCD 
interventions in general must ‘meet rigorous, evidence-based criteria’,786 so too must interventions 
that seek to control the factors of the addictiogenic environment. As Marmot suggests, in order to 
make effective policy, ‘a simple prescription would be to review the scientific evidence of what 
would make a difference, formulate policies, and implement them – evidence based policy 
making’.787 Formulating policies from the available evidence though is far more complex than these 
three basic steps suggest - the analysis below argues that the process of selecting interventions of 
proven effectiveness that are likely to produce the outcomes sought will be most accurate when 
guided by the right policy paradigm. First, paradigms and their utility to designing an effective 
addiction strategy will be explained. Then, one paradigm that would be particularly suitable to guide 
policy choices on how to control the addictiogenic environment – the paternalism paradigm – will be 
discussed.  
 
i. The utility of paradigms for connecting goals to action  
According to Thomas Kuhn, the first scholar to thoroughly address the nature of a paradigm, 
paradigms are a way of making sense of and solving the problems that the world presents us with. 
He described a paradigm as an achievement that comprises two elements. First it is ‘sufficiently 
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific 
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activity’.788 Second it is ‘sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined 
group of practitioners to resolve’.789 In other words, a paradigm should constitute a novel way of 
thinking, which identifies a particular type of problem and how that problem should be dealt with. 
Some have alternatively summarised paradigms as instructions that help to ‘deal with … the 
research questions [investigators] should ask, and the rules to follow in the interpretation of the 
results’.790 Others identify them as conceptual tools that ‘guide what problems are deemed 
acceptable for investigation’791 and which provide ‘an overarching set of theories, methods and 
commitments’792 that should be relied on in order to solve that set of problems. Paradigms then, are 
sets of ideas that identify problems and propose acceptable solutions.  
 
When applied specifically to policymaking, the purpose of paradigms has been described in a 
number of ways. Campbell defines them as ‘assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful 
solutions available to policy makers’.793 Hall has suggested that paradigms give policy makers a 
‘framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are 
meant to be addressing’.794 Capano adds further detail by describing a policy paradigm as ‘a 
coherent series of beliefs about the “things to be done”, and about “how” they should be done’, 
which more specifically includes ‘the basic, inexorable values that are to dictate policy strategy’ and 
‘the series of cause-and-effect relationships by means of which the participants formulate their 
general strategy of intervention’.795 Policy paradigms are then, essentially, a ‘method for translating 
thought into action’.796 Consequently, employing policy paradigms to guide policy choices in the 
addiction field will help to ensure that the goals of renewed and more intense addiction strategy will 
be pursued by appropriately targeted interventions. 
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A well-chosen paradigm, or set of paradigms, will be able to ‘redirect … efforts towards the factors 
that are responsible’797 for a strong addictiogenic environment, and to ‘increase efficiency by 
guarding against wayward tangents’798 that might be thrown up by forces such as corporate 
lobbying, which seek to distract policymakers from selecting interventions that are likely to exert 
meaningful control over the addictiogenic environment. When it comes specifically to the unequal 
manner in which the addictiogenic environment affects populations on account of widespread social 
inequalities, the right paradigms can provide ‘an explicit framework that attempts to explain health 
disparities across populations’,799 with action then being targeted at the root of this explanation. In 
sum, basing the selection of addiction interventions upon well-chosen policy paradigms will allow 
policymakers to work out what the most effective interventions will be for controlling the factors of 
the addictiogenic environment.  
 
For policymaking at the EU level in particular, in addition to guiding policymakers towards the most 
evidentially effective solutions, the right paradigm can bring coherency to attempts to create a 
strategic approach to a certain policy issue. Coherency occurs when ‘policies pursued by different 
parts of the EU machine [are] consistent with each other’.800 This calls for some method of ensuring 
that ‘different initiatives buttress the same goals’.801 When there are multiple facets to solving a 
policy problem, such as there are when tackling the factors of the addictiogenic environment, 
approaching each facet of the problem through the same or similar paradigmatic process will help to 
ensure that the same or similar ‘ideational resources or patterns of thought’802  are drawn upon, 
therefore leading to a set of harmonious interventions. Adopting a coherent approach to addiction 
policy is not just an advantage in terms of ensuring that interventions will not contradict each other 
– as Hall points out, ‘policymakers are likely to be in a stronger position to resist pressure from 
societal interests when they are armed with a coherent policy paradigm. If it does not dictate the 
optimal course for policy, at least it provides a set of criteria for resisting some societal demands 
while accepting others’.803 Thus, choosing the correct paradigms to ensure a coherent approach to 
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addiction policy is not only important for the targeting of interventions, but for resisting the 
organised efforts of the addiction industries to influence policy change. 
 
However, care must be taken when choosing paradigms, since paradigms are not solely used to 
direct policymakers towards a set of solutions that are evidentially effective – they can also be 
employed to channel policymakers towards solutions that are the most politically feasible. Although 
basing addiction interventions upon evidence is crucial, evidence is not the only factor that must be 
considered in selecting interventions, since policymaking is ‘driven by ideology, value judgements, 
financial stringency, economic theory, political expediency, and intellectual fashion’,804 as well as 
science and epidemiology. Since paradigms are more than just objective theories, but rather are 
subjective problem solving blueprints that ‘are not value-free and neutral… [but rather] may be 
viewed as social constructions’,805 they can be employed by stakeholders wishing to push their own 
agenda in order to ‘target the values of the policymakers’.806 Similarly, if policymakers themselves 
approach an issue with a closed view of what they want to hear, there is a risk that the available 
evidence on the addictiogenic environment will not be translated into effective policy. As Marmot 
notes, ‘although it is understandable that governments should do what they want rather than what 
a group of scientists suggests they should do, it means that the model of evidence based policy … is 
something of a parody’.807 Effective control of the addictiogenic environment calls for several actions 
that are not politically appealing. Thus, care must be taken to resist following an addiction policy 
paradigm that will point to solutions that are politically easy, rather than ones that are evidentially 
effective.  
 
Having discussed the nature of paradigms, and the reasons why addiction policymakers should allow 
their selection of interventions to be guided by paradigms, the analysis below will argue that 
following a paternalist paradigm in the making of addiction policy will lead towards legal 
interventions that will be most evidentially effective in controlling the addictiogenic environment.  
 
ii. The paternalist paradigm  
This section argues that approaching addiction policy through a paternalist paradigm is one way in 
which a renewed and more intense strategic approach to addiction policy could be guided towards 
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strong interventions that are likely to provide effective, targeted control over the factors of the 
addictiogenic environment.   
 
Paternalism is an approach to policymaking that has traditionally been defined as ‘interference with 
the liberty of another for the purposes of promoting some good or preventing some harm, for the 
sake of the other person’.808 It is possible, however, to understand the concept in a more refined 
way. Paternalism, in essence, describes a process where a public authority exercises power over 
individuals in order to substitute the preferences of the individual for the preferences of the 
government. The paternalist paradigm is essentially the idea that adopting legal interventions that 
replace individual preferences with state preferences will neutralise the profoundly unfair influence 
of many factors of the addictiogenic environment. What follows is an argument that a renewed 
approach to addiction, which seeks to more strategically and intensely control the factors of the 
addictiogenic environment, based on the available evidence, should be guided by a paternalist 
paradigm.  
 
The idea that states should intervene paternalistically in order to protect citizens has been present in 
the academic literature for a while. Discussions of public health paternalism date back to the mid-
1980s,809 yet it has only been in the first decade of the 21st Century that discussions on the 
legitimacy of public health paternalism have begun to burgeon. This is because the application of 
paternalist ideas to solve public health problems is still a relatively taboo subject - as Gostin has 
remarked, ‘few people are willing to concede that their beliefs or actions are paternalistic; seldom 
will one see a frank defence of paternalism’.810 This is perhaps because there is still perceived to be a 
‘dichotomous … choice between, on the one hand, upholding individual autonomy and, on the 
other, intervening paternalistically’.811 Autonomy is still viewed as a guiding ethical principle of 
public health, despite the fact that, as explained at various points in this chapter, few choices made 
within a strong addictiogenic environment are truly autonomous.  
 
It will be argued below that paternalism should not be seen as an unwarranted inference by 
government, but as action that makes good upon a government’s obligations to protect its citizens 
when such protection would be just and equitable to afford. The addictiogenic environment exerts a 
pervasive and unfair influence upon individuals, who have little chance of controlling it themselves. 
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If populations are to become healthier through the absence of a strong addictiogenic environment, 
public action is required to exert socially just control on behalf of populations. 
 
 Selecting a paternalism paradigm to guide addiction policy is supported by the fact that consumers 
are constantly being manipulated by powerful actors, a lot of the time with negative health 
consequences. As discussed previously in this thesis in relation to the ethical principle of autonomy, 
it is rare that individuals are in the position to make decisions that are completely uninfluenced by 
external forces. Building on this analysis, the reasons why individuals are so susceptible to the 
influence of external environmental forces might be explored in more detail. First, in the modern 
marketplace, individuals are exposed to ‘consumer hyperchoice’,812 a situation which leads to ‘a 
diminishment of mindfulness or attentional control’813 due to the fact that ‘consumers have finite 
limits to absorb and process information during any given unit of time’.814 In order to cope with 
information overload, there is ‘compelling evidence that consumers use heuristic decision rules’815 to 
narrow down their options. Heuristic decision making involves ‘develop[ing] rules of thumb and 
rely[ing] on ad hoc perceptions, emotions, accumulated memory, and loose associations’.816 This 
type of decision making, while improving cognitive efficiency, markedly decreases choice optimality. 
For example, ‘one strategy for estimating unknown quantities is to start with information one does 
know and then adjust until an acceptable value is reached’.817 This anchoring heuristic enables rapid 
estimation of (on the whole) numerical value, but ‘adjustments are typically insufficient’818 as 
‘different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values’.819 
Another example is the availability heuristic – consumers ‘assess the magnitude of risks by assessing 
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whether examples of harm can readily be brought to mind’.820 Although this is cognitively powerful, 
it is subject to large bias, as ‘the easier it is to retrieve examples of an event, the higher the 
estimated likelihood of occurrence’,821 and is furthermore ‘influenced by the degree to which 
information is emotionally compelling and vivid’.822 
 
The fact that individuals regularly employ heuristic decision making is routinely exploited by 
economic operators. As Hansen and Kysar note: 
 
‘the presence of unyielding cognitive biases makes individual decision makers susceptible to 
manipulation by those able to influence the context in which decisions are made … market 
outcomes frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor 
to control the format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting 
within which market transactions occur. Once one accepts that individuals systematically 
behave in nonrational ways, it follows from an economic perspective that others will exploit 
those tendencies for gain’.823 
 
Thus, individuals often make consumption decisions that they have been pushed towards. For 
example, ‘it is often possible to frame a given decision problem in more than one way’,824 with the 
result that ‘seemingly inconsequential changes in the formulation of choice problems cause[s] 
significant shifts of preference’.825 In situations of consumer uncertainty, ‘advertising rhetoric is 
aimed at reminding us of what we are supposed to know (or rather, of what the company wants us 
to know)’.826 Careful design allows marketers to match products very closely to the emotional and 
psychological needs of different consumer groups, making it more likely that such groups will choose 
the products being targeted at them.827 These are mere examples of the vast array of market 
manipulation performed by corporations that produce potential objects of addiction, in order to 
persuade consumers of the attractiveness of their products, and discount their risks.  
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From the perspective of a government that aspires to the pursuit of social justice, allowing economic 
actors to push individuals in vulnerable positions towards consumption decisions that will harm 
them is unfair. Furthermore, from the perspective of a government bound by obligations to provide 
individuals with conditions in which they can avoid the development of addiction, neglecting to 
control the actions of economic actors who would seek to take advantage of behavioural biases and 
vulnerabilities is a violation of those obligations. The obligations placed on States (and normative 
responsibilities placed upon the EU through Article 35 CFREU) require the pursuit of ‘positive 
measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to health’,828 and an 
effort to ‘fulfil (provide) a specific right contained in the Covenant when individuals or a group are 
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize that right themselves by the means at their 
disposal’.829  
 
Thus, where economic actors seek to exert power over individuals so as to push them towards 
particular consumption decisions, or place them in situations where their vulnerabilities will incline 
them towards certain consumption decisions, public authorities should take responsibility for 
exerting their own powers to place individuals back into situations where the influence of those 
economic actors is negated. As Berman notes, individuals often ‘do not [and cannot] appreciate the 
degree to which their decisions are products of their environments’,830 and thus the state should, in 
discharging its legal and ethical obligations to protect the health of its citizens, replace individual 
preferences that are the product of malicious environmental influence with preferences that seek to 
return agency to individuals.  
 
This social justice perspective on paternalism, ‘recognizes that there are basic health protections 
which are fair, and which are in everyone’s best interests to take together’.831 As Wiley argues, it is 
time to ‘replace the “nanny state” framing with a more positive vision of community action’.832 Some 
have argued that it is ‘not even accurate to think of public health paternalism as directed at the 
individual at all, but instead directed towards overall societal welfare’,833 meaning that a choice to 
substitute preferences ‘acts at the level of practices and not at the level of individual behaviour’.834 
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In any event, a paternalist approach to policymaking encapsulates the proposition that where 
societal conditions unfairly influence the lives of individuals, the response of the state should be to 
intervene to neutralise their effects in order to protect populations. This reflects the justifications for 
intervention presented earlier in this thesis. It is argued that this understanding of paternalism 
should be adopted and applied as a guiding paradigmatic idea to the selection of legal interventions 
that will comprise a renewed strategic approach to controlling the factors of the addictiogenic 
environment.  
 
In summary, the paternalist paradigm could be used to ensure that a renewed strategic approach to 
addiction selects effective and equitable interventions. Policymakers should aim to adopt policies 
that replace individual preferences with state preferences at a population level, wherever individual 
preferences are likely to be the product of strong, unfair environmental influences upon their 
behaviour. A paternalist approach would therefore connect goals such as those outlined above, 
which seek to reform, prevent and restrict, to action that would indeed reform, prevent and restrict, 
by prompting policymakers to assume that unfair influence of any character must be negated. The 
final section of this chapter will briefly illustrate how this paradigmatic thinking could guide EU 
policymakers towards interventions that, within the limits of the EU’s competence, are effective, 
evidence based, and fit the best practice principles for addiction policy discussed in earlier chapters.  
III. Interventions that EU policymakers could undertake 
Having discussed how the selection of legal interventions to control the addictiogenic environment 
should be guided by the careful articulation of strategic goals and appropriate policy paradigms, this 
chapter moves on to consider which specific interventions EU policymakers might consider pursuing 
in order to address transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment and add value to the 
addiction policy efforts of the Member States.  
 
The analysis below will consider on three policy fields - fiscal policy, social exclusion policy and 
communications policy – and will discuss an example intervention that might be taken. In doing so, 
this section hopes to show that by focusing on clearly defined problems, and by committing to 
policymaking ideas that prompt a more intense yet equitable level of action, the EU can contribute 
meaningfully to controlling transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment. It will also show 
how such design can draw upon the principles of holisticism, horizontality and multilevel 
responsibility.  
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A. Interventions in the fiscal field 
The first policy field that could be drawn upon by EU legislators seeking to impose greater control 
over the addictiogenic environment is fiscal policy. Fiscal interventions in the context of public 
health involve utilising rates of taxation on products, minimum price floors, financial incentives, and 
other policies relating to the price of goods. Due to the link between the affordability of products 
and consumption habits, particularly amongst the heaviest consumers, 835 fiscal policies  have great 
‘ability to change people’s consumption behaviours’.836 By making addictive objects less affordable, 
they are less likely to be seen as everyday consumption items, and are less likely to be available to 
individuals on a regular basis. Although an increase in tax or a minimum price might appear to 
increase government and industry revenues, in actual fact the reductions in consumption that 
results from increased taxation are such as to produce an overall fall in government revenue.   
 
A particular factor of the addictiogenic environment that could be addressed through fiscal 
interventions is the prevalence of price promotion on potential objects of addiction. Price promotion 
can elicit positive emotional feelings in consumers, who by taking advantage of a price promotion 
can feel that they have themselves engineered a discount,837 as well making purchasing the desired 
products cheaper. Price promotion is therefore a key factor facilitating vocational consumption of 
objects of addiction. Consequently, it is a tactic relied upon by manufacturers and retailers in order 
to ‘cultivate long-term relationships with individual consumers’.838 A good example in the context of 
alcoholic beverages is the proliferation of “happy-hours” – specific periods of time in which alcoholic 
beverages are heavily discounted – since during these times, drinkers are induced to drink far more 
(and thus spend more) than they would otherwise have done due to the low prices and appearance 
of value for money.839 They also contribute to a ‘”wet” environment, in which alcohol is prominent 
and easily accessible’.840 Thus, this is a factor that fits squarely within the parameters of an economic 
operator increasing the accessibility and affordability of an object of addiction, and thus falls within 
the scope of the third goal outlined above. Since consumers are unaware most of the time of the 
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purpose of price promotions, or that they may consume more than they might have done in the 
absence of the promotion, price promotions also constitute an unfair environmental influence, and 
therefore also fall within the scope of the type of problem identified by the paternalist paradigm. An 
intervention that replaces the preference of the individual with preferences that promote 
population health is therefore required.  
 
The EU could, relying on the broad regulatory scope of Article 114, legitimately adopt harmonised 
standards setting minimum selling prices for objects of addiction. Member States have already 
begun to adopt minimum pricing policies for objects of addiction,841 so the potential for barriers to 
arise to the operation of the internal market of goods and services has already been established, in 
line with the Tobacco Advertising rulings.842 This provides a sufficient link to the operation of the 
internal market to permit the use of Article 114 TFEU. Furthermore, The CJEU has confirmed that 
minimum pricing raises issues of cross-border trade, yet may only be compatible with EU law so long 
as they pursue targeted objectives and are supported by evidence.843 A growing evidence base has 
indeed been accumulating to support the efficacy for minimum pricing measures in relation to 
alcohol, which aims to reduce the proliferation of cheap, high strength alcohol within society,844 and 
which would serve to prevent economic operators from using artificially low selling prices to attract 
consumers. Consequently, a minimum pricing intervention would seek to counter unfair 
environmental influences, it would fall within the limits of the EU’s legal powers, and it reflects 
accumulating evidence. 
 
The idea of minimum unit pricing, which has already gained support in the alcohol field, could be 
applied holistically to create harmonised standards for a range of common objects of addiction, on 
the basis that the basic function of any price promotion, whatever the product or service, is to allow 
consumers to temporarily purchase a greater quantity than normal market conditions would 
normally allow. For example: a minimum stake could be placed on games of chance to reduce the 
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proliferation of ‘first bet free’ promotions often run by gambling operators to entice consumer;845 
minimum prices per gram of could be imposed to reduce the appeal of hyper-palatable foodstuffs;846 
and minimum prices per gram of nicotine in a tobacco product could be imposed to reduce the 
appeal for smokers of simply switching existing consumption of nicotine to considerably cheaper 
electronic cigarettes,847 thereby encouraging actual smoking cessation rather than smoking 
substitution.848 Such interventions will fit naturally within a paternalist paradigm – while individuals 
might prefer to access addictive objects very cheaply, consumers have very little knowledge of the 
way in which the terms of their engagement with objects of addiction are heavily manipulated by 
price promotions.849  
 
B. Interventions in social exclusion field 
Social policies represent another essential policy field for an EU Addiction Strategy to engage with. 
Social policy can be understood as an effort to ensure that basic human needs are met, in order to 
enable the fulfilment of various secondary needs that are considered necessary for human existence 
above a minimum threshold.850 Doyal and Gough identify physical health and autonomy as the two 
primary categories of basic human need,851 and further research identifies the building of social 
relationships and social integration as an important human need that is powerfully connected to 
physical and mental health.852 Thus, promoting psychosocial integration for the purposes of reducing 
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the strength of the addictiogenic environment is an activity that falls squarely within the remit of 
social policy. Another way of expressing the link between social policy and addiction prevention is 
through the role of social policy in building social capital – ‘connections among individuals, within 
families, friendship networks, businesses and communities’.853 The more social capital building that 
the state can encourage through policy, the more opportunities it gives citizens for building a 
cushion of psychosocial integration that will protect them from the experience of negative affect.   
 
If psychosocial integration can be understood as ‘a profound interdependence between individual 
and society that … reconciles people’s vital needs for social belonging with their equally vital needs 
for individual autonomy and achievement’,854 then one likely place where the interface between 
individual and society could fail to encourage psychosocial integration is the provision of housing 
support to foreign nationals. The way in which law provides for housing support to foreign nationals 
can be discriminatory towards those persons,855 can actively dissuade them from settling in certain 
areas,856 or in some situations can conversely even lead to the perception that an unfair advantage is 
being conferred and to subsequent vilification of foreign nationals.857 Discrimination or other poor 
treatment of immigrants in the housing support system has been found to lead to negative social 
consequences and the generation of negative affect,858 potentially contributing to the breakdown of 
psychosocial integration. Targeting the elimination of discrimination within housing support services 
therefore fits well with the first goal outlined above, and would constitute the elimination of an 
unfair environmental influence, in line with paternalist paradigmatic thinking.   
 
Due to the role of EU citizenship in facilitating the movement of persons with a view to settling in 
another Member State, the EU arguably has a responsibility to encourage its Member States to re-
organise certain aspects of housing support policies so as to provide increased opportunities for the 
psychosocial integration of those who move between Member States. This responsibility could 
plausibly be discharged through the revival of an OMC-type process – undertaken under the 
competence provided by Article 153 TFEU – that could potentially focus on preventing the erosion of 
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psychosocial integration. While OMC process may not have achieved their potential so far, they offer 
one advantage that would be valuable to addiction governance in particular, making it worth the 
effort to minimise disadvantages of the process. OMC processes offer a forum to facilitate multilevel 
governance, in which ‘each level contributes its distinctive expertise and resources to tackling 
common problems cutting across jurisdictions’.859 When considering a factor of the addictiogenic 
environment such as housing support discrimination against migrants, the way in which a 
psychosocial integration OMC process could encourage discussion of common objectives (but not 
necessarily common actions) helps to link action both upwards to core EU values and downwards to 
various national objectives.860 Thus, a psychosocial integration OMC process that encompassed a 
discussion of housing support discrimination may encourage better diffusion of the idea of social 
citizenship of the EU861 into how Member States treat foreign nationals who seek social support, 
while allowing the Member States to take action that is consistent with their own social systems. It is 
therefore worth considering how OMC processes might be utilised in renewed strategic action on 
addiction at EU level. 
 
C. Interventions in in the communications field. 
Communications policy is another field of policymaking that an EU Addiction Strategy should draw 
from. The phenomenon of communication is ‘at the heart of who we are as human beings. It is our 
way of exchanging information; it also signifies our symbolic capability’.862 Given the importance of 
psychosocial integration as discussed above, the ability or lack of ability to communicate in order to 
forge social bonds is crucial to the development of an addiction. The ability to simulate these bonds 
is also crucial to the development of an addiction – as Alexander again explains, when an individual 
is suffering social dislocation (a lack of psychosocial integration) they seek to alleviate this though 
adaptation to a different type of life, one of addiction. Human beings seek social connections, and 
depend on this for identity and social belonging.863 In the absence of the opportunity to forge such 
connections, humans who cannot bear the painful consequence of dislocation will naturally attempt 
to search for ‘substitutes for psychosocial integration’864 – the pseudo-relationship. As has been 
explored, pseudo-relationships can potentially be formed with anything that has the capacity to 
sustain such a phenomenon, such as an object of addiction. Boosting the communicative capacity of 
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an object of addiction, usually through advertising, sponsorship, branding and product placement,865 
increases the capacity of that object to sustain a pseudo-relationship, and thus the likelihood that 
addictions to that object will be developed by individuals experiencing social dislocation. 
 
Relating this to increased appeal and acceptability, a good example of the above can be drawn from 
the marketing practices of multinational producers of lager. Take for example, the brand Fosters, 
brewed by multinational beer producer Heineken. The marketing history of Fosters is replete with 
examples of its producers attempting to enhance the emotional appeal of what is already a 
psychoactive substance. Fosters has traditionally been promoted with an advertising campaign 
depicting an ‘agony uncle’ phone-in situation, depicting two males consuming Fosters and offering 
light-hearted advice to worried male callers. This is designed to associate the lager in the viewer’s 
mind with comfort, security, and dependability, and the strapline included with the advertisement 
reflects this – ‘Good Call’. Although the campaign is now being dropped after six years, due to 
Heineken’s desire to move the brand away from accusations of sexism,866 it is unsurprising that 
during the height of the campaign the Foster’s brand director said that the adverts were ‘universally 
loved by our consumer and levels of consumer engagement and brand reputation have soared 
during the campaign’.867 Fosters have complemented this campaign with numerous sponsorship 
agreements. Sponsorship is a ‘large and powerful part of alcohol promotion … raising brand 
awareness, creating brand attitudes and building emotional connections with consumers’.868 Despite 
this though, there is no restriction placed on alcohol sponsorship at EU level by the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive.869 This has allowed Foster’s to associate their brand with emotionally 
charged activities such as sport870 and comedy.871 The ability of producers of potentially addictive 
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substances to promote their brands through association with emotive activates, participation in 
which facilitate the creation of emotional bonds, falls within the scope of the second goal outlined 
above. 
 
As has been identified multiple times throughout this thesis, corporate actors that pursue strategies 
to enhance the emotional appeal of their products are mostly multinationals that operate at 
transnational levels. Action at the EU level is therefore necessary to counter these strategies. Not 
only has the EU already engaged in transnational advertising regulation in the past in the tobacco 
field, but it has the mandate to do so in all three of the focus fields of tobacco, alcohol and gambling 
reviewed previously. There is very little reason, besides persistent political opposition, why the EU 
should not take responsibility for further action in controlling the commercial communications of 
addiction industries, particular in the field of sponsorship, in which some Member States have had 
their rules challenged on grounds that they are internal market obstacles.872  
 
The EU could implement a harmonised prohibition on sponsorship by producers of addictive objects, 
again using the legal basis provided by Article 114 TFEU. Sponsorship is a particularly subtle and 
powerful method of enhancing the emotional capacity of objects of addiction to sustain pseudo-
relationships. Sponsorship of cultural or sporting events by alcohol, unhealthy food or gambling 
brands (tobacco sponsorship now being prohibited under EU law) aims, by industry’s own admission, 
to create an emotional bond between the individual and the product, relying on the already existing 
emotional bond between the individual and the event sponsored.873 Even more subtly, sponsorship 
by addiction industries attempts to weave addictive object brands into the fabric of everyday life in 
order to normalise their product,874 and targets activities that are especially popular with young 
people, such as sports, in order to recruit individuals early.875 Consumers in vulnerable positions 
have little power to resist the formation of such bonds, and have little awareness that it is 
happening. Harmonised sponsorship bans would, following a paternalist paradigm, remove the 
option for individuals to receive communications from producers of addictive objects, and would 
remove the preference of corporations to communicate through this medium, with the objective of 
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replacing these preferences with a transparent communication environment, through which 
consumers are able to more clearly see the commercial intent of corporations.  
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has endeavoured to argue that clearly articulated goas that are targeted at the most 
important issues presented by the addictiogenic environment, and appropriate paradigms that help 
policymakers to find the most effective actions for pursuit of those goals, are essential in the design 
of a strategic approach to addiction. An array of different interventions and variations of these 
interventions might be selected for inclusion in an addiction strategy, depending on what is deemed 
most appropriate in different regions of Europe – but whatever content is chosen to populate an 
addiction strategy, at the very least it should explicitly outline how the three elements of the 
addictiogenic environment are to be targeted, and should ensure that appropriate, evidence backed 
interventions are selected to realise each of these goals. Following an appropriate policy paradigm in 
selecting interventions, such as the paternalist paradigm, will help to ensure that interventions 
linked to one goal will be coherent with interventions linked to any other goal, within the broader 
strategy. Ultimately, designers of an addiction strategy must keep in mind that the overarching 
purpose of such a policy endeavour is to weaken the addictiogenic environment, and that all 
elements of the strategy must have this at least in common.  
 
The design blueprints suggested by this chapter could be followed by any public authority that seeks 
to address addiction in a more intense and strategic manner. It would seem most logical that the 
authorities best placed to drive forward renewed effort on addiction prevention in Europe would be 
the EU Member States, based on many factors that have been raised previously – their 
commitments at WHO level to increased NCD action, the societal differences between countries 
which mean that a completely harmonised European solution to addiction would probably not be 
effective in some countries, and the fact that as the middle level of public authority between the 
subnational and the supranational they would be best placed to see how responsibility might be 
divided. What is clear though is that Member States of the EU cannot, and should not, construct 
strategic approaches to addiction alone. The EU itself has a crucial role to play, not only in 
contributing interventions when the factor of the addictiogenic environment in question is 
transnational and thus should be addressed at transnational level, but in helping the Member States 
to coordinate with each other when constructing their own strategies – for example to ensure that 
when allocating responsibilities across multiple levels, the same responsibilities are allocated to the 
EU in each strategy. 
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The design of addiction strategies does not, however, take place in a vacuum. Strategies and 
interventions that might be theoretically and legally possible may attract substantial opposition. The 
final chapter of this thesis is therefore will therefore analyse the challenges that will be faced in 
implementing a more intense approach to addiction policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT – CHALLENGES OF A 
RENEWED APPROACH TO ADDICTION 
POLICY 
I. Introduction 
Designing effective addiction interventions is only half the story. Well-designed interventions must 
be steered through the policymaking process in order to actually get to the stage where they might 
be implemented. This process is perhaps even more challenging than working out which 
interventions to put forward in the first place, since a number of interests are arrayed against the 
adoption of effective addiction interventions, not least the industries that produce potential objects 
of addiction. Thus, this final chapter will focus on the nature of the challenges presented by industry 
opposition to bold and effective addiction policies.  
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Previous chapters have shown that the addictiogenic environment promotes, encourages and 
facilitates the development of addictions. The use of legal interventions in order to control the 
factors of Europe’s currently strong addictiogenic environment is normatively justified, and the 
contribution of the EU to such legal intervention is both desirable and legally possible. Such a 
contribution would support the Member States in developing their own national strategies on 
addiction and address transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment that cannot be 
addressed by the Member States alone.  
 
However, despite the fact that many aspects of effective addiction policy design can be identified in 
the current approaches of Member States, Member States have struggled to make best use of the 
available evidence on the operation of the addictiogenic environment. One reason for this may be 
that the EU has not been delivering upon its responsibilities for contributing to addiction policy at 
the supranational level, failures which may not only be responsible for the lack of best practice 
sharing amongst the Member States, but may also be actively preventing the Member States from 
discharging their own addiction policy responsibilities. In order to rectify this situation, a renewed 
and more intense strategic approach to controlling the factors of Europe’s addictiogenic 
environment is needed, based on the principles of holisticism, horizontality and multilevel 
responsibility. The design of this renewed approach to addiction policy should be guided by clearly 
articulated goals and policy paradigms that prompt evidence-based interventions that are well 
matched to those goals.   
 
A renewed and more intense approach to addiction policy will of course attract opposition, 
especially from the industries that produce objects of addiction, in particular the tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling and unhealthy food industries, all of which are dominated by powerful and resourceful 
multinational corporations as highlighted earlier in the thesis. The opposition of these industry 
actors presents important practical challenges that must be addressed if EU policymakers are to 
steer policies such as the examples discussed above through the policymaking process, in pursuit of 
their responsibilities to contribute to renewed strategic governance of addiction in Europe. 
Addiction industries are single minded in their determination to protect their economic positions 
from any policy development that is likely to be effective in reducing consumption of their products. 
 
This chapter will examine two particular challenges for the implementation of new addiction 
interventions at EU level that are connected to the industries that produce objects of addiction. The 
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first half of the chapter will discuss the obstacles to getting new addiction interventions onto the 
policymaking agenda that are presented by the policy power that the industries have amassed, while 
the second half of the chapter will discuss the fundamental rights-based legal challenges that the 
industries are likely to mount against any policies that are enacted.  
II. The industry’s power in the policymaking process 
The most theoretically well-designed policy is all but useless if it is impossible in practice to adopt. 
The policymaking process can be disaggregated into a number of different stages,876 all of which can 
present difficulties for the adoption of policies that are controversial or sensitive in subject matter. 
These stages are usually recognised in the policymaking literature as the problem definition and 
agenda setting stage, the policy formulation and adoption stage, the implementation stage and the 
evaluation stage.877 From the point of view of policymakers seeking to steer addiction interventions, 
such as the ones discussed above, through the policymaking process, arguably the trickiest stage to 
get past is the first one – getting addiction interventions onto the policymaking agenda.  
In this section I will argue that a major practical obstacle to getting new EU addiction interventions 
onto the policy agenda of the EU institutions is the power of addiction industries to block such 
interventions from gaining sufficient momentum to ascend from general political debate onto the 
focused policy agenda. The section will argue that industries exert the power they have amassed to 
draw focus away from the most influential factors of the addictiogenic environment, and to redirect 
attention attention instead to ‘problems’ that are not really problems at all. This argument will be 
developed by first discussing why the issue of power is essential to agenda setting, then analysing 
how addiction industries have acquired power, how the industry have used this power, and how the 
power balance might be changed so as to remove obstacles that prevent effective addiction 
interventions from moving through the policymaking process.  
 
A. Why is actor power important to problem definition and agenda setting in addiction 
policy? 
Addiction is a highly charged and complex area of public policy. The complexity of regulating 
substances and behaviour whose consumption can simultaneously bring pleasure and pain is 
summed up by Leitzel – ‘many people consider themselves to be better off by drinking alcohol, or by 
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smoking marijuana’,878 yet, ‘public debate regarding vice policy is typically conducted as if vices were 
some sort of mysterious activities that involve only costs’.879 
 
As a consequence, opinions and values have an important role to play880 in shaping how the 
problems that supposedly cause addictions are defined, and in shaping how policymakers approach 
this problem definition process.881 
 
If opinion and values are important to problem definition in the process of adopting addiction policy, 
it follows that the ability of political actors to manipulate opinions and values to suit their own 
interests can determine whether problems actually make it onto the policymaking agenda at all. As 
Stone notes, policy problems ‘are not given out there in the world waiting for smart analysts to 
come along and define them correctly’ – ‘they are created in the minds of citizens by other citizens, 
leaders, organizations, and government agencies, as an essential part of political maneuvering’.882 
 
Addiction industries have managed to amass sufficient power and influence so as to be able to 
manipulate the opinions and values of the public and policy makers alike extremely effectively, when 
the question of addiction appears on the policymaking horizon. The result is that most political and 
policymaking debates on addiction have identified weak or incorrect factors of the addictiogenic 
environment to tackle, and this is reflected in the public health policy agenda at EU level.  
 
In order to reverse the influence that addiction industries are currently exerting on the policymaking 
process, it is necessary to examine how they have managed to acquire this power and influence. It is 
to this question that the next subsection turns.   
 
B. How have addiction industries acquired policy power? 
Policymaking power is the ‘ability of a political actor to influence the behaviour of others in such a 
way as to gain a preferred outcome.’883  As such, it must be earned, and this is usually achieved by 
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industries through processes of building social legitimacy.884 Innate authority and the strength to act 
upon it – such as that conferred upon governments through democratic elections – does not 
generate true power. Instead, it is the perception of strength being used in a way that is socially 
legitimate, as well as in accordance with proper authority, that makes an actor powerful.885 As 
Barnett and Finnemore note, a government becomes powerful not because it is in government, but 
due to ‘the values it claims to embody and the people it claims to serve.’886  Industries that produce 
potential objects of addiction do not benefit from the legitimising process that comes with election 
to public office, so have have used the following three mechanisms to build social legitimacy, and 
therefore power.   
 
The first is to promote the image of being champions of prevailing popular opinion relating to 
addiction, particularly if this popular opinion rails against regulation. This is mostly achieved through 
‘media capture’.887 The use of ‘media ownership, advertising, public relationship and spin, attacking 
critics and … ideology’888 in order to ensure that the media promotes an industry position that is in 
line with prevailing public sentiments. This gives industry operators the ‘opportunity to connect with 
popular opinion’,889 giving the impression that industry operators are on the side of the public. The 
capture of media outlets also provides industry with the opposite opportunity of ‘mediating popular 
concerns’890 where public sentiment conversely favours regulation. The tactic of piggybacking 
prevailing views of addiction and addictive objects, in order to boost the public acceptability of their 
own views, is an effective legitimacy-building strategy for industry operators, since pushing a 
particular policy agenda will be successful ‘to the extent [it] can be grafted on to previously accepted 
norms’.891 
 
The second is by portraying themselves as accepted and normal parts of society. Industries market 
themselves and their products relentlessly in an effort to ‘mask [the] uncomfortable truths [about 
themselves and their products] by disguising inanimate corporate monoliths as benign friends under 
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the guise of branding.’892 In order to do this, companies invest huge sums of money in advertising, 
sponsorship and other promotional tools in order to broadcast a message about the company as 
much as the product being marketed.893 This is done on the basis that the more the company’s 
desired message saturates daily life, the more the company will be seen as a normal part of daily life. 
Sponsorship of important global events is an excellent way of achieving this – which perhaps might 
explain why both Coca Cola and MacDonalds have worked to secure positions as Worldwide Olympic 
Partners.894 Being dubbed an official partner of a beloved global phenomenon such as the Olympic 
Games is something of a coup for industries wishing to portray themselves as part of the social 
fabric, and an effective one.895 Such activities contribute enormously to the social legitimacy of 
addiction industries. 
 
The third is by portraying themselves as part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. 
Industries have worked hard to turn attention away from their own activities and towards those of 
the individual. This is achieved through consistent and intense promotion of personal responsibility 
rhetoric, which attempts to push the view that individuals should be primarily responsible for their 
own health.896 This then gives addiction industries the opportunity to conduct corporate social 
responsibility exercises, the purpose of which is supposedly to help individuals develop personal 
responsibility, but in reality is to show policymakers that industry operators can be helpful 
partners.897 An excellent example is the creation of the Drinkaware foundation, a charity that 
conducts highly visible campaigns on alcohol awareness in the UK, yet was set up and continues to 
be run by the alcohol industry.898 All corporate responsibility exercises are ultimately aimed at 
convincing policymakers that industry operators are ‘part of the solution rather than the 
problem’,899 in order to build an aura of social legitimacy. 
 
By building an aura of social legitimacy – primarily through manipulating public and political 
perceptions of their activities – addiction industries have incredibly been able to persuade 
governments and international organisations to formally transfer policymaking authority upon them. 
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This has been seen for instance in the UK’s Responsibility Deal, in which the food and alcohol 
industries have been invited to partner with government and where there is a ‘clear presumption in 
favour of partnerships and voluntary regulation’.900 Industry operators were also handed policy 
authority at European level in the EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, and the EU 
Alcohol and Health Forum – the primary drivers of the EU’s strategies in the field of alcohol and 
diet.901 Furthermore, the EU Alcohol Strategy actively encouraged the involvement of the alcohol 
industry in policy making by making it a priority of EU level action on commercial communication to 
‘reach an agreement with representatives from a range of sectors (hospitality, retail, producers, 
media/advertising) on a code of commercial communication implemented at national and EU 
level’.902 
 
Once addiction industry have built social legitimacy and been handed authority within the 
policymaking process, they are able exert real power and influence upon the policymaking process. 
This influence is used to keep effective addiction interventions off the policymaking agenda. 
 
C. How have the addiction industries exerted their power in problem definition and 
agenda setting? 
Problems must be defined in a certain way in order to make it onto the policymaking agenda903 -  the 
connection that is established between the proffered definition of the problem and the preferred 
policy outcome is essential in whether or not the problem as defined is brought onto the agenda.  
 
The use of particular policy ideas allow problems such as addiction to be defined in ways that can be 
easily linked to a practical solution.904 The ‘key role of language and narrative stories in the 
negotiation of such definitions’,905 means that if ideas, problems and solutions are knitted together 
into a compelling enough narrative, a course of action that is not actually helpful in tackling 
addiction can make it onto the policy agenda. To recall the arguments made in the previous chapter 
on paradigms, paradigms are essential for linking policy goals to the interventions that are most 
likely to achieve them. This is because a paradigm is a ‘framework of ideas and standards that 
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specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, 
but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’.906 Paradigms assume a 
particular problem, and guide policymakers towards appropriate solutions. This is why the selection 
of the right paradigm will ensure that the assumed problem is matched to the policy goals, and thus 
the intervention made is effective in pursuing those goals. However, if a paradigm is inappropriately 
chosen, the problem assumed by the intervention is not the same as the problem described by the 
goals, and thus the interventions taken will not be effective. Adherence to a particular policy 
paradigm can be deliberately engineered in order to frustrate the achievement of certain goals, or to 
raise the salience of new problems and new goals entirely. If this happens, then a paradigm’s 
function of ‘constrain[ing] the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers’,907 will 
guide policymaking towards solutions that are unlikely to do anything to solve the real problems of 
the addictiogenic environment. If the right policy window opens up when adherence to the 
paradigm is particularly strong,908 then policymakers will end up placing a ‘problem’ related to 
addiction on the agenda that in no way relates to the operation of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
The addiction industries purposefully promote certain paradigmatic policy thinking in order to 
manipulate the definition of problems to suit their own interests. As noted above, the way in which 
this is done has to form a compelling enough narrative – as Dery explains, ‘problems do not exist 
“out there”, are not objectives entities in their own right, but are analytic constructs’.909 To ensure 
that politicians and policymakers buy into the way in which their preferred paradigms construct the 
problems of addiction,  industry operators have leant on the fact that politicians as well as 
consumers use certain behavioural shortcuts in their decision making. Policymakers are decision 
makers, just like consumers, and  ‘decision-makers – like all other people – have a natural limited 
mental capacity and are therefore only able to cope within these limits and with a limited volume of 
information.’910 Furthermore, policymakers ‘do not have perfect information about resulting 
consequences upon which to determine the best alternative [and] [a]s a consequence, there will 
always be uncertainty and risk about the eventual impacts of decisions taken, which means that a 
fully rational decision may eventually lead to an undesired effect.’911 The framing of problems, real 
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or fabricated, through the promotion of particular paradigmatic policy thinking, is therefore 
absolutely crucial in whether or not they are adopted onto the policymaking agenda. It was shown 
above how adherence to the paternalist paradigm would guide policymakers towards interventions 
that would effectively control the addictiogenic environment. The analysis below will explore the 
paradigms that the addiction industries have promoted in order to guide policymakers away from 
effective control of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
The addiction industries have firstly tried to promote the information paradigm, which is based 
around the idea that information provision is an efficient and effective way of protecting individuals. 
Industry promotes the idea that ‘information [provision] seems to offer a win-win solution. 
Consumers are given the means to protect themselves and drive up standards, whilst business is 
allowed flexibility to provide the goods and services the market demands.’912 This plays on the fact 
that the policymaking process is often ‘perceived in terms of winners and losers.’913 Ideas for policy 
action that appear to lead to only winners will be seen as superior by policy makers who  ‘deny that 
there are trade-offs and that there are some values which many not be served by their favoured 
alternative’914 – in other words, information play upon the natural desire of policymakers to find a 
solution that pleases everyone. To exploit this, the addiction industries have focused on highlighting 
neo-classical economic views of information provision that suggest that that mere provision of 
information allows consumers to protect themselves and preserve their preferences, while allowing 
traders to innovate and drive economic growth.915 This cements the link between information 
provision as a guiding idea and information provision as a serious strategy, and overpowers the 
conclusions of more modern studies which demonstrate the ineffectiveness of information provision 
in NCD prevention.916 
 
The addiction industries secondly promote ideas of individual autonomy, in order to frame 
discussions in terms of whether interventions promote or detract from autonomy. Voters are fickle, 
and are ‘swayed by rhetoric, framing, and advertising, and hold incumbents accountable for events 
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that are clearly beyond the incumbent’s control,’917 and the industry play on the fact that much of 
the time ‘politicians are motivated by their concern for re-election, office and power’918 and 
therefore ‘politicians who face frequent re-election often pursue short term outcomes’.919 
Promoting ideas that protecting individual autonomy in the short term will be favourable with 
voters, compared to the protection of longer term health concerns, therefore appeals to the short 
term thinking of most politicians. In aid of this, industry might highlight statistics that reinforce 
public approval of autonomy-preserving interventions and focus attention on philosophical 
discourses of autonomy.920 Policy makers will accept this evidence far more easily than statistics that 
show support for potentially unpopular interventions such as restrictive marketing regulations, even 
if such evidence is genuine.921  
 
The addiction industries thirdly promote personal responsibility paradigms, which revolve around 
the idea that individual behaviour is the primary factor in determining individual health. 
Policymakers ‘often do not really know what the problem is, what to aim for, [or] how to achieve it, 
even less what the best way is to achieve it’,922 and therefore their ‘judgement of a situation is 
affected by the way it is framed.’923 When it comes to topic such as addiction with so many different 
factors that contribute to the problem, it is relatively simple to highlight factors that are easy to 
understand, and make intuitive sense, such as the idea that if individuals behaved responsibly, then 
they would not engage in heavy consumption of potential objects of addiction, and would not 
develop addictions. Despite the fact that personal responsibility, while important, is far from the 
decisive factor that contributes to the development of addictions, addiction industries consistently 
frame debates on the use of their products in these personal responsibility terms, making sure that 
‘those afflicted by chronic disease are generally represented as the agents of their own misfortune, 
typically because they have freely chosen particular health-damaging behaviours.’924 This 
representation of the ‘problem’ is much easier for policymakers to understand and focus their 
attention on than evidence which suggests that the real problem is constituted by a complex web of 
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factors, the sum of which is an environment that goes to the heart of policymaking processes 
themselves.  
 
The addiction industries have been successful in promoting adherence to these policy paradigms. 
For example, the UK Alcohol Strategy adopted in 2012 states plainly that ‘a combination of 
irresponsibility, ignorance and poor habits – whether by individuals, parents or business’925 was 
responsible for alcohol related harm, that the strategy ‘seeks to turn the tide against irresponsible 
drinking’,926 and that in pursuit of this goal the strategy will ‘secure industry’s support in changing 
individual drinking behaviour’927 and ‘support individuals to make informed choice about healthier 
and responsible drinking, so it is no longer considered acceptable to drink excessively’.928 Although 
encouraging responsibility when engaging with alcohol is a valuable goal of any strategy that seeks 
to weaken part of the addictiogenic environment, the level of focus on irresponsibility and the 
individual in the UK Alcohol Strategy is misguided, and plays perfectly into the hands of the industry.  
 
Alcohol policy at EU level similarly displays evidence of the information provision and personal 
responsibility paradigms promoted by the industry. Of the commitments adopted by EU level 
stakeholders in the EU Alcohol Forum, 70 per cent focus on organising campaigns to raise awareness 
of the harmful effects of alcohol, or on responsible drinking.929 Furthermore, information provision is 
a major component of the Commission’s Recommendation on Online Gambling – in the Preamble to 
the Recommendation, the information provision is suggested to be a suitable way of protecting 
consumers on eight occasions,930 yet interventions on commercial communications are raised on 
only five.931 This is perhaps indicative of where the focus on the Commission’s Recommendation 
truly lies.  
 
In summary, the addiction industries have managed to built social legitimacy and acquire 
policymaking power, particularly at EU level. They have then exerted this power in order to promote 
promote paradigmatic ideas of information provision and personal responsibility in the policymaking 
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process, which has resulted in national and EU level policy agendas filling up with the pursuit of 
interventions that seek to rectify irresponsibility and individual failure, while promoting partnerships 
with industry operators, at the expense of interventions that would seek to control the truly 
problematic factors of the addictiogenic environment, of which the addiction industries themselves 
are a major part.  
 
Power in the initial stages of the policymaking process is therefore crucial in shaping the eventual 
success of interventions that are ostensibly aimed at reducing the prevalence of addictions. The next 
section will discuss strategies for how the public health community can try to weaken the social 
legitimacy, and therefore the policy power, of the addiction industries. 
 
D. How can the power balance be moved away from commercial interests? 
As can be seen from the section above, the ability of the addiction industry to promote their 
preferred interpretation of the addiction problem to the policy agenda has resulted in much 
ineffective interventions being pursued. In order to refocus the agenda onto effective legal 
interventions, as part of a renewed strategic approach to addiction policy, it is imperative that the 
public health community weaken the ability of the industry to influence problem definition in 
addiction policy. This can be achieved through the following strategies, if the public health 
community are able to commit whole-heartedly to them.  
 
First, the public health community must organise far more effectively in order to present a united 
front that, put simply, is able to shout louder than the industry in political debate. At the moment, 
the public health community ‘suffers from poor articulation, image, and understanding’,932 and in 
order to become a stronger voice in the political debate, public health advocates must create 
stronger, more visible and easier to understand image, which can be presented to the public. 
Addiction industries present an image to the public that is clear and obvious in its message. The 
public health community must do the same. Public heath work has also ‘become increasingly 
fragmented into disciplinary silos,’933 with experts approaching the same problem independently of 
each other. This must change – public health advocates and experts must all work together, pooling 
their knowledge to contribute a single argument to political debate, rather than many, potentially 
conflicting arguments. As Lang and Rayner note, ‘specialists need to be noisy and to build 
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alliances.’934 The end goal of this collaborative effort is to establish the same ‘boldness of purpose’935 
that drives the industry. It is only by shouting as loudly and as clearly as industry operators that the 
policymaking paradigms that would lead to effective action on the factors of the addictiogenic 
environment can be promoted.  
 
Second, the public health community must take action to publicise the addiction industries’ tactics 
and practices, in an effort to break down the façade of social legitimacy that they have created. 
Analysis of internal industry documentation has already taken place in academic forums, showing 
the industry’s intent to recruit consumers early, exploit them, and keeping them consuming.936 This 
must be replicated in more popular forums than academia, in order to more widely communicate 
the message that industry operators intentionally disguise the true motives that lie behind their 
activities. As Oliver remarks, efforts to change the image portrayed by industry ‘are most potent in 
triggering policy initiatives when harmful consequences are viewed as intentional rather than 
accidental.’937 Success in tobacco control can be attributed in no small part to ‘perceptions of a 
demon industry’938 that purposefully manipulated youngsters and concealed evidence on tobacco 
harm from the public. Although this imagery is perhaps too strong for less homogenous industries 
such as alcohol and food, within which there are smaller entities with less irresponsible motives, a 
more widespread perception of the most powerful multinational alcohol and food corporations as 
unfriendly to population health interests could be pursued. This will begin to undermine the 
perception of such corporations as benign entities that simply provide products that are a desirable 
and normal part of modern life. 
 
In sum, those with the knowledge of how industries build social legitimacy and manipulate the 
policymaking process in their favour must be noisier in bringing this to the attention of the public. 
The ability of the addiction industries to distract policymakers from the really important tasks in 
addiction prevention is a major potential obstacle to a renewed effort to address the addictiogenic 
environment in a stronger and more strategic fashion, yet this ability rests on the perception of the 
industries as socially legitimate. Removing this legitimacy would go a long way towards removing 
this particular obstacle. The addiction industries do not just present obstacles at the start of the 
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policymaking process however, but also at the end. Even if the industries are unsuccessful in 
preventing effective addiction interventions from making it onto the agenda and all the way through 
to implementation, they still wield another powerful weapon that could prevent effective addiction 
policies from sticking. This weapon is the challenge to the legality of interventions on the grounds 
that they contravene the fundamental rights of businesses. It is to how this obstacle might be 
overcome that the second half of this chapter turns.  
III. The fundamental rights objections that industry could raise  
A more intense approach to controlling the factors of the addictiogenic environment, several of 
which are concerned with the actions of corporations that produce objects of addiction, will 
necessarily involve restricting the actions of these corporations or mandating that they take certain 
actions. This means that many of the interventions that are discussed in this thesis potentially 
infringe the fundamental rights of corporations. In order to ensure that effective addiction 
interventions that do make it onto the policymaking agenda are actually implemented, they must be 
defended from the legal challenges advanced by the addiction industries must be devised.  
 
This section will argue that the two most important potential conflicts will be with the freedom of 
commercial speech and the freedom to carry out a business, both of which are enshrined in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. It will further argue that it is possible to justify restrictions of the 
rights of corporations as proportionate to the pursuit of public health objectives. 
 
A. How can intervention be balanced with commercial speech rights? 
Many interventions adopted to weaken the addictiogenic environment will be directed specifically at 
restricting the ability of industry operators to manipulate the information environment surrounding 
potential objects of addiction. These will take the form of advertising restrictions, disclosure 
requirements, restrictions on sponsorship and product placement, restrictions on the release of 
Internet content, and other related interventions. These interventions all come into conflict with the 
established rights of commercial operators to freedom of speech, and as such are likely to attract 
legal challenge.  
 
Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU)939 – legally binding as of 2009 – the right to 
freedom of expression is protected by Article 11, which states that ‘everyone has the right to 
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freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.940 
According to Article 52(3) of the Charter, if Charter rights ‘correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ – the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – then ‘the meaning and scope’ of the Charter rights ‘shall be 
the same as those laid down by the said Convention’. 
 
Article 10 ECHR corresponds to Article 11 CFREU. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
interpreted Article 10 ECHR to include the right of commercial free speech. For example, in Markt 
Intern the ECtHR held that commercial expression ‘cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 10 
… which does not apply solely to certain types of information or ideas or forms of expression’.941 
More specifically in Casado Coca, the ECtHR stated that ‘Article 10 guarantees freedom of 
expression to “everyone”. No distinction is made in it according to whether the type of aim pursued 
is profit-making or not’.942 They went on to state that Article 10 ‘included the freedom to impart 
information and its corollary, the right to receive it’,943 and that ‘for the citizen, advertising is a 
means of discovering the characteristics of services and goods offered to him’.944 Commercial 
advertising therefore clearly falls within the scope of Article 10 ECHR as the ‘paradigmatic case of 
commercial expression’.945  
 
As a result of this body of case law, EU law – and specifically Article 11 of the Charter - must be 
understood to protect the freedom of commercial operators to advertise or otherwise market their 
products. As such, numerous objections have been made against EU laws that seek to restrict the 
marketing activities of commercial operators in pursuit of the objective of public health protection. 
For example, in Imperial Tobacco, tobacco producers applied for judicial review of the UK’s intention 
to give effect to the provisions of the Tobacco Advertising Directive, and argued that commercial 
speech is protected by EU, and improvement of the internal market is not a permissible ground upon 
which to restrict speech relating to lawfully marketable products.946 In Neptune Distribution, the 
manufacturers of sparkling water argued that obliging them to remove packaging claims relating to 
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salt content interfered with their freedom of expression.947 Finally, in Tobacco Advertising 2, it was 
argued that bans on cross-border tobacco advertising would be likely to hamper the activities of the 
press, and thus prejudice the enjoyment of freedom of expression.948  
 
Despite these objections, ECHR and EU jurisprudence plainly recognise that the freedom of 
expression is not absolute. Article 10(2) ECHR states that freedom of expression ‘may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society … for the protection for health or morals’. The case law of the ECtHR confirms 
that restrictions may therefore be placed on commercial speech. In Casado Coca, it was stated that 
advertising:  
 
‘may sometimes be restricted, especially to prevent unfair competition and untruthful or 
misleading advertising. In some contexts, the public action of even objective, truthful 
advertisement might be restricted in order to ensure respect for the rights of others or 
owing to the special circumstances of particular business activities and professions’.949  
 
The margin of the discretion that the ECtHR affords to have further confirmed that a margin of 
discretion must be given to public authorities when they decide that a restriction of freedom 
expression for the above purposes is necessary, and that this margin may be broader where some 
types of expression are concerned. In the case of Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, the ECtHR confirmed 
that ‘the breadth of such a margin of appreciation varies depending on a number of factors, among 
which the type of speech at issue is of particular importance … States have a broad margin of 
appreciation in the regulation of speech in commercial matters or advertising’.950 Thus, it ‘would 
seem that restriction on commercial speech may be compatible with the Convention so long as a 
state reasonably views them as necessary … for example, a state’s restrictions on tobacco 
advertising, with the aim of the protection of health, are likely to be compatible with Article 10 
provided they are not disproportionate’.951  
 
This case law has been reflected in the CFREU, and in accordance with Article 52(3) CFREU has been 
followed by the CJEU in their interpretation of Article 11 CFREU. The CFREU acknowledges that 
limitations might be made on the freedoms it guarantees, but that these ‘must be provided for by 
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law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’,952 and furthermore that ‘[s]ubject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others’.953  
 
EU case law confirms that Article 11 CFREU may be restricted in a proportionate manner so that 
certain overriding imperatives may be realised, and that a margin of discretion is afforded to 
Member States in this process. The CJEU set out in Karner that: 
 
‘whilst the principle of freedom of expression is expressly recognised by Article 10 ECHR … 
freedom of expression is also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the 
public interests … that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.954  
 
The Court continued to state that: 
 
‘the discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the balance to be struck 
between freedom of expression and the above mentioned objectives varies for each of the 
goals justifying restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in 
question. When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public 
interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the member States have a certain 
amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and 
proportionality of the interference’.955 
 
These principles have been applied by the CJEU to instances of commercial expression, establishing 
that the right of commercial operators to market their products may – especially in view of the 
nature of commercial speech – be restricted in a proportionate manner when there is a pressing 
social need, such as protecting public health or upholding the right to health. In the case of Neptune 
Distribution the CJEU held that ‘the need to ensure that the consumer has the most accurate and 
transparent information possible concerning the characteristics of goods is closely related to the 
protection of human health and is a question of general interest … which may justify limitations on 
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the freedom of expression’.956 The CJEU furthermore held that if public health measures conflict 
with the freedom of expression, ‘the determination of the validity of the contested provisions must 
be carried out in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those 
various fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order, and striking a fair balance between 
them’.957  
 
Under the CJEU’s jurisprudence therefore, ‘the extent to which public authorities may restrict the 
marketing of harmful goods and services with a view to protecting public health very much rests on 
determining how competing interests should be balanced against each other’.958 However, it is also 
clear that ‘the Court has tended to grant an extremely broad margin of discretion to the EU 
legislature in determining how far it would restrict fundamental rights to ensure a high level of 
public health protection’.959 This has argue been due, as Alemanno and Garde point out, to the fact 
that ‘the Court has not substituted its assessment to that of the legislature’960 – they make the point 
that despite the consequence of this deference being the ‘failure to engage effectively with existing 
evidence demonstrating the proportionality’961 of lifestyle regulation measures, notably in Tobacco 
Advertising 2, from the perspective of balancing the fundamental rights of industry with the 
protection of public health, ‘the outcome … is nonetheless compelling’.962 
 
Thus, as with the question of balancing public health protection with internal market obligations, the 
question of the proportionality of measures is the fulcrum upon which the balancing of addiction 
interventions with commercial speech turns. The principle of proportionality ‘requires the means 
employed by a Community provision to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and not 
to go beyond what is necessary to achieve it’.963 The CJEU was called to rule directly on the 
proportionality of a lifestyle regulation that allegedly abridged commercial expression for the first 
time in Tobacco Advertising 2. As noted above, the response from the Court was disappointing. After 
reviewing the arguments, the Court simply notes that the Community legislature enjoys a wide 
discretion in this area, and that the legality of a ban on tobacco advertising ‘can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
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institutions are seeking to pursue’.964 A total of twelve paragraphs later,965 the court had concluded, 
that the tobacco advertising ban was within the limits of the legislature’s discretion, without having 
provided any substantive indication of why the measure was proportionate. Thus, the case left the 
question of the extent to which lifestyle interventions, including interventions that seek to control 
factors of the addictiogenic environment, rather unsatisfied.  
 
This may, however, have been rectified recently. In the judgement in Phillip Morris Brands,966 the 
proportionality of a particularly high profile tobacco control intervention, the revised Tobacco 
Products Directive adopted in 2014, was resoundingly supported by both Advocate General Kokott 
and the CJEU. The Opinion and Judgement gives a more satisfying account of why the balance 
between protecting public health and protecting commercial speech might be tipped in favour of 
protecting health.  
 
The Comments of Advocate General Kokott are illuminating. Phillip Morris brought an action in the 
English High Court seeking to prevent the implementation in the UK of the revised Tobacco Products 
Directive.967 In her Opinions, the Advocate General made it quite clear that ‘the protection of human 
health has considerably greater importance in the value system under EU law than such essentially 
economic interests [as commercial speech] … with the result that health protection may justify even 
substantial negative economic consequences for certain economic operators’.968 In light of the fact 
that ‘the dissemination of opinions and information which – as in this case – are intended to pursue 
solely business interests generally warrants less protection as a fundamental right than other 
expressions of opinion in the economic sphere’,969 the Advocate General advised the CJEU that 
restriction on tobacco marketing were not disproportionate to the public health objectives pursued, 
and that ‘the undertakings concerned must, in the interest of a high level of health protection, 
accept the limitation… of their opportunities to promote their products’970 and that ‘the essence of 
freedom of expression … is likewise not affected if commercial communications by undertakings 
which are intended solely to promote sales are restricted’.971  
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The CJEU responded positively to the Advocate General’s Opinion, and upheld the restriction upon 
the freedom of expression as proportionate. In particular, the CJEU this time engaged with the 
public health evidence base, and noted that ‘given that it is undisputed that tobacco consumption 
and exposure to tobacco smoke are causes of death, disease and disability’ legislation banning 
promotional or health claims on tobacco packaging ‘contributes to the achievement of [the public 
health] objective’.972 The Court went further, and noted that due to the requirements of Article 
168(1) TFEU and Article 35 CFREU to mainstream a high level of human health protection, there is a 
need ‘to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those various fundamental rights’.973 The 
Court, upon weighing the competing interests, concluded that ‘human health protection - in an area 
characterised … by the addictive effects of tobacco …outweighs the interests put forward by the 
claimants’974 on account of the fact that, as the Court insists plainly, ‘as is apparent from … Article 35 
of the Charter and Articles 9 TFEU, 114(3) TFEU and 168(1) TFEU, a high level of human health 
protection must be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the European Union’s 
policies and activities’.975 Thus, the Court suggests that public health interests, including the concern 
to prevent addiction, will outweigh commercial interests precisely because the EU is under a legal 
obligation to ensure a high level of health in its policy activities – an objective that, on the evidence, 
should be achieved with stringent tobacco control measures.  
 
This level of judicial support for public health interventions that seek to control the marketing of 
potential objects of addiction means that it is possible to overcome objections to an EU addiction 
strategy that are made on the basis of conflict with freedom of expression. As long as the 
interference are proportionate, European case law will support the implementation of strong 
addiction interventions that restrict the free speech rights of corporations in order to protect the 
public’s health. The next subsection discusses whether the same is true for interventions that 
restrict the right to carry out a business.  
 
B. How can intervention be balanced with rights to carry out a business? 
Any interventions within an addiction strategy that seek to reduce the ability of commercial 
operators to sell their products to the public, including but not restricted to marketing, may also 
infringe the rights of those operators to conduct a business. These interventions may take the form 
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of restrictions on the placement and character of retail outlets, age restrictions, licensing 
restrictions, prohibitions on promotional tactics, regulation of branding, and related measures.   
 
Under the CFREU, the freedom to conduct a business is protected by Article 16, which states that 
‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and 
practices is recognised’. There is no corresponding right to conduct a business under the ECHR, so 
therefore the content of the right has been determined solely through EU case law, as was made 
clear by the CJEU in Sokoll-Seebacher.976 
 
The freedom to conduct a business has been described as ‘one of the less traditional rights 
contained in the Charter’,977 which ‘introduces a concept crucial to modern society … about enabling 
individual aspirations to flourish, about encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation, and about 
social and economic development’.978  The freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 
16 CFREU is therefore inextricably linked to the objective of economic growth and recovery, and as 
such is an important freedom to protect.979 As Groussot and colleagues explain, ‘effective 
competition between businesses is a key principle for economic growth and stability. Therefore the 
freedom to operate a business or engage in enterprise without unnecessary state intervention in an 
almost universally acknowledged requirement’.980   
 
EU case law has established that the legal content of Article 16 ‘covers the freedom to exercise an 
economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free competition’.981 Moreover, 
Article 16 specifically covers ‘the freedom to choose with whom to do business, and the freedom to 
determine the price of a service’.982 This broad scope of application means that a large number of 
commercial activities undertaken by corporations that produce potential objects of addiction are 
potentially protected by Article 16 CFREU.  
 
However, although several types of activity might be protected, the interference with the activity 
made by the public health measures in question needs to be sufficiently intense in order to trigger 
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Article 16 CFREU. Advocate General Kokott indicated in relation to advertising that ‘it is more 
difficult for an operator to exercise its freedom to conduct a business if it is not permitted to 
advertise its products or may do so only to a limited degree’.983 From this we might infer that any 
measure that makes it more difficult for a producer commercial operators to engage in the 
commercial activities outlined above would conflict with the freedom to conduct a business. This 
appears to be confirmed by Neptune Distribution, where the Court held that where a measure 
simply makes commercial activities ‘subject to certain conditions’984 or ‘merely controls, in a very 
clearly defined area’985 a particular commercial activity, the ‘actual content’ of the freedom to 
conduct a business … is not affected’.986 Thus, for Article 16 CFREU to be triggered, the actual 
substance of the freedom has to be affected, in a way that makes exercise of that content more 
difficult.  
 
Several objections to public health measures have been raised by commercial operators on the basis 
that they restrict their freedom to conduct a business. For example in Deutchers Weintor, alcohol 
producers complained that restrictions preventing them from making certain health claims about 
their products in promotional literature prevented the exercise of the freedom to conduct a 
business.987 In Neptune Distribution the prohibition of health claims was also at issue, but this time 
the complaint of conflict with the freedom to conduct a business related to claims made on 
packaging. In the gambling field, gambling operators complained in Pfleger that making the 
operation of gambling machines subject to authorisation by the state was, in addition to being a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services under internal market law, also a violation of the 
freedom to conduct a business under the Charter.988 Finally, in the case of Sokoll-Seebacher, a 
pharmacist complained that strict rules controlling where and when new pharmacies might be 
opened based on the determination of necessity were contrary to her freedom to conduct a 
business.989  
 
However, in all of the above cases and many more, the CJEU has confirmed that, as with the 
freedom of expression, the freedom to conduct a business is not absolute. Public authorities may 
enact measures that restrict the freedom to conduct a business as long as these restrictions are 
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made in pursuit of the public interest, and are proportionate. Deutsches Weintor may be considered 
the seminal case in the CJEU’s approach to how the right to conduct a business might be restricted 
in pursuit of public health objectives. The CJEU established that the freedom to conduct a business 
‘is not an absolute right but must be considered in relation to its social function’,990 and furthermore 
that ‘restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those freedoms, provided that those 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interests pursued by the European Union and 
do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, 
impairing the very substance of those rights’.991  The CJEU furthermore established that where other 
important Charter freedoms are at stake – in this case the protection of health under Article 35 
CFREU – then the measures impugned ‘must be assessed in the light not only of the freedom to 
choose an occupation and the freedom to conduct a business, but also of the protection of 
health’.992  
 
The CJEU concluded that, in striking a fair balance between the protection of health and the right to 
conduct a business, the ‘risks of addiction and abuse’993 should make alcohol ‘subject to particularly 
strict regulation’.994 The Court held that ‘measures restricting the advertising of alcoholic beverages 
in order to combat alcohol abuse reflect public health concerns and that the protection of public 
health constitutes … an objective of general interest justifying … a restriction of a fundamental right’. 
In this instance, such regulation was ‘necessary to ensure compliance with the requirements that 
stem from Article 35 of the Charter’. 995 Thus it appears that ‘the grounds that can justify a member 
state’s limitation of the free movement of goods can also justify the EU legislator to limit human 
rights.996 In view of the Charter obligation, the CJEU felt moved to declare that restrictions on 
business pursuits were made ‘in one specific respect, compliance with those freedoms is 
nevertheless assured in the essential respects’,997 and that therefore the ‘the prohibition at issue 
does not in any way affect the actual substance of the freedom to choose an occupation or of the 
freedom to conduct a business’.998  
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While the judgement has been criticised for the weakness of its fundamental rights analysis,999 
Deutsches Weintor nonetheless offers promising authority that the freedom to conduct a business 
may be restricted, proportionately, in the legitimate pursuit of public health policy goals. This, 
potentially, should allow the EU legislature to ‘invoke rights-based arguments’1000 in order to control 
factors of the addictiogenic environment such as irresponsible marketing ‘far more strictly than they 
have done to date’.1001 This potential has arguably been borne out in the recent case of Pillbox 
38,1002 the third of three concurrent challenges in 2016 to the validity of the revised Tobacco 
Products Directive, and a further statement in favour of the primacy of health protection in the 
adoption of addiction interventions. After noting the right to conduct a business ‘does not constitute 
an unfettered prerogative’1003 – a slightly more confrontational wording perhaps suggesting a new 
hostility to industry use of fundamental rights to challenge EU legislation – the Court claimed that 
Article 16 CFREU ‘may thus be subject to a broad range of interventions … reflected in the way in 
which Article 52(1) of the Charter requires the principle of proportionality to be implemented’.1004 
Without much further analysis, the Court curtly concluded that the prohibition placed on the 
promotion of electronic cigarettes, ‘does not affect the essence of the freedom to conduct a 
business … neither that provision … no indeed any other… prevents economic operators from 
manufacturing and marketing electronic cigarettes in compliance with the conditions laid down’.1005 
While the Pillbox 38 case may be considered a slightly unsatisfactory follow up to Deutsches Weintor 
in terms of analytical quality,1006 it certainly shows the CJEU’s wiliness to reject the fundamental 
rights objections of the tobacco industry to effective interventions designed to control factors of the 
addictiogenic environment.1007 
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Review 305; R Perotti, ‘New Tobacco Products Directive: the CJEU says it is compatible with EU law’ (2016) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpw095. 
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The judgements in Deutches Weintor and Pillbox 38 could therefore be said to support the pursuit of 
addiction interventions that restrict the freedom to conduct a business. Considering the range of 
addiction measures that involve such a restriction– advertising restrictions, labelling restrictions, 
licensing rules, built environment control, and many more – this constitutes a welcome boost to the 
armoury of governments and public authorities for defending strong addiction interventions from 
the fundamental rights-based legal challenges brought by corporations.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show that it is possible to overcome practical challenges to the adoption 
and implementation at EU level in particular of strong legal interventions that seek to impose 
renewed control over the factors of the addictiogenic environment.  
 
The power of the addiction industries is not impossible to overcome, although it might seem that 
their influence upon policy represents a substantial barrier to bold action. For all the power that 
they hold, they lack the authority to shape the conditions in which populations will interact with 
their products. That authority remains with public authorities alone, and the building of a critical 
mass of belief in this fact will enable public authorities to take back control of the policy process that 
private interests are currently co-opting.1008 While this might sound beguilingly straightforward, the 
building of this critical mass will be tough.1009 Once accomplished though, it will begin an irreversible 
process of the de-legitimisation of addiction corporations as policy actors.1010 We have already seen 
this process beginning in the tobacco field – with concerted effort, it will spread to all others.  
 
Even with addiction industries de-legitimised as policy actors, the question of fundamental rights 
remains. It is not possible to de-legitimise the rights of businesses to free speech, even though we 
might decry what addiction corporations do with this speech. Instead, we must find legal arguments 
with which to rebut the arguments of the industry that free speech rights should prevail over the 
right of individuals to health, whenever a conflict between the two imperatives arises. This is not 
straightforward from a legal point of view. Through the careful interpretation of the EU Treaties, the 
ECHR and CFREU, and the principle of proportionality, with reference to the commitments of the EU 
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denormalisation as a tobacco control intervention: a review’ (2012) 21 Tobacco Control 162.  
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and its Member States at the international level to implement effective standards of public health 
protection,1011 it will be possible to secure the legal backing that innovative action in the addiction 
field will require. 
 
This chapter represents the conclusion of the argument that has been developed throughout this 
thesis. The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that addiction is a serious public health and 
social problem, that action in order to reduce preventable addictions is normatively justified, and 
that the EU in particular has the mandate and the powers to contribute to solving a problem that is 
in part inherently transnational in nature. However, neither EU Member States nor EU institutions 
have found a way of effectively addressing this problem, with the EU in particular being poor in 
discharging its duties to support the Member States at the supranational level of addiction 
policymaking. A renewed, strategic approach to addiction policy is therefore needed, with more 
intense and effective interventions that will target the most important factors of the addictiogenic 
environment. Strategic action must be well designed if it is to be effective, and it was argued that 
any addiction strategy should be designed upon the basis of policymaking principles that reflect the 
evidence of how the addictiogenic environment works. Several novel interventions could be 
envisaged within this framework, particularly at EU level. However, as this final chapter has 
highlighted, if policymakers in Europe are to embrace such interventions, then certain challenges will 
present themselves and will need to be overcome, not least those posed by the opposition of the 
addiction industries. With the analysis complete, the following concluding chapter will attempt to 
summarise the main lessons that can be drawn, and how these lessons might be acted upon in years 
to come.  
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CHAPTER NINE – CONCLUSION 
I. Initial Remarks 
This thesis has attempted to show that it is possible and necessary for the EU to take a far more 
active role in tackling the factors of the addictiogenic environment in Europe. The existence of right 
to health and stewardship obligations means that ineffective control of environmental factors that 
promote, encourage and facilitate high levels of addiction in Europe cannot be accepted, especially 
given the level of evidence that now supports courses of actions that would be effective in 
controlling these factors. Member States employ highly diverse approaches to addiction policy that 
often conflict with their obligations under the EU treaties, and the EU has not been effective in 
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brokering supranational coordination of responses to transnational addictiogenic environment 
factors. A new approach level is needed – on the one hand to encourage the sharing of well-
conceived addiction governance ideas between Member States, and on the other to provide a 
focussed framework within which the EU can concentrate on adding value to addiction policy where 
it should be adding value, through the exercise of its public health, social and internal market 
competences.  
 
The major insights gained from the analysis conducted in this thesis on the control of the 
addictiogenic environment are summarised below, along with some reflections upon how this 
knowledge might be acted upon in future years. 
II. Effective addiction policy is not extensively practiced  
The first clear point that the analysis in this thesis reveals is that good addiction policy based on 
available evidence – that is to say, policy that embraces the principles of holisticism, horizontality 
and action on multiple levels – is not extensively practised either within Member States or at EU 
level. Of course, in the decades that addiction has been a policy issues for Member States, some 
have put in place strategic approaches to addiction policy that are evidentially and theoretically 
likely to produce effective results. However, as has been pointed out repeatedly in the analysis, 
addiction is a particularly intractable problem, and therefore an approach that is anything less than 
fully coherent and fully evidence based will be highly unlikely to reduce the prevalence of 
preventable addictions to the fullest possible extent. No Member State has yet implemented an 
addiction strategy that manages to reflect the three key principles of holisticism, horizontality and 
multilevel governance.  
 
In order to work towards holistic, horizontal and multilevel addiction governance, a certain critical 
mass of political willpower is needed. Building such critical mass will in all probability be difficult and 
slow, however prior experience in public health advocacy, most notably in the tobacco field, shows 
that it is not impossible. In reality, a lack of political understanding of the available evidence, and a 
lack of vision of how it can be acted upon are responsible for the absence of a critical mass of 
political willpower to act on addiction.1012 This thesis has shown that it is possible to embraces all 
three principle of good addiction governance, even within the constraints of limited resources, 
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 See the remarks of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: 'Remarks to General Assembly Meeting on the 
Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Disease' (2011) 1(1) The Global Journal of Health and Physical 
Education Pedagogy 72, 73. 
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through the careful design of an evidentially and theoretically supported strategic approach to 
tackling the factors of the addictiogenic environment. Therefore, a lack of momentum at the political 
level should really be seen as stemming from a lack of vision, rather than from the impossibility of 
action.  
 
Given this, the absence of holistic, horizontal and multilevel addiction policy may be seen as a failure 
by governments to uphold right to health and stewardship duties. These duties require that 
governments do all that they can within the limits of their resources in order to tackle the 
addictiogenic environment. This is reinforced by the international commitment of states to step up 
actions in the fight against NCDs. The apparent lack of vision of Member State and EU policymakers 
in identifying the most important environmental factors that impact upon the development of 
addictions, and in attempting to identify which combination of legal interventions are most likely to 
be effective in changing these environmental conditions, does not meet the level of effort required 
by the ethical principles that legitimise the transfer of governmental authority in the public health 
and social fields in the first place.  
 
In order to start building political awareness of how the addictiogenic environment works and what 
the most effective responses to it are, more detailed attention needs to be paid to the concept of 
the addictiogenic environment. Whatever name is given to the group of environmental factors that 
combine to increase the risk of individuals developing addictions, a deeper evidence base that is 
more explicitly concerned with the interaction between this group of factors and how they influence 
the development of addictions should be built. Further research should also be conducted to 
evaluate the potential impact of holistic, horizontal and multilevel design in addiction policy. The 
evidence currently available to policymakers is spread across multiple different fields of scientific 
and legal research, and often the links to addiction that exist between different research projects 
are not made, making it difficult for policymakers to connect the pieces of the puzzle. A unified 
evidence base is necessary, one from which policymakers can easily draw lessons on the nature of 
the addictiogenic environment and the combination of policy options that are most likely to 
constitute justified and effective control of that environment.  
 
Efforts to do this are already being made – primarily in the form of the ALICE RAP project, which 
brought together a large of addiction scientists and policy experts over a five year period to build a 
more comprehensive evidence base on addiction. This project has built a highly comprehensive 
evidence base of the socio-economic and scientific determinants of addiction, the prevalence of 
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addiction and corporate influence in addiction policy, amongst other things, and should be 
welcomed.1013 However, the ALICE RAP project was notably light on the legal aspects of addiction 
governance, and how policymakers can justify the adoption of renewed, stronger and more 
coherent forms of action that are supported by evidence. This is an area that must receive further 
research attention, if the specific evidence based starting to accumulate on the addictiogenic 
environment is to be accessible to policymakers, and can provide answers on how exactly they are 
to translate addiction science into addiction law and policy.  
III. The EU has supranational addiction governance responsibilities 
The second point that can be drawn from this thesis is that the EU has its own distinct 
responsibilities for addiction policy, in addition to those borne by its Member States. By conferring 
public health and social competences upon the EU, the Member States have entrusted the EU with 
the power to pursue at transnational level the principles embodied in the right to health, that is to 
say to the provision of conditions that will allow individuals to pursue their highest level of physical 
and mental health. By virtue of Article 168 TFEU, a high level of health is ensured in all EU policies 
and activities, and by virtue of Articles 9 TFEU and 151 TFEU the EU required to take into account the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion and fundamental social 
rights. The EU is legally obliged under the Treaties to discharge a certain level of responsibility for 
health and social protection, which, considering the importance that has been attached at global 
level to the prevention of NCDs, must be taken to include all factors that contribute to the NCD 
burden, including the prevalence of addiction.  
 
The EU also arguably holds stewardship responsibilities in the public health and social protection 
fields. In delegating sovereignty to the EU, the Member States have entrusted the EU with the 
authority and powers to ensure certain objectives of transnational cooperation that the Member 
States cannot achieve individually. Just as national governments owe stewardship duties to their 
populations, the EU – as a supranational organisation to which power has been delegated – owes 
stewardship duties to its Member States. The EU has so far failed to discharge its stewardship 
responsibilities in the field of addiction prevention. It does very little to tackle transnational 
elements of the addictiogenic environment, and sometimes even prevents Member States from 
discharging their own addiction governance responsibilities.  
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 One can review the lines of research pursued by the ALICE RAP project, together with summaries of the 
deliverables produced by these lines of research, at: http://www.alicerap.eu/about-alice-rap/areas-a-
workpackages.html (last accessed 3 August 2016).   
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These circumstances are, again, connected to the absence of political vision. In seeking to encourage 
EU policymakers to recognise their duties in relation to transnational public health and social 
problems, it will be necessary to address the perception of the EU’s competence gap in public health 
and social matters. As the analysis of EU competence demonstrated, the gap between the EU’s 
ambitions and its competences in NCD prevention can be bridged by the use of Article 114 TFEU. In 
situations where the EU could add value by creating harmonised standards of protection, this option 
has proved useful (as the analysis made clear, one must remember that this is not always where EU 
added value lies). However, if Articles 114 TFEU, 168 TFEU and 153 TFEU are to be used to their full 
potential, it will be necessary to address how the addiction competence gap is perceived.  
 
The power to bridge the competence gap is available, and has indeed been used on isolated 
occasions in tobacco control. Greater advocacy is needed to encourage the Commission in particular 
to reconsider its currently stubborn refusal to apply EU competences to other addiction issues.1014 
This advocacy must focus on explaining how and why EU policymakers should use the full potential 
of the EU’s public health and social competences in order to discharge the duties owed to Member 
States, and indeed EU citizens. In particular, advocacy should highlight the link between 
transnational factors of the addictiogenic environment and how the subsidiarity principle can ‘cut 
both ways’1015 in supporting the necessity of EU action in the field of addiction, rather than 
dismissing it.  
 
IV. The EU can better use its competences to support the Member 
States 
The third point that the analysis in this thesis has attempted to show is that it would be challenging 
yet legally possible for the EU to make more extensive and more effective use of its available 
competences to support the Member States in implementing holistic, horizontal and multilevel 
addiction prevention policies, and to create harmonised standards that will resolve conflicts 
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Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), 49. 
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between the obligations of the Member States to ensure the free movement of goods and their 
obligations to step up actions in the fight against NCDs.   
 
As noted above, the EU’s specific competences in public health and social protection are more 
powerful than EU policymakers want to acknowledge. However, even if national and European 
policymakers could be motivated to use these competences more often, the likelihood that they 
would be used to their greatest potential in contributing to holistic, horizontal and multilevel 
addiction governance is uncertain. Thus far, the only instance of Article 168 being relied upon in any 
addiction prevention context, the EU Alcohol Strategy, resulted in a highly ineffectual piece of policy, 
where Article 168 was relied on more as an excuse not to take strong action than as a tool of public 
health protection.1016 The Commission clearly has the political mandate to go further in using 
competences such as Article 168 and 153 TFEU to support the addiction prevention activities of the 
Member States, but must take steps to reexamine the potential embodied in these complementary 
and coordinating competences if it is to most effectively act on this mandate.  
 
Not only has the Commission not made full use of its supporting competences, it has also somewhat 
neglected the power of its competence to enact harmonised standards to improve the functioning of 
the internal market. This thesis has attempted to show that one of the ways in which the Member 
States would be best supported is through the removal of situations where their internal market 
obligations could conflict with their public health obligations and prevent the implementation of 
effective yet trade-restrictive addiction policies. It was shown that Article 114 TFEU is a powerful 
tool for ensuring that Member State’s conflicting obligations on trade and public health do not 
prevent evidentially effective interventions from being employed in order to save lives. However, at 
present the EU has not used Article 114 TFEU to any great extent to support addiction prevention or 
NCD prevention efforts – aside from two directives in the tobacco control field, the potential of 
Article 114 TFEU as a tool of public health protection has gone unrealised.  
 
In order to help European policymakers unlock the potential of the internal market, public health 
and social protection competences, greater advocacy by those with expertise in the use of EU 
competence in NCD prevention is needed in order to demonstrate how it is possible to maximise the 
powers conferred upon the EU by Articles 114 TFEU, 168 TFEU and 153 TFEU. Even if the critical 
mass of political willpower that is necessary for action on the addictiogenic environment is built, 
policymakers may not know the extent of the action that could be achieved. Thus, awareness of how 
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EU competences could most effectively contribute to holistic, horizontal and multilevel addiction 
governance must be raised among EU policymakers and other concerned stakeholders, including 
awareness of how the use of these competences might be defended in the face of opposition.   
 
V. A major obstacle to addiction policy is corporate power and 
influence 
The final point that can be drawn from the analysis in this thesis is that corporate influence is a 
major obstacle to effective control of the addictiogenic environment of addictions. Corporations that 
produce objects of addiction not only try to increase the appeal of their products in order to drive up 
their consumption, they actively work against policymakers in a number of overt and covert ways in 
order to prevent the adoption of policies that would decrease consumption of their products or 
prevent them from promoting them.  
 
Addiction industries will naturally lobby policymakers in attempts to influence policy when their 
commercial interests are threatened - this is simply a limb of their commercial strategy, a logical and 
legal extension of the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders that should be anticipated by 
policymakers.1017 Unfortunately, the reality is that the intention behind much industry activity is not 
seen clearly by the policymakers. This means that addiction industries, in particular the alcohol, 
unhealthy food, and gambling industries, are still often treated as trusted partners, when the only 
quality of their engagement in policymaking that one can trust is that they will act in their own 
interests.    
 
Since the number of corporate factors of the addictiogenic environment is high, there are therefore 
plenty of reasons for addiction industries to seek to preserve profits. The influence of corporations 
has on multiple occasions prevented the building of critical mass of political willpower to act on 
addiction issues, or has prevented or weakened the adoption of strong and innovative policies. This 
is unsurprising, given that companies that produce objects of addiction are one of the few industry 
groups that spend over a million Euros per year on EU level lobbying in order to influence the 
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direction of policy.1018 Thus addiction problems push back ferociously against the efforts of 
policymakers to solve them, and require special attention if renewed efforts at effective addiction 
policy are to be effective. 
 
Addressing the role of addiction industries in addiction policy is therefore a major challenge. In 
particular, addressing the perception of the industry’s contribution to policymaking must be a high 
priority. In order to counter the power that the addiction industries have amassed, further work 
must be conducted to reveal the extent to which all addiction industries, not just the tobacco 
industry, operate to their own lobbying playbooks. This will help policymakers to identify when 
conflicts of interest might occur, and to deal with them appropriately.  
 
The emphasis should be placed on dealing appropriately with situations in which conflicts of interest 
might occur, rather than ignoring altogether the contribution that might be extracted from industry 
actors in addiction governance. Corporations are complex entities, comprised of several elements, 
some of which have a genuine interest in health and well-being, some of which are interested in 
creating sustainable futures for their organisations while paying lip-service to health and well-being, 
and some which seek to deny entirely the impact of their organisations on health and wellbeing. This 
means that corporations may at times be able to offer useful perspective and advice to policymaking 
efforts, so long as conflicts of interests are avoided.1019 In any event, since corporations produce the 
objects that addiction policy are concerned with, and possess fundamental rights to corporate 
speech and to conduct business, they cannot simply be shut out of the policymaking process. An 
interesting future for addiction governance might therefore involve research into how corporate 
forms might be altered to liberate the genuinely health-conscious elements of corporations from the 
fiduciary duties binding corporations to the pursuit of increased consumption and increased profit, 
and into how addiction industries might be incentivised to adopt such altered corporate forms.1020 
This may permit the limited yet productive engagement of corporate representatives in the 
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policymaking process, at a reduced risk of these representatives bringing conflicted interests to the 
policymaking table.  
VI. Final remarks 
This thesis has made the case that addiction policy is weaker throughout Europe due to the EU’s lack 
of engagement, and that renewed and more intense action at EU level would better support the 
current activities of the Member States and discharge the duties that are incumbent upon the EU to 
address transnational threats to public health on behalf of the Member States. Some stakeholders 
have been fighting for increased action on addiction issues for some time, some are indifferent to 
such action, and some actively resist further action on addiction. If Member States are to control the 
factors of the addictiogenic environment more effectively, in order to step up action on addiction 
and NCD prevention, then building consensus between these disparate outlooks is essential. The EU 
could and should contribute to this process. 
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